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Abstract
Title: “Execution:

A Catalytic Capability in Firm

Performance”
Author: Robert Frank Keimer
Advisor: Scott Benjamin, Ph. D.

This qualitative study explores the nature of business
execution.

Specifically, it seeks to understand the

nature of a firm’s capability to execute, how and why
some firms execute better than others, and the impact
that this capability may have on firm performance and
outcomes.

A review of the organizational routine,

organizational capability, and dynamic capabilities
literature reveals a gap where no theory, model, or
framework of analysis can be found for the concept of
execution.

The author proposes a novel definition of

execution as a “catalytic capability”; that is, a
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stored behavioral capability comprised of repetitive,
recurrent actions, shaping principles, and guiding
discipline that energizes and effectuates
organizational behavior.

This qualitative, grounded

theory multicase study seeks to discover, identify, and
explain these actions, principles, and discipline that
may be at work in the firms selected for this study.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview
Today’s global business environment is one of
rapid change (Teece, 2009), hyper competition (D’Aveni,
1994), and continual innovation and disruption
(Christensen, 1997; Schumpeter, 1942).

In such an

environment, achieving superior performance and a
competitive advantage for several quarters can be
considered a major accomplishment.

Maintaining such

success for several years seems like a herculean
challenge, and the thought of retaining such a position
for decades seems incomprehensible.

Yet there are

examples of enduring, long-lived companies that have
been able to successfully transform and adapt in the
face of a constantly changing, hyper-competitive
business environment (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).
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How do they do it?

How and why are some

organizations able to deliver superior performance and
results year after year?

The work on dynamic

capability theory by strategy scholar David Teece is
helpful in finding the answers to these questions.
Dynamic capabilities are a firm’s ability to sense new
opportunities, seize those opportunities, and transform
the organization’s resources in support of those
sensing and seizing activities and in response to an
ever-changing environment (Teece, 2012).

Developing

dynamic capabilities is very much about selecting the
right things to do and getting them done (Leih & Teece,
2013).
This study focuses on that second element of
dynamic capability development; that is, an
organization’s activities related to “getting things
done”.

Specifically, this study explores the

phenomenon of business execution.

I seek to discover

and explain the nature of the capability of execution,
and to address and answer the question as to how and
why some organizations consistently execute better than
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their competitors.

I define “execution” as a

“catalytic capability”; that is, a stored behavioral
capability comprised of repetitive, recurrent actions,
shaping principles, and a guiding discipline that
energizes and effectuates organizational behavior.
Execution is the organizational capability that makes
all other capabilities possible; it is the capability
behind the concrete activities of “getting things
done”.
The starting point for this inquiry into the
nature of business execution is a literature review of
three major disciplines:

organizational routines,

within organizational theory, and organizational and
dynamic capabilities, within strategic management
theory.

Routines and capabilities are well recognized

as major determinants of how organizations get work
done (Nelson & Winter, 1982), and how they achieve
performance objectives (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2001).
As the literature review will demonstrate,
organizational theory tends to focus more on a microlevel, organizational behavior analysis, and
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organizational and dynamic capability theories tend to
focus more on a macro-level strategic management
analysis.

The concept of execution straddles all of

these disciplines.

The exciting opportunity for this

study is the fact that these theories fail to provide a
comprehensive, systematic analysis of the concept of
execution.

Execution has primarily an implied and

assumed presence.

There is a gap in this routine and

capabilities literature; a theory, model, or framework
of analysis cannot be found to explain the nature of
execution.

Figure 1 provides a high-level

representation of the current state of the literature:
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Figure 1:

Literature Gap

My critical review of the literature will provide
numerous examples of indirect references and the
assumed presence of execution in the organizational
routine and capabilities literature.
My study focuses on execution and its catalytic
effect on performance.

I identify several “drivers” of

execution, and I examine key elements, i.e. actions and
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principles, comprising these drivers.

By way of the

literature review and field research, I explore these
key elements, gaining new knowledge and understanding
of the concept.
In support of this effort to explore and explain
the nature of execution, I conducted a qualitative,
grounded theory case study of two companies:

Maxcorp

Distribution Inc. (MAX), a publicly traded distribution
company, and Development Systems Corporation (DSC), a
professional services firm.

The names of both

companies have been changed to assure their anonymity.
These two companies represent an ideal context to study
execution.

Several significant differences exist

between the two companies that are detailed in chapter
four.

Despite their differences, common findings

emerged which helps build a case that these shared
findings may be generalizable to other companies and
contexts.
MAX maintains an entrepreneurial culture and
decentralized structure where each branch operates as
an independent profit center.

Each branch manager and
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his or her team have the freedom and pressure to
determine, pursue, and implement the activities and
practices that best meet their performance objectives.
MAX’s corporate success and its decentralized branch
structure provide an exciting environment to compare
and contrast branch location performances, and to
search for and to identify specific branch level
activities that may contribute to successful execution.
DSC is a professional services firm with a long,
successful history in the field of international
development.

The DSC business structure consists of

nine practice areas ranging from governance and
accountability to peace and stability to public sector
management.

DSC clients consist primarily of U.S.

government agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign
governments.

What makes DSC an interesting and

potentially valuable source of data relative to this
study of execution are the challenges DSC faces in
operating around the world, and its reliance on a mix
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of DSC staff, sub-contractors, and NGO partnerships to
complete major development projects.
The specific participants in this study included
nine employees from DSC and nine employees from MAX.

I

employed a multicase study in order to obtain context
rich data from these two organizations, which enabled
me to perform an in-depth analysis of how these
organizations execute.

The addition of a grounded

theory analysis complemented the case studies and
proved valuable due to the grounded theory focus on
process and actions that have distinct steps over time.
Grounded theory also attempts to develop a theory or
provide a framework of analysis to explain that process
and those actions based upon participant observations
(Creswell, 2013).

This is important and beneficial for

this study because, as I demonstrate in the literature
review, there is no theory or framework of analysis to
explain execution.

The discoveries and knowledge

generated by this inquiry provides insight into the
presence and impact that execution has on
organizational performance.
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This chapter begins with a presentation of the
background and the rationale for this study.

This

section will be followed by the statement of the
problem, the purpose of the study and the accompanying
list of research questions.

Subsequent sections will

include a definition of terms, the significance of the
study and conclude with an overview of the organization
of the remainder of the study.

Background and Rationale
Execution is a phenomenon of great concern to
business practitioners.

Companies today operate in a

rapidly changing global business environment.

They are

faced with the normal day-to-day operational
challenges, as well as the need to transform their
businesses in response to competitive threats and
potential disruptors of markets and industries
(Christensen, 1997; Teece, 2009).

Witness examples

such as Netflix, Amazon, and UPS.

Netflix was founded

as a subscription service that delivered DVDs through
the mail; today it is a streaming video provider and an
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original studio producing shows and movies (“Streaming
on Screens”, 2016).

Amazon, which began as an online

bookseller, now operates across numerous industries
that include such businesses as Amazon Web Services
(AWS), Amazon Fresh grocery delivery, and a recently
announced intention to open Amazon Go grocery stores
(Kim, 2016).

A final example, UPS, which historically

has been known as a premiere package delivery business,
recently announced the launch of its own 3-D printingmanufacturing network (UPS, 2016).

If asked to

describe these companies ten years ago, few would have
imagined Netflix as a movie studio, Amazon as a grocery
store chain, and UPS as a 3-D manufacturer.

These

companies have evolved and transformed their
businesses.

They seem to validate Teece’s (2012)

dynamic capability theory by successfully sensing,
seizing, and transforming their organizations to pursue
and exploit new opportunities, and adapt to a highly
competitive, rapidly changing environment.
While Netflix, Amazon, and UPS are currently
succeeding in this rapidly changing environment, many
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firms struggle to adapt.

Though much research has been

done on innovative thinking and strategic change, not
much research has been done on how to implement and
execute these ideas.

Studies confirm the challenges

and struggles of firms to adapt.

A McKinsey report

showed that average life expectancy of firms on the S&P
500 was ninety years in 1935, and in 2005 the average
expectancy was down to just fifteen years (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008).

Other research shows that over the

last fifty years the percentage of public firms that
reached the top quartile of profitability in any given
year and then remained in that quartile the following
year has declined from twenty-two percent to fourteen
percent (Teece, 2016).

The current reality is that

firms are hard pressed to maintain a competitive
position over the long term.

They must plan, execute,

and operate in an environment beset by constant
disruption and innovation.
Several factors impact a firm’s ability to succeed
in such an environment.

Success requires that

management develop and pursue the right strategy and
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make good choices regarding what should be done to
implement the strategy; that is, deciding and choosing
what activities should be executed in support of the
strategy (Teece, 2014a, 2016).

Adaptation and

transformation also create the need for a constantly
changing mix of resources and capabilities (Helfat,
2007).

Constant disruption and innovation require

firms to develop dynamic capabilities:

to sense

changes and identify new opportunities in the
marketplace; to mobilize and seize those opportunities
to their advantage; and to continuously renew and
reconfigure their resources and capabilities in
anticipation and in response to the changing
environment (Teece, 2012).
While a significant body of research has
documented resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984),
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), dynamic
capabilities (Teece, 2012), and good strategy and
strong entrepreneurial management (Teece, 2016) as
critical variables to organizational performance, they
are not sufficient to explain all performance and
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outcomes.

Management can craft the right strategy,

develop the appropriate resources, and build the
necessary capabilities to support the strategy, but
without a capability to execute those critical
variables they simply possess a set of good intentions.
The capability of execution involves the hard work of
identifying and enacting the concrete actions, shaping
principles, and guiding discipline that energize and
effectuate resource development, capability creation,
and strategy implementation.
The capability to execute is vital in the
practitioner world.

Executives have identified and

they understand the ability to get things done is
critical for such adaptation and transformation.
Executional excellence was cited as the number one
challenge for business leaders in a survey of 400
global CEOs (Sull, Homkes, & Sull, 2015).

That same

survey revealed that roughly three quarters of
organizations struggle to implement their strategies.
Another survey of 500 executives found that 42% of
those executives were “significantly concerned”
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regarding strategy execution, and 55% of those
executives revealed that their organizations were not
focused on execution (PwC, 2014).
In addition to such surveys, writings in the
business press over the last fifteen years also reflect
this practitioner concern with execution.

An

increasing number of articles such as, “The Execution
Trap” (Martin, 2010), “The Secrets to Successful
Strategy Execution” (Nelson, Martin, & Powers, 2008),
and books such as, “Making Strategy Work” (Hrebiniak,
2013), “Playing to Win” (Lafley & Martin, 2013),
“Execution:

The Discipline of Getting Things Done”

(Bossidy & Charan, 2002), and “Purpose Meets Execution”
(Efron, 2017) have been published that identify
execution as the critical, practical issue for
organizations seeking to achieve their strategies,
goals, and objectives.
While an acknowledged critical issue for business
practitioners, execution has proven to be an elusive
concept in business scholarship.

Strategic management

and organizational theory provide valuable insights and
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evidence to explain the nature and operation of firms.
The literature provides a long, rich history that shows
how resources (Barney, 1991), organizational
capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), and
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982)
contribute to and explain organizational behavior and
firm performance.

There is, however, a gap in this

literature relative to the concept of execution.

The

concept of execution does indeed have a presence in the
literature, but that presence is either characterized
by cursory references or it is largely implicit and
assumed, and rarely is it explicitly identified and
addressed.

Strategic management and organizational

theory fail to explore and explain the specific
activities, practices, and principles that constitute a
firm’s capability for execution.
Cursory or indirect references to the concept of
execution are numerous throughout the literature on
strategic management.

Some of the most influential

strategic management scholars have indirectly
identified execution in their writings.

Wernerfelt
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(1984) cites a need for structure and systems to
execute firm strategies.

In proposing his inter-

locking system of activities and arguing that
organizational structures, systems, and processes need
to be strategy specific, Porter (1996) assumes an
ability to execute as the underlying foundation.

An

ability to execute relative to dynamic capabilities is
assumed in much of David Teece’s early work (Teece,
Pisano, & Schuen, 1997), and then explicitly referenced
in much of his later work (Teece, 2009; Teece, 2016;
Teece, 2017; Teece, 2018).

In one such example Teece

(2009) argues that management must “make the decisions
and institute the disciplines to execute on the
opportunity” (p. 60). Finally, Ghemewat (2002)
specifically acknowledges the importance of execution
to understanding strategy.
Recently, the work of a growing number of strategy
scholars points to the need and importance to further
explore the concept of execution.

Several scholars

have identified operational level strategy
implementation and capability assembly as under-
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researched and unexplored (Alhilou, 2015; Li, Guohi, &
Eppler, 2008).

In fact, a new stream of strategy

research is gaining prominence with execution as a
critical focus.

The Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) field

of research examines “strategy as doing” and focuses on
the key variables of practitioners, practices, and
praxis to provide valuable insights into strategic
management (Chia & McKay, 2007; Jarzabowski, Balogu, &
Seidl, 2007; and Jarzabowski & Spee, 2009).
Confirmation of this historical gap in the strategy
literature relative to execution is evidenced by the
rapid growth of S-as-P.

There is a Strategy-as-

Practice International Network that includes more than
3,000 scholars and practitioners in over 150 countries
(SAP-IN, 2018).

There has been a call by some scholars

from this field to shift the strategy research agenda
away from the macro-level to the micro-level with a
focus on key processes and practices driven by
individuals, groups, and networks of people within
organizations (Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003).
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A similar implicit assumption regarding execution
can also be found in the organizational theory
literature, where execution plays an important role in
understanding the nature of organizational routines.
The notion of organizational routines gained prominence
with the seminal work by Nelson and Winter (1982) where
the authors, in proposing an evolutionary theory of
economic change, analyze and explain routines as a
firm’s way of doing things.

Throughout their analysis,

an ability to execute is assumed in the building and
enacting of those organizational routines.
The work of Nelson and Winter (1982) initiated a
voluminous stream of research where scholars continue
to engage in a robust debate regarding definitions,
characteristics, and empirical evidence of the nature
and role of organizational routines and their impact on
firm performance.

Many scholars working in this field

are seeking knowledge and answers by examining task
performance (Becker & Zirpoli, 2008), routine
performance (Feldman, 2000), and routines as specific
sequences of action (Pentland, Feldman, & Becker,
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2012).

Execution is never explicitly identified and

explored in this task and action level analysis of
organizational routines, but as the chapter two review
of the literature will demonstrate, its presence is
very much assumed.
Some recent scholarship, while failing to employ
the word “execution”, has acknowledged the concept as
an essential element of organizational routines and
organizational capabilities.

Eggers and Kaplan (2013)

argue that what an organization “can do” is part of
capability assembly.

They also maintain that research

on deliberate managerial action in relation to the
creation of routines is under developed.

Helfat and

Peteraf (2015) share this view by arguing for the need
to examine middle manager execution efforts and the
underlying routines that may involve managerial input.
Other scholars argue for the need of further study into
the microfoundations (Salvato & Rerup, 2011), as well
as the interconnectedness of routines and capabilities
(Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).
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Statement of the Problem
An ability to execute is well recognized by
practitioners as a critical issue in organizational
performance and for continued viability and success.
Strategic management theory has long implied execution
as underlying strategy implementation and capability
development.

Organizational theory has long assumed

the presence and important role of execution in
organizational routines.

Despite an influential, real

world presence and an acknowledgement by scholars in
major disciplines, execution remains largely unexplored
within strategic management and organizational theory,
such that there is no academic theory, model, or
framework of analysis to adequately explain the concept
of execution.
This failure to explore the concept of execution
may be due to several reasons.

One reason may be the

multi-disciplinary nature of execution.

It can be

found in the macro-level analysis of strategic
management theory, as well as the micro-level analysis
of organizational behavior in organizational theory,
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specifically, in organizational routine theory.
Execution maintains a presence and influence in both
disciplines, and both disciplines assume its existence.
Some scholars note that strategic management
theory has primarily engaged in macro level analysis
(Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003).

Others point

out the hesitancy and reluctance of scholars to pursue
the necessary, granular level analysis of strategy
execution (Harreld, O’Reilly, & Tushman, 2007).

Still

other scholars argue that the only way to achieve a
better understanding of how firms operate and how they
get things done, is to examine specific actions, by
specific individuals, in a specific context (Feldman &
Orlikowski, 2011), and to conduct more and better
qualitative studies (Salvato & Rerup, 2011).
A thorough exploration of the concept of execution
is needed, and I submit that execution may be an
unidentified, catalytic capability important to both
strategic management and organizational routine
theories.

This “catalytic capability” may be a unique

set of firm characteristics that have not been
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previously identified and combined.

Through the

literature review and the field study, I discover and
identify the specific actions and shaping principles
that constitute this capability.

This execution as a

catalytic capability proves to be a valuable framework
of analysis for explaining how firms “get things done”
and the impact on organizational performance and
outcomes.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory,
multicase study is to explore and understand how
employees at DSC and MAX execute the daily operations
of their businesses in an effort to achieve their
desired organizational performance and outcomes. By
studying their day-to-day operations, I discover and
examine the activities that contribute to each
organization’s capability to execute.

These

discoveries reveal several “drivers” of execution, an
aggregation of specific actions and principles that
have a dramatic impact on each organization’s overall
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ability to get things done.

This qualitative study

also provides an opportunity to assess whether the
organizational routine and capability theories reviewed
are present and active in these firms, and also to
evaluate their potential impact as performance
indicators.

Questions that Guide the Research
A better understanding of how organizations
execute will help practitioners as they pursue a
sustainable competitive advantage in today’s rapidly
changing business environment.

This improved

understanding will also prove valuable to strategic
management and organizational theory scholars as they
seek evidence-based research to test and confirm their
theories regarding strategy implementation,
organizational capabilities, and organizational
routines.

To further investigate this lack of

knowledge regarding firm execution, I seek to answer
the following research questions:
1. What, exactly, is execution?

24

2. How can execution be measured?
3. How does the ability to execute impact
organizational performance?

Definition of Terms
There is a tremendous volume of literature and
much continued debate regarding the definitions of the
words and concepts that follow.

Where applicable I

cite the scholar with whom I agree relative to a
specific definition; detail, discussion and
justification for the choice will be found in the
literature review in chapter two.
Organizational Routines—stored behavioral
capabilities that, when utilized, involve multiple
actors and produce repetitive, recognizable patterns of
interdependent action. (A combination of Feldman &
Pentland, 2003, p. 96; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004, p.
290).
Organizational Capabilities—a firm’s ability to
perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing
organizational resources and competencies, for the
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purpose of achieving an intended outcome (Helfat &
Peteraf, 2003, p. 999).
Ordinary Capabilities—a firm’s ability to perform
administrative, operational and governance related
activities necessary to run and maintain the current
business.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and

best practices.

(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece,

2016).
Dynamic Capabilities—an ability to engage in
change related activities that enable a firm to
develop, build, and reconfigure internal and external
resources and competencies in response to rapidly
changing business environments.

(Teece, 2012).

Execution—is a catalytic capability; that is, a
stored behavioral capability comprised of repetitive,
recurrent actions, shaping principles, and guiding
discipline that energizes and effectuates
organizational behavior.
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Significance of the Study
Motivation for this study stems from my experience
in senior management and having had profit and loss
responsibility for multiple regional operations
comprised of numerous, independent business units.

As

part of several senior management teams, we engaged in
frequent review and continual analysis to determine how
and why some business units were able to achieve and
maintain ongoing superior performance.

We were in

search of the activities, practices, and principles
that made certain business units so successful in their
execution, with the intent of developing a template or
model that we could then apply to all locations
throughout the organization.

This study sheds light on

several drivers of execution and provides some valuable
operational insights to all managers charged with
meeting and exceeding performance objectives in today’s
rapidly changing environment.

This study will help

managers make more money; it will help them execute
better, meet and exceed their performance objectives,
and generate greater profit for their organizations.
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This study proves significant not only for
practitioners, but it also provides great value to
strategic management and organizational theory
scholars.

By engaging in an in-depth, activity and

practice level analysis of how organizations execute,
this study uncovers evidence of how execution as a
catalytic capability may impact organizational behavior
and firm performance.

For organizational theorists,

organization routines have been widely recognized as
playing a major role in how firms operate and how work
is accomplished.

This study provides an analysis of

the activities, practices and principles that go into
the execution of those routines.

It produces a

granular level analysis, a level of analysis that is
under developed relative to organizational routines
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).
This study also answers the call by a growing
number of scholars in both disciplines to examine
organizations at the micro-foundational and practice
levels.

The micro-foundational research approach

focuses on individual level factors and how those
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factors impact organizational capabilities (Barney &
Felin, 2013; Salvato, 2003; Winter, 2013).

Those

arguing for greater micro-foundational research share
an affinity with the Strategy-as-Practice scholars who
maintain the need to examine the micro-activities,
behaviors, and processes within organizations
(Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidle & Vaara (Eds.), 2015;
Johnson et al., 2003).

This study generates micro-

foundational or practice level data that contributes to
the strategic management and organizational theory body
of knowledge.
Finally, this study is important given the nature
of the problem and the challenge of the topic.

There

is no academic theory, model, or framework of analysis
of execution within strategic management or
organizational theory.

The concept of execution is

abstract; one that is difficult to describe and
operationalize.

It is hard to unpack and it may be

entirely context dependent.

But there is a compelling

need to better understand this concept because it
represents a nexus for the practitioner and academic
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worlds.

Knowing how and why some organizations,

business units, and/or departments execute better than
others will lead practitioners to better performance
and higher profits, and scholars to a better, more
granular understanding of organizational behavior and
effective management.

Organization of the Remainder of the Study
With the conclusion of this overview in chapter
one, I move into a review of literature in chapter two.
I examine the literature for organizational routines,
organizational capabilities, and dynamic capabilities.
It is critical to examine these streams of literature
due to the fact that:

1.

Execution is a concept that

shares elements from both organizational routine and
organizational capabilities perspectives, and 2. The
concept of execution is implicit in much of the
writings for these disciplines. At the conclusion of
chapter two, I propose and outline a novel concept of
execution as a catalytic capability.

Chapter three

details and describes the qualitative, grounded theory,
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case study methodologies that I employ for this study.
I present my data and findings in chapter four.

In

chapter five, I develop and explain my conclusions,
recommendations, and implications for research in the
areas of organizational capabilities and organizational
routines, and their practical applications to the firms
and industries studied.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Overview
Through this grounded theory case study, I seek to
discover the specific actions, shaping principles, and
guiding discipline that may constitute a “catalytic
capability” of execution.

My hope is that by

researching such a phenomenon, new knowledge and
insight may be gained as to how organizations get
things done relative to their overall performance and
results.
To carry out this study, it is necessary to
complete a critical review of the current literature.
I examine the literature related to organizational
routines, organizational capabilities, and dynamic
capabilities.

As this literature review will

demonstrate, these disciplines provide a valuable
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framework of analysis for explaining how organizations
accomplish work and achieve performance objectives.

Why Both Routines and Capabilities?
Compelling Arguments
There are several compelling reasons to search for
the concept of execution in both the organizational
routine and capabilities literature.

One

consideration, which has been confirmed by the
literature, is that an examination of both routines and
capabilities does much to explain what an organization
is able to do and how it is able to do it.

I believe

that these two issues, the “what” and the “how”, of
organizations getting things done are valuable focal
points for researching a concept of execution.
Another reason for selecting these disciplines for
critical review is in anticipation of some likely,
basic questions regarding the nature of execution:
“execution” a routine?

Is it a capability?

both, or, something entirely different?

Is

Is it

Responding to

and seeking to answer these questions necessitates a
review of both organizational routines and
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capabilities.

Despite my assumption and proposition

that execution is a catalytic capability, I remain open
to the insights found in the literature.

A close

examination of the relevant definitions and
characterizations found in the literature contributes
to a rigorous, thorough analysis of the concept of
execution.
As the literature demonstrates, the writings of
many scholars include analyses of both routines and
capabilities, and there is a substantial body of
theoretical and empirical work showing the
interconnectedness of routines and capabilities.

Thus,

a multi-discipline review affords more opportunities to
identify and document the implicit and explicit
references to execution as opposed to an examination of
just one discipline.

Reviewing the references in these

disciplines also allows the comparing and contrasting
of how each discipline addresses the concept of
execution, which helps to answer the questions as to
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whether execution is a routine, a capability, or
something different.
Obviously a critical review of the literature for
organizational routines and organizational and dynamic
capabilities is no small undertaking.

One may rightly

criticize that such an attempt is too broad in scope
and could only result in deficient reviews of the
literature.

This is true; I am not able to adequately

address and review the voluminous writings found in
these disciplines.

Yet selecting one discipline to the

exclusion of the others is not reasonable either, given
the fact that there has been extensive research and
writing on both routines and capabilities within each
discipline.

The different literature streams

demonstrate a close relation and frequent intersection
of routines and capabilities in explaining how
organizations are able to get things done.

For

example, many organizational routine scholars generally
agree that routines are “the building blocks” of
capabilities (Becker, 2008; Becker & Lazaric, 2009;
Becker, Lazaric, Nelson, & Winter, 2005; Dosi et al.,
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2001).

Similarly, in reviewing the capabilities

literature, and most notably the literature on dynamic
capabilities, the definitions of capabilities often
include direct references to routines (Teece et al.,
1997; Winter, 2003), as well as a comparing and
contrasting of routines and capabilities (Dosi et al.,
2001).
The fact that organizational routine and
capability theories focus on how organizations get
things done, and that there is a frequent intersection
and extensive writing on routines and capabilities
within these disciplines, makes a review of the three
streams of research essential to adequately examine the
concept of execution.

What makes this critical review

interesting and valuable is the fact that the concept
of execution remains largely unexplored in the
organizational routine and capabilities literature.
This study advances the body of knowledge in each of
these disciplines because in any consideration of how
organizations get things done, there is a critical need
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to examine the actions, practices, and principles that
drive execution.

Format of the Review
The format and structure of this critical review
begins with an examination of the relevant literature
for organizational routines, followed by a similar
examination of the relevant literature for
organizational and dynamic capabilities.

The review

proceeds chronologically within each discipline, with a
focus on the leading scholars and highly cited
articles.

A chronological review reveals the

interesting evolution of the concepts of routines and
capabilities, and the rigorous debate and exchange
among scholars regarding definitions, descriptions,
concept extensions and position challenges.

I examine

this literature with the purpose of identifying all
references, both explicit and implicit, to the concept
of execution.

Throughout the review, I attempt to

point out important gaps and omissions relative to
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execution in the organizational routine and
capabilities literature.
Having identified several key elements from both
organizational routines and capabilities, as well as
gaps and omissions in the literature, I attempt to
develop a conceptual theory (Rocco & Plakhotnick,
2009).

I conclude chapter two by proposing a novel

conceptual theory for execution as a catalytic
capability.

Throughout my data collection and analysis

efforts, I tested my assumptions regarding this
proposed catalytic capability.

The results of this

testing is reported in the conclusions related to the
findings of this study found in chapter five.

Organizational Routines
Early Writings
An examination of the literature related to
organizational routines is a valuable starting point
for the search and exploration of the concept of
execution.

There is a long history and wide

recognition among scholars that routines are crucial to
accomplishing tasks within organizations (Becker et
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al., 2005) and that much organizational work is
accomplished through routines (Becker & Zirpoli, 2008;
Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson &
Winter, 1982).

Though the notion of routinization may

be identified by a variety of labels, such as
“programs” (March & Simon, 1958) and “standard
operating procedures” (Cyert & March, 1963), there is
much agreement and a shared understanding that
routinized behavior is integral to explaining how
organizations get things done and that routines serve
as “building blocks” of organizational capabilities
(Becker, 2004; Becker et al., 2005; Dosi et al., 2000;
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Salvato & Rerup, 2011).

As

Becker and Zirpoli (2008) correctly observe,
organizational routines provide insights into task
performance, the causes of behavior, and how work gets
done.

Given this view of the role and influence that

routines have on an organization’s ability to get
things done, it is logical to explore and expect to
find evidence regarding how this routinized behavior is
executed.

How are routines enacted?

What activities,
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practices, and principles may be found in the execution
of organizational routines?

The answers to these

questions may help in the development of a conceptual
theory of execution.
Scholars of organizational routines often cite two
seminal works in organizational theory and
organizational behavior theory: “Organizations”, by
March and Simon (1958), and “A Behavioral Theory of the
Firm”, by Cyert and March (1963).

Both of these works

address routines, but organizational routines receive
relatively minor attention within the authors’ broader
focus on organizational theory and behavior.
March and Simon (1958) argue that routinized
responses are developed and learned as a result of the
prior history of an organization, and these responses
occur in reaction to repetitive stimuli.

They maintain

that a telling characteristic of routinized activities
is the degree to which decision-making has been
simplified by the development of a fixed response to
particular stimuli.

March and Simon (1958) also argue

that most organizational behavior is governed by
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“performance programs” (p. 163), and much like
routinized activities, organizations develop and employ
repertoires of response programs to address recurrent
situations.

These programs serve two important

functions within an organization:

serving as part of a

control system, for example by specifying standard
operating procedures, and as part of a coordination
system.

The concept of routines receives only minor

attention within March and Simon (1958); the authors’
primary focus is on choices, decision-making and how
organizations respond to changes in their environment.
While Cyert and March (1963) do not explicitly
employ the word “routine”, their description of
standard operating procedures evokes the key
characteristics identified by March and Simon (1958).
Cyert and March (1963) argue that “standard operating
procedures” are procedures most likely to be treated as
“fixed”, and they provide direction to activities that
are constantly recurring (p. 103).
set of behavior rules that:

They are a learned

evolve from the history of

the firm’s adaptive learning, serve as the focus of
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control within the firm, and are used to make and
implement choices (p. 113).

Cyert and March’s (1963)

standard operating procedures share similar
characteristics of March and Simon’s (1958) routinized
and program actions:

an historically developed set of

responses to recurring situations that guide
organizational choices in the overall effort to control
and coordinate the activities of an organization.
The early writings of March and Simon (1958) and
Cyert and March (1963) are interesting from an
historical perspective because the key elements they
identified relative to routines can still be found in
the definitions and characterizations of many present
day organizational theory scholars.

Unfortunately, the

concept of execution is neither identified nor implied
in these seminal writings.

There is no discussion and

analysis of how, exactly, those routinized responses
and standard operating practices are executed.

In

fairness, the major focus of both works is on choice
and decision making within organizations, not a
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granular level analysis of how organizations get things
done.

Nelson and Winter (1982)
It was not until the publication of “An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” by Nelson and
Winter (1982) that organizational routines received
great attention.

Some scholars have argued that this

book is the single most influential work on routines
(Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).

In explaining

their evolutionary perspective on the economy, Nelson
and Winter (1982) place routines at the forefront,
using routines to explain the functioning of firms and
the economy, and to provide insight into organizational
and economic change (Becker, 2004).

Nelson and

Winter’s (1982) treatment of routines initiated a more
than thirty-year rigorous discussion and debate
regarding the nature, characteristics, role and effects
of routines in organizations.
Nelson and Winter (1982) view routines as a
reflection of the decision rules in their evolutionary
theory.

They offer a variety of definitions and
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descriptions of routines, which include the following:
a “way of doing things”; that which is regular and
predictable in business behavior; a repetitive pattern
of activity in an entire organization; regular
predictable behavior patterns; and routines as “the
skills of an organization”.

Some scholars have

criticized these multiple definitions as vague and
unclear (Hodgson, 2003; Pentland & Reuter, 1994).

What

ties these various descriptions together, however, is
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) position that routines
define a list of firm functions that are a response to
external variables, such as market conditions, and
internal variables (p. 16).
They further describe routines by classifying them
as operating characteristics, capital investment
decisions, and “search”, i.e. change capabilities.
Routines fill critical organizational functions by:
operating as organizational memory; serving as truces,
by limiting inter-organizational conflict and
reconciling competing interests among organization
members; providing a template for norms or rules of
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enforcement; representing organizational skills; and
operating as genes, by predicting future organizational
behavior based upon the routines of the past.
Throughout their comprehensive examination of the
nature of routines and their effects on organizations
and the economy, Nelson and Winter (1982) do not
identify and explore a concept of execution as part of
routines.

They never address the specific activities

and practices that go into the creation and enactment
of their organizational routines.

Regarding execution,

one may conclude that for Nelson and Winter (1982), it
is assumed; that is, organizational routines are
automatically executed.

Routines: Patterns and Repetition
Much of the scholarship not long after Nelson and
Winter (1982) explored the concepts of patterns and
repetition as key elements of organizational routines.
Regarding these concepts, it is interesting to note
that Becker (2005) recently concluded that after
decades of research, study, and debate, “patterns” and
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“repetition” are the only elements for which there is a
consensus among scholars.
For Weiss and Ilgen (1985) much organizational
behavior involves repetition; that is, behavior caused
by habitual responses to familiar situations.

They

define routinization as repetitive behavior that
precludes consideration of alternative courses of
action by limiting exploration and attention to the
external environment (pp. 57-58).

Routines develop

through repetition and task success (p. 59).

Weiss and

Ilgen (1985) argue that repetition alone, however, is
not sufficient to constitute a routine; routinization
also involves the reduction in environmental awareness
and responsiveness.

Routinization produces the benefit

of efficiency; it allows individuals to devote mental
energy to non-routine activities while producing
quicker responses in routine situations.

This benefit,

however, also puts an organization at risk by reducing
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its ability to adapt in response to a changing
environment.
This attribute of efficiency, i.e. reliability and
speed of organizational response, is expanded upon by
Cohen and Bacdayan (1994).

They argue that routines

arise in repetitive situations where the ongoing cost
of careful deliberation is high (p. 555).

Cohen and

Bacdayan (1994) define organizational routines as
“patterned sequences of learned behavior involving
multiple actors who are linked in relations of
communication and/or authority” (p. 555).

They explain

that a routine is a complex concept due to the
following attributes:

its multi-actor nature; an

emergent quality, due to the evolution of
organizational behavior; and the difficulty
participants in a routine often have articulating what
they do and why they do it.
This study by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) is well
known for its use of a card game experiment to support
their description of organizational routines.

The

evidence from their experiment supports their assertion
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and conclusion that organizational routines are stored
as distributed procedural memories.

Based upon this

conclusion, Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) revisit the issue
and concern as to how to articulate these memories,
transfer this knowledge within an organization, and
account for the possibility that an “organizational
unconscious” body of inarticulate know-how may serve as
the basis of most of an organization’s capabilities (p.
566). They call for additional research in this area.
Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) are not alone in their
belief that routines are complex phenomenon.

Pentland

and Reuter (1994) argue that routines are complex
patterns of social action, making them difficult to
study.

They draw attention to a dualism that they

observe in the nature of routines.

Pentland and Reuter

(1994) build upon prior definitions of routines as
patterns of repetitive behavior, but expand the concept
to include sets of possible patterns of behavior
established by the structure of an organization and the
individuals involved in the routines.

Pentland and

Reuter (1994) reject the view that routines are
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exclusively fixed or automatic; instead they argue that
routines are effortful accomplishments best understood
by the concept of grammars in language.

Just as

grammar allows an individual to produce a variety of
sentences, so does an organizational routine allow
members to produce a variety of performances (p. 490).
The introduction of the concept of grammar is a
valuable insight and critical justification for
Pentland and Reuter (1994) to explain how and why there
can be variation in the performance of routines.

Given

organizational routines as sets of patterns of
behavior, members can and do enact a specific
performance from a large set of possibilities.
Pentland and Reuter (1994) provide evidence to
support their argument of routines as grammars in the
results of research they conduct for a software product
firm.

They study the software support group that

maintains a firm’s technical phone lines.

What

Pentland and Reuter (1994) observe is the very nonroutine nature of the group’s problem-solving work from
which a set of functionally similar patterns emerge (p.
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492).

From their data and analysis, the authors

conclude that despite observations of diverse software
support responses, i.e. performances, there was an
underlying structure that reflected their concept of a
“grammar”; that is, “a repetitive, functionally similar
pattern of action” (p. 504).

They maintain that

variability relative to routines should be understood
as performances that are “functionally similar but not
necessarily the same” (p. 504).

In this specific

study, they showed how the “call—solution—close the
call” pattern could indeed be identified as a routine
despite what seemed to be much non-routine behavior
within this actual routine.

Execution, Patterns, and Repetition
This review of the preceding authors,
unfortunately, revealed neither direct nor indirect
reference to the concept of execution.

While the

definitions and descriptions advanced by Weis and Ilgen
(1985), Cohen and Bacdayan (1994), and Pentland and
Reuter (1994), further the exploration and development
of the concept of routines within organizational
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theory, the authors do not examine the execution behind
these routines; that is, how routines are enacted.
Whether considering them as repetitive behavior,
patterned sequences of learned behavior involving
multiple actors, or grammars of behavior, the authors
never question the specific activities and practices
behind the execution of those organizational routines.
Even with Pentland and Reuter’s (1994) evidence of
variance and non-routine behaviors within an
organizational routine, they fail to question and
explore a more granular level analysis of the
activities and practices in the performance of the
routines.

Much like Nelson and Winter (1982), these

scholars also make the ability to execute an unspoken
assumption within organizational routines.

Routines: Wide-Ranging Characteristics
A considerable body of research followed these
early definitions and descriptions of organizational
routines.

While it is the intention of this literature

review to focus primarily on the evolution of the
definition of routines within the literature, it should
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be noted that there is extensive writing and numerous
empirical studies that identify and explore specific
characteristics attributed to organizational routines.
Just a few of those researched characteristics include
the following:

stability and change (Becker et al.,

2005; Feldman, 2000); reducing uncertainty (Becker,
2004; Becker & Knudsen, 2005; Feldman & Pentland,
2003); relatedness to habits, rules, and standard
operating procedures (Becker & Zirpoli, 2008; Hodgson,
1997); innovation (Becker, Knudsen, & March, 2006);
replication (Hodgson, 2003; Winter & Szulanski, 2001);
and storage and transmission of knowledge (Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994; Zollo & Winter, 2002).

An extensive

chronicling of organizational routine characteristics
can be found in Becker (2004) and Gerard (2009), and a
comprehensive documentation and review of empirical
studies devoted to routines can be found in Parmigiani
and Howard-Grenville (2011).

While this research that

focuses on the various characteristics of routines is
interesting and valuable in the broader context of
organizational theory, it does not prove helpful in
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gaining a better understanding of how organizations
execute, and how they execute those routines.

This

descriptive and empirical literature does not focus on
the underlying actions, principles, and discipline
behind organizational routines.
The scholars who focus on and engage in a
definitional analysis of routines produce valuable
insights and raise critical issues worth considering in
an effort to develop a conceptual framework for
execution.

For this reason, I focus primarily on the

articles and scholarly debate that have evolved
regarding the definition of organizational routines.
The ontological issues surrounding organizational
routines hold the promise of shedding some light on to
the effort to explore and better explain the nature of
execution.

Routines: Performative and Ostensive Aspects
A significant development in the evolution of the
definition of organizational routines occurs when
several scholars identify and examine the dualism or
multi-level nature of a routine.

One of the first
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scholars to raise the issue of the dual nature of
organizational routines is Martha Feldman in her
empirical study of routine change within a university
housing operation (Feldman, 2000).

In providing

evidence to support her argument that the potential for
change exists within the routine itself, Feldman (2000)
introduces the concepts of the performative and
ostensive aspects of routines.

She proposes a

performative model for routines that involves a cycle
of plans, actions, outcomes, and ideals.

Feldman

(2000) argues that her performative model correctly
accounts for the human agency and actions in the
performance of routines, which she maintains had been
neglected in previous research.

While the primary

focus of this article is an elaboration of this
performative model, Feldman (2000) asserts the dual
nature of routines by also introducing the ostensive
aspect.

She maintains that the ostensive aspect of a

routine is the routine as it exists in “principle” (p.
622).

She does not elaborate on the ostensive aspect

in this article, but she does provide an extensive
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explanation in a follow-on article that expands the
definition of routines beyond that of a series of
recurring, repetitive behaviors.
This dual nature of organizational routines
receives greater development by Feldman and Pentland
(2003).

Organizational theory scholars frequently cite

this article, and many scholars accept the Feldman and
Pentland (2003) definition of organizational routines
as the starting point for their own research and
analysis.

While concurring with what they state is a

generally accepted description of routines in the
literature, i.e. routines as “repetitive, recognizable
patterns of interdependent actions carried out by
multi-actors”, Feldman and Pentland (2003) argue that
ontology must also be considered in any analysis of the
concept.

They expand and further elaborate on

Feldman’s (2000) prior introduction of the dual
performative and ostensive aspects of routines.
For Feldman and Pentland (2003), the performative
aspect of a routine is “the routine in practice”; the
specific actions, performed by specific individuals, in
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a specific context (p. 101).

The literature provides

strong evidence to support their performative aspect.
Numerous empirical studies document the specific
patterns of action that organizations take in
performing routines in a variety of industries and
contexts.

Some supportive empirical studies include:

garbage collection (Turner & Fern, 2012), a board game
experiment (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994), software technical
support (Pentland & Reuter, 1994), vehicle packaging
design in the automobile industry (Becker & Zirpoli,
2008), and decision-making (Becker & Knudsen, 2005).
The ostensive aspect is the routine in principle;
that is, the ideal or “abstract, general idea of the
routine”.

Feldman and Pentland (2003) assert that

capabilities develop from the repetitive actions of
routine enactment, which they compare to the script of
a play or a musical score.

These scripts or scores are

the ostensive aspect, and they serve as a guide and
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template of behavior, providing a framework and point
of reference to make sense of performative actions.
Feldman and Pentland (2003) conclude that one
cannot understand the nature of a routine without
recognizing and accepting this dual nature, which
requires acknowledging both the idea of the routine
(ostensive) and the enactment of the routine
(performative).

Feldman and Pentland (2003) maintain

that both aspects are required for an organizational
routine to exist.

They also demonstrate how their new

conceptualization accounts for the prior, generally
accepted definitional elements of organizational
routines related to repetitive, recognizable patterns
of action, and multiple actors.
Several key elements in the Feldman and Pentland
(2003) elaboration of this dualism provide potential
insight and guidance into the concept of execution.
While their “enactment” of the performative aspects of
a routine is assumed, they correctly draw focus and
attention to the actions of the underlying routine.
fact, it is through this action-level analysis that

In
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they are able to build a strong case as to how routines
are a source of organizational change.

A similar focus

on action is necessary to better understand the nature
of execution.

My understanding of action related to

execution is very similar to Feldman and Pentland’s
(2003) performative aspect, as certain routines or
specific practices within routines will prove to be
constitutive elements of execution as action.

In

following the Feldman and Pentland (2003) approach, I
examined the specific activities taken and practices
followed by specific actors when conducting my field
research.
While others have identified routines as a
possible template of performance (Cyert & March, 1958;
Levitt & March, 1988; March & Simon, 1963; Pentland &
Reuter, 1994), Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) ostensive
aspect helps explain how routines guide, account for,
and make sense of specific organizational activities.
These are also important considerations for explaining
how and why organizations are able to execute.

Much

like Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) ostensive aspect, I
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similarly assume the existence of execution in
principle; that is, some norm or template, and a
framework of accountability to help explain execution
in practice.
Another critical Feldman and Pentland (2003)
observation that has implications and ties to
organizational capabilities is their argument that
performing an organizational routine “maintains the
ostensive aspect of the routines by exercising the
capability to enact it” (p. 148).

They argue that

performing a routine develops and maintains many of the
capabilities required for continued performance.

Thus,

the exercise of their performative aspect; i.e.
enacting routines, helps to build and maintain
organizational capabilities.

This in turn, supports

and maintains their ostensive aspect; that is, the
routine in principle and as template and norm.

For

Feldman and Pentland (2003), this dualism of
organizational routines is self-reinforcing.
The Feldman and Pentland (2003) analysis of
organizational routines provides several important
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insights and some helpful guidance for exploring a
potential conceptual framework for execution.

Their

analysis points to a need to: (a) address and account
for execution in principle; that is, the idea, norm or
template of what execution may look like, (b) identify
and analyze the activities and practices that
constitute the actual performance of execution, and (c)
determine the role, influence, or impact of execution
on organizational capabilities.

Routines: Dispositions or Capabilities
While the Feldman and Pentland (2003) dualism
related to the definition of organizational routines
gained significant acceptance (Becker, Lazaric, Nelson
& Winter, 2005; Becker & Zirpoli, 2008; Felin, Foss,
Heimeriks & Madsen, 2012; Miller, Pentland, & Choi,
2012; and Pentland, 2011), Hodgson (2003), and later
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004), took a decidedly different
approach to defining organizational routines.

The

Hodgson (2003) definition, while singular in nature, is
relevant to this multi-level understanding of routines
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because it introduces a new conception not found in the
prior literature.
Hodgson’s (2003) examination of the nature of
routines is a response to what he views as the
confusing definitions found in Nelson and Winter
(1982), where routines are characterized as behaviors,
dispositions, and capabilities (p. 363).

He criticizes

Nelson and Winter (1982) by arguing that routines
cannot be both actual behavior and the cause or
principle behind that behavior.

He maintains there is

a necessary ontological distinction between the
potential and the actual, between dispositions and
outcomes, because causes are not events, and causes
relate to potentialities and not necessarily to
realized outcomes.
Given this view, Hodgson (2003) argues that
routines should be understood as “conditional, rulelike potentialities or dispositions, rather than
behavior” (p. 364).

This position leads Hodgson (2003)

to reject the view of those scholars who maintain the
predictable nature of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982;
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Weiss & Ilgen, 1985).

He argues that routines are

usually conditional on other inputs and events, so the
predictability of the result is not due solely to the
routine itself, that predictability is based upon other
factors as well.

Hodgson (2003) asserts that the

outcome does not make something a routine, but rather,
it is the “generative rule-like structure” that causes
“the enduring and persistent quality” of a routine (p.
365).

Hodgson (2003) goes on to characterize routines

as dispositions or capabilities; that is, stored
behavioral capacities or capabilities to energize
behavior within an organization.
Further development of his line of reasoning and a
formal definition of routines is found in Hodgson and
Knudsen (2004) where they define routines as
“…organizational dispositions to energise conditional
patterns of behavior within an organized group of
individuals, involving sequential responses to cues”
(p. 290).

Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) maintain that

organizational routines are stored behavioral
capacities or capabilities that, when triggered, lead
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to sequential behavior.

They provide the example of

the common business practice where managers and
employees follow a five-day work week, in which
numerous organizational routines are energized during
that week.

Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) point out that

those routines do not disappear over the weekend; they
are routines-as-capacities that exist, waiting to be
triggered once again on Monday morning when the
managers and employees return to work.
The Hodgson (2003) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004)
conception of routines as an energizing capacity or
capability is much different than the performative and
ostensive aspects proposed by Feldman and Pentland
(2003).

This ontological element of potentiality and

causality is missing from Feldman and Pentland’s (2003)
definition and description of organizational routines.
The contrasting approaches of Feldman and Pentland
(2003) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) in defining and
describing organizational routines raise several
questions for consideration.

What is the bridge or

link between Feldman and Pentland’s performative and
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ostensive aspects?

How does one explain the movement

or connection from routine as norm or template to
routine as action?

What are the triggers, referenced

by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004), that cause the enactment
of routines?

Is it possible to reconcile these

contrasting approaches and differing ontological
elements espoused by these scholars?

Routines: A Multi-Level Concept
Combining the definitions of Feldman and Pentland
(2003) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) answers these
questions and resolves the ontological issues by
acknowledging that organizational routines consist of
three essential elements; they are:

action, norm or

template, and energizing causal mechanism or
capability.

The combination of these definitions also

points and leads to a further consideration of the
concept of execution.

Execution is the nexus; it is at

the center of these three ontological elements.

Both

sets of scholars assume and imply an ability to execute
in their definitions.

An ability to execute must exist

in order for performative action to occur, and an
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ability to execute must be the antecedent of any
“trigger” that energizes a stored capability.
Given such a critical role in the conception of
organizational routines, there is a need to further
explore those assumptions regarding execution.
Identifying and addressing execution explicitly, i.e.
examining the activities and practices behind the
concept may lead to a better, more complete
understanding of organizational routines, and provide
valuable insight in to the possible development of a
conceptual framework for execution.
Fortunately a proposed resolution to the
contrasting definitions and key ontological issues
discussed above can be found in Becker (2005).

Like

Hodgson and Knudsen (2004), Becker (2005) also
recognizes the problems and limitations in various
definitions that attempt to combine routine as action
with routine as a representation of repetitive
patterns.

He maintains that the only way to adequately

explain the concept is to recognize and address the
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fact that routines operate on three different
ontological levels.
Becker (2005) identifies those three levels as the
following: (a) a “deep level” involving underlying
causal mechanisms and tendencies that, once triggered,
facilitate the expression of recurrent action patterns;
(b) an actual level that captures regular patterns of
behavior, i.e. those recurrent action patterns; and (c)
an empirical level that consists of representations of
the recurrent action patterns (p. 251).

Becker’s

(2005) three level ontological framework nicely
combines and accommodates the contrasting positions of
both Feldman and Pentland (2003) and Hodgson and
Knudsen (2004):

Feldman and Pentland’s (2003)

performative aspect operates at Becker’s (2005) active
level, while their ostensive aspect exists at Becker’s
(2005) empirical level, and Hodgson and Knudsen’s
(2004) routine as disposition or capability is captured
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by Becker’s (2005) notion of an underlying causal
mechanism found at his “deep level”.
Becker (2005) further explains how these three
ontological levels are connected.

They are connected

by “tendencies”; these tendencies are potentialities
that link the recurrent action patterns, their
underlying causal mechanisms, and their representation.
Becker (2005) asserts that these tendencies must be
“triggered” in order to be actualized (p. 252).

He

also maintains that his empirical level, where rules
reside, should not be viewed as a cause for the level
of action.

For a variety of reasons, such as

subjectivity of the rule creator, a need to supplement
rules with judgment, the embeddedness of rules in
context, and the role of interpretation in rules,
Becker (2005) concludes that one cannot deduce action
from rules, nor induce rules from action.

For these

reasons the underlying causal mechanism found in his
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deep level must be acknowledged as a third, critical
element of organizational routines.
While Becker’s (2005) philosophical analysis is
meaningful and valuable in its own right, the critical
question for this study is how does his three-level
definition of organizational routines aid in better
understanding execution, and perhaps in developing a
conceptual framework for execution.
First, Becker’s (2005) introduction of the three
ontological levels accurately captured and responded to
the definitional problems that existed in the
literature up until that point in time.

Recently,

other scholars have also acknowledged and addressed
these seemingly incompatible definitions and
ontological issues related to routines.

Pentland,

Feldman, Becker and Lui (2012) develop a generative
model that they argue also solves the problem of
conflicting definitions by accommodating routines as
both dispositions and patterns of behavior.

While

still subject to debate, I agree and accept Becker’s
(2005) position that organizational routines consist of
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actions, patterns of behavior, and underlying causal
mechanisms or potentialities.

Interestingly, these

same ontological issues will emerge in the later
literature review of organizational capabilities.
Second, as other scholars have argued, standard
operating procedures are not the same as routines
(Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994), and Becker (2005) takes this
position as well by maintaining that rules are not the
same as routines and rules are not the cause of
routines.

This leads to the third, critical point

related to execution.

Both Hodgson and Knudsen (2004)

and Becker (2005) assume an ability to execute as the
basis of their definitions.

For Hodgson and Knudsen

(2004), execution is clearly implied when they define
routines as “organizational dispositions to energise
conditional patterns of behavior”.

Simply replace

their word “energise” with the word “execute” and their
definition retains its meaning.

For Becker (2005),

those underlying causal mechanisms and tendencies at
the deep level require a “triggering” to be actualized.
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That triggering implies an ability to execute and
assumes the actions necessary for execution.
While neither Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) nor
Becker (2005) employ the word “execution”, the concept
of execution and an underlying ability to execute is
evident; it is clearly implied and assumed in their
definitions and explanation of organizational routines.
This understanding of organizational routines as stored
behavioral dispositions or causal mechanisms and
tendencies, points to a need and an opportunity to
further explore the nature of execution.

As the more

recent literature on organizational routines will
demonstrate, scholars are beginning to demand a closer
examination of the actions that go into the enactment
of routines; that is, they are seeking to identify and
explain the activities and practices related to
execution.

Routine Dynamics
Some of the more recent writings related to
organizational routines demonstrate a welcome focus and
concern for the practices and actions that go into
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specific routines.

Routine dynamics is a stream of

research that focuses on the internal dynamics of
routines.

One of the key insights of this research is

the connection between routines, practices, and
processes (Howard-Grenville & Rerup, 2017).

Scholars

exploring routine dynamics accept and build upon
Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) ostensive-performative
definition and their original findings regarding both
the stable and changing nature of routines.

What is of

interest and valuable for the purposes of developing a
conceptual framework of execution is the prominence of
the role of action in the research on routine dynamics.
Action is the primary focus; the unit of observation is
situated action and the unit of analysis is patterns of
action (Feldman, Pentland, D’Adderio, & Lazaric, 2106).
Feldman et al. (2016) best articulate the importance of
action by stating:
But like the wind, routines don’t exist without
being enacted. We can see the effects of a
routine, we can remember enacting a routine, we
can write down what we did or what we would like
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to have someone do, but none of these constitute a
routine without action (p. 29).
While not explicitly stated, this focus on action
requires some consideration and explanation of the
nature of execution.

This focus, and Routine Dynamic’s

granular level approach to research, is an exciting,
encouraging development, and one that helps justify the
need to further explore and develop a conceptual
framework for execution.

Routines to Capabilities
Unfortunately the organizational routine
literature reviewed failed to uncover an explicit
articulation and explanation of the concept of
execution.

It did, however, point to the

organizational capability literature as a potential
source and good next step in the search to find and
explore the nature of execution.
The capabilities literature is a promising, and
logical, next step in the search for execution for
several reasons.

First, as is the case with

organizational routines, many scholars view
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capabilities as a significant phenomenon and
determinant in explaining how organizations get things
done and how they perform (Ansoff, 1977; Dosi et al.,
2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008;
Teece, 2014).

Additionally, some scholars see the

value and importance of capabilities beyond just the
level of the firm; they argue that capabilities are
“…fundamental to understanding how society works and
how it changes” (Dosi et al., 2000, p. 1).

Given such

a focus, one may expect, and hope, that the literature
on capabilities will identify and address execution in
any attempted explanation of how firms actually operate
and perform.
Second, as the literature will demonstrate, there
is an interconnectedness between organizational
routines and organizational capabilities.

From the

inclusion of routines in the actual definitions of
capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Salvato & Rerup,
2011; Teece & Leih, 2016; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997,
2000; Winter, 2003) to identifying routines as an
attribute or variable of capabilities (Felin, Foss,
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Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012; Leih & Teece, 2016; Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011;
Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012; Winter, 2013),
many scholars maintain a strong explanatory link
between routines and capabilities.

To better

understand the nature of routines, one must also
examine capabilities; to better understand the nature
of capabilities, one must also know and understand the
nature of routines.

Examining this interconnectedness

will, hopefully, also shed more light on the nature of
execution.

Organizational Capabilities
Nelson and Winter (1982) Revisited
The concept of capabilities is complex and some
scholars caution that the term capabilities “…floats in
the literature like an iceberg in a foggy arctic sea,
one iceberg among many and not easily recognized as
different from several icebergs near by” (Dosi et al.,
2000, p.3).

As was the case in the review of

organizational routines, Nelson and Winter (1982) again
prove a compelling and valuable starting point for an
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analysis of organizational capabilities.

They ask

several fundamental questions regarding capabilities,
one of which is: “What is really involved when an
organization is ‘capable’ of something?” (p. 52). For
Nelson and Winter (1982), routines are a determinant of
what an organization is capable of doing.

The

repertoire of routines of organization members, as well
as the possession of particular assets and resources,
serve as the “ingredients” of a capability.

In

addition to these ingredients, an organization must
also possess the “recipe” as to how the routines and
assets should be utilized.

Ingredients and the recipe

alone are not sufficient however to constitute a
capability.

Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that a

productive performance requires “coordination”, i.e.
that the organizational members who know their jobs,
correctly interpret and respond to the needs and
demands of the situation (p.104).

This coordination of

routines within an organization and the decision-making
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and choices made by organization members are
foundational to capabilities.
In further describing organizational capabilities,
Nelson and Winter (1982) indirectly refer to the
concept of execution.

They argue that “implementation”

is intimately related to choice, and they maintain that
the “…ability to deliberate and implement are elements
of a firm’s capabilities…” (p. 71).

By choosing to

employ the word “implementation”, Nelson and Winter
(1982) make clear the importance of being able to
execute on those capabilities; that is, in enacting
those organizational routines.
Finding this early, indirect reference to the
concept of execution in Nelson and Winter (1982) is
encouraging, and one might expect the scholars who
followed their work to further expand and elaborate on
this concept of “implementation”.

Unfortunately, many

of the scholars who follow Nelson and Winter (1982)
focus on defining and describing organizational
capabilities without identifying and exploring the
concept of execution as an element of capabilities.
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As the literature will demonstrate, execution is, at
best, implied or assumed in the description of
organizational capabilities.

Implementation, Capacity, and Performance
Collis (1994) defines organizational capabilities
as “…socially complex routines that determine the
efficiency with which firms physically transform inputs
into outputs” (p. 145).

He attributes two important

elements to capabilities: (a) capabilities are embedded
in firm routines, and (b) specific to transforming
inputs into outputs, capabilities enable firms to
choose and implement activities required to produce and
deliver products and services.

Collis’ (1994)

definition highlights the interconnectedness of
routines and capabilities, and he echoes Nelson and
Winter’s (1982) reference to implementation.

The

“transforming” of inputs into outputs, and the
“implementation” of the activities necessary for that
transformation, clearly assume execution as an
important element of capabilities.

Here, the word

“execution” could be interchanged with
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“implementation”.

This identification and recognition

is encouraging, however Collis (1994), like Nelson and
Winter (1982), does not examine “how” organizations
actually implement those necessary activities, nor does
he address the nature of the specific activities
themselves.

Thus, the search for a more granular level

analysis of execution continues.
Several scholars build on these early
articulations of capabilities and Sydney Winter’s work
in this area is particularly influential.

For Dosi,

Nelson, and Winter (2000), capabilities “fill the gap
between intention and outcome”, and they are the
authors who are so frequently cited for their
identification of routines as the “building blocks of
capabilities”.

For Dosi et al. (2000), capabilities

are the know-how that enables organizations to perform
sets of activities, and to be “capable” means that an
organization possesses a generally reliable capacity to
produce a desired outcome based upon “intended actions”
(p. 1).

Though they do not employ the word

“execution”, their references to “capacity to produce”
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and “intended action” reveal their assumption that an
ability to execute is at play here.

Effectuation of

any capacity and the realization of intended actions
can only occur if an organization is able to carry out
specific activities and practices in support of their
execution.

Their definitional elements are similar to

Hodgson and Knudsen’s (2004) routine as capability or
causal mechanism, and Feldman and Pentland’s (2003)
performative aspect, i.e. routines as patterns of
action.
It is also encouraging that Winter (2003)
continues to refer to execution, albeit implicitly, in
his later writings as well.

He states that an

“organizational capability is a high-level routine (or
collection of routines) that, together with its
implementing input flows, confers upon an
organization’s management a set of decision options for
producing significant outputs of a particular type”
(Winter, 2003, p. 991).

Other scholars highlight the

importance of action in their definitions of
capabilities as well.

O’Reilly and Tushman (2008)
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maintain that “…capabilities are discrete business
level processes and associated activity systems
fundamental to running a business…” (p. 189).

These

references to the words and phrases “implementation”
and “activity systems”, and the earlier reference to
“capacity to produce” and “intended action”, are
evidence that some scholars do indeed acknowledge
execution as a relevant consideration in the
conceptualization of organizational capabilities and as
a variable in organizational performance.
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) accept the attributes of
capacity and reliability found in the Dosi et al.
(2000) definition of organizational capabilities, and
they expand the concept.

They define an organizational

capability as the “ability of an organization to
perform a coordinated set of tasks, for the purpose of
achieving a particular result” (p. 999).

For Helfat

and Peteraf (2003), to possess a capability means that
the organization has attained a minimum level of
functionality that “permits repeated, reliable
performance of an activity”; that is, a capability
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reaches some threshold level of routine activity and
must work in a reliable manner (p. 999).

They do not

specify or provide guidelines as to how to determine
this minimum level of functionality.

What is

noteworthy regarding their definition is the fact that
by stating that it is an ability to perform, Helfat and
Peteraf (2003) acknowledge, implicitly, that execution
is an essential element of an organizational
capability.

Without the ability to execute those

“coordinated tasks”, there is, by their own definition,
no organizational capability.
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) draw a further
distinction relative to organizational capabilities by
arguing that capabilities are either operational or
dynamic.

Operational capabilities denote those that

involve repetitive patterns of activity, such as the
routines to perform the individual tasks required in
manufacturing.

Dynamic capabilities for Helfat and

Peteraf (2003) involve routines that coordinate those
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individual tasks and serve to change and modify
operational capabilities.
Helfat maintains this definition of organizational
capabilities throughout her later writings as well
(Helfat, 2007) and she provides the clearest
articulation most recently in Helfat and Winter (2011)
where capability is defined as “the capacity to perform
a particular activity in a reliable and at least
minimally satisfactory manner” (p. 1244).

For Helfat

and Winter (2011), there are three critical elements
associated with this definition: (a) the capability has
an intended purpose; (b) performance means the doing,
the carrying out of the activity that involves
discretionary choice; and (c) the capability enables a
repeated and reliable performance of an activity.

This

Helfat and Winter (2011) definition and description of
capabilities provide a clearer articulation of the
elements first identified in the Helfat and Peteraf
(2003) definition of organizational capabilities.
Over the course of several years, the concept of
execution retains an implied presence in the evolving
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definition of capabilities from Helfat and Peteraf
(2003) to the more current Helfat and Winter (2011).
The definitional element of a “capacity to perform” and
an attribution of “repeated and reliable performance”
imply and assume an underlying ability to execute the
activities in support of that capacity and reliable
performance.

Once again, however, further examination

and exploration of execution cannot be found in this
literature.

The authors fail to pursue and provide an

additional analysis of the action and activities that
go into the execution of their organizational
capabilities.
It is interesting to note that when scholars such
as Helfat and Winter (2011), along with others such as
Eggers and Kaplan (2013), actually identify and
acknowledge “doing” as a critical element in explaining
capabilities, they then choose to direct further
inquiry into the area of decision making as opposed to
researching and examining the concrete actions that go
into the “doing”.

While decision-making is certainly

important and valuable to both routine assembly and
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capability development and deployment, choice and
decision-making are not sufficient to explain
capability utilization and task performance.

It still

requires one additional step of analysis; that is,
examining the action that follows the choice or
decision.

Though I may choose or decide to enact

routine A or deploy capability B, I may never actually
take the actions required to enact routine A or deploy
capability B.

Actions taken are at once the cause and

the “proof” that one has executed a decision, and they
serve as the fine-grained evidence that helps explain
how an organization’s routines and capabilities
contribute to an overall ability to get things done.
In maintaining that a repeated and reliable
performance is a “particularly important feature” of a
capability, Helfat and Winter (2011) raise an issue
that only a further analysis of execution can resolve.
They recognize and anticipate a potential criticism of
their definition by arguing in a footnote (p. 1244)
that their reference to reliable performance does not
make their definition of capability tautological.
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Helfat and Winter (2011) define “minimally satisfactory
performance” to mean that the outcome of the
performance is recognizable and it functions at some
minimally acceptable level.
There are two critical points to consider here.
First, as Helfat and Winter (2011) admit, organizations
will vary in how well they perform an activity (p.
1244).

Given this variance in performance,

organizational capabilities will necessarily differ
from firm to firm.

Assuming that Helfat and Winter’s

(2011) minimum performance threshold has been met, the
execution of a manufacturing capability in firm A will
be different than the execution of a manufacturing
capability in firm B.

Therefore, to thoroughly

understand the nature of capabilities, one must pursue
an analysis that is context specific, i.e. firm A or
firm B, and one that examines the specific activities
and practices that go into the execution of the
capability.
Second, though advocating “minimally satisfactory
performance” as a pre-existing element of capabilities,
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Helfat and Winter (2011) also readily admit that
possession of the capability does not guarantee
performance beyond that minimum threshold, nor does
their definition address superior performance.

Other

scholars also maintain that possession of a capability
does not guarantee a certain level of performance.
Eggers and Kaplan (2013) observe that “mere possession
[of a capability] does not affect performance” (p.
300), and Teece (2014b) argues that what an
organization could accomplish is not necessarily what
it may be currently producing (p. 329).
The fact that Helfat and Winter (2011) choose to
avoid this problematic issue; i.e. a more precise
definition and explanation of organizational
performance, and the fact that other scholars
acknowledge and maintain that there is a difference
between the potential and the actual capability, makes
an analysis of execution all the more critical for
better understanding the nature of organizational
capabilities.

The only way to verify minimally

satisfactory performance and to evaluate any gap
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between potential and actual capability deployment, is
to examine the context specific actions behind
capability execution.
Understanding this gap is also critical to
explaining the difference between intentions and
outcomes among firms.

Firms construct organizational

routines and capabilities with the best intentions;
that is, the intention to deliver superior performance
and secure a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
However, only a select few achieve this outcome.

The

capability to execute those actions, principles, and
discipline that turn those good intentions into
outstanding, measurable results is what separates the
exceptional firms from all the rest.

Ontological Similarities to Routines
This analysis of the definitions of organizational
capabilities is similar to the evolution of the
definitions of organizational routines, and the
literature demonstrates the interconnectedness of
organizational routines and capabilities.

Several

scholars identify action and implementation as key
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definitional elements of an organizational capability
(Dosi et al., 2000; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Winter,
2003), and this recalls the Feldman and Pentland (2003)
performative aspect of routines.

Other organizational

capability scholars identify capacity; i.e. the
potential to perform, as another critical definitional
element of a capability (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Helfat
& Winter, 2011), and this evokes the ostensive aspect
of organizational routines also found in Feldman and
Pentland (2003).
These definitional similarities, however, do not
extend further to the concept of an energizing causal
mechanism, such as the one introduced by Hodgson and
Knudsen (2004) in their analysis of organizational
routines.

The organizational capability scholars

reviewed here do not explore the general concept of
causation in their examination of capacity and action.
There is an abundance of research in such areas as
managerial cognition (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Tripsas &
Gavetti, 2000), dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner
& Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Helfat &
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Peteraf, 2015), and ambidexterity (Birkenshaw,
Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008,
2011) as critical elements in the development and
deployment of capabilities, but they stop short of
detailing the specific actions as the causal mechanisms
of those organizational capabilities.
In this regard, the organizational capability
scholars should follow the lead of the organizational
routine scholars, such as Hodgson and Knudsen (2004)
and Becker (2005), by acknowledging, addressing and
incorporating a third ontological element to the
definition of capabilities; that is, an energizing
causal mechanism.

Dosi et al. (2000) have called

attention to the gap between “intention and outcome”;
causation and action sit squarely between intentions
and outcomes.

Questions and issues related to

causation and action reside in the gap, and they
require explicit examination to better understand
organizational capabilities.

Such an examination will

necessarily lead to a consideration of the activities
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and practices related to execution.

Exploring

execution will help to close this gap.

A Need for Fine-Grained Analysis
A reasonable, logical question to ask is why
scholars have chosen not to explore this third
ontological level, i.e. organizational capability as
causal mechanism, especially given the early,
encouraging references made by Nelson and Winter (1982)
and Collis (1994) regarding the importance of
“implementation” to organizational capabilities.

One

reason may be due to the challenging nature of
identifying and proving causation.

Much like Helfat

and Winter’s (2011) admission of the challenge and the
context specific nature of specifying “minimally
satisfactory performance” relative to a capability, so
too the challenge of specifying the concrete actions
and conditions that go into execution.

Unpacking the

elements of execution and testing hypotheses at such a
granular level of analysis is difficult work and likely
to be organization specific.

Thus, more and better

qualitative case studies will be required to adequately
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capture those activities and practices behind
execution.

This need for a more granular level

analysis must also be balanced against the risk, as
Johnson et al. (2003) warn, that studies which are too
fine grained may not provide insight and knowledge
applicable to organizational level or general outcomes.
This challenge and difficulty should not deter
research in this area.

Evidence that this is indeed a

neglected level of analysis may also be inferred by the
recent calls from numerous scholars from a variety of
disciplines who strongly advocate for more fine-grained
research.

While their disciplines may differ, the

Strategy-as-Practice (Ambrosini, Bowman, & BurtonTaylor, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Johnson et
al., 2003; Regner, 2008; Vaara & Whittington, 2012),
microfoundations (Barney & Felin, 2013; Felin, Foss, &
Ployhart, 2015; Salvato & Rerup, 2011; Teece 2007;
Winter, 2013), and practice theory (Feldman, 2015;
Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Parmigiani & HowardGrenville, 2011) scholars share a common
dissatisfaction with the historical macro-level
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analysis found in much social science research.

They

maintain a need to pursue and explore a more granular
level analysis, whether action based or individual
specific, to better understand and explain
organizational behavior and performance.

Scholars

advocating these approaches readily admit the context
specific nature of such research and the need for more
qualitative studies (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville,
2001; Salvato & Rerup, 2011).
As stated in the Introduction of this
dissertation, identifying, defining, describing, and,
hopefully, developing a conceptual framework for
execution is difficult and challenging.

The ubiquitous

nature of execution necessitates a granular level
examination of the actions, i.e. the activities and
practices that firms take to enact their routines,
deploy their capabilities, and achieve their
performance objectives.

Such challenges should not

deter the search and pursuit to a better understanding
of this concept of execution, and as the review of the
dynamic capability literature in the next section will

92

demonstrate, execution finally moves from an implied
and assumed presence in the literature, to an
explicitly identified and explored variable relative to
organizational change and performance.

Execution and Dynamic Capabilities
Origins of Dynamic Capabilities
An examination of dynamic capability theory proves
valuable for gaining a better understanding of the
concept of execution.

While the review of

organizational routine and capability literature
demonstrated the implicit and assumed presence of
execution, a review of the dynamic capability
literature will show a similar implied and assumed
presence in the early literature, then transition to an
explicit identification and elaboration of the concept
in the most recent writings among several scholars.
In what is widely recognized as a seminal article
on the subject, “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management”, the authors, Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
(1997), articulated the concept of dynamic capabilities
that initiated a more than twenty-year discussion and
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debate of the topic.

Over the course of that

discussion and debate, scholars have focused
considerable attention to the issues of dynamic
capability definitions, identification, and strategic
management theory development.

As dynamic capability

theory and understanding have evolved, so has the
concept of execution within that theory and
understanding.

Execution has evolved from having no

explicit role, to moving into an assumed role, and then
finally, to being identified and recognized as an
essential element in strategy formulation and
organizational operations.
Teece et al. (1997) define dynamic capabilities as
“the firms ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure
internal and external competences to address rapidly
changing environments” (p. 516).

The word “dynamic”

means “renewal”; that is, a firm’s ability to renew
competences, and “capabilities” are the “internal and
external organizational skills, resources, and
functional competences” of a firm.

Having established

definitions, Teece et al. (1997) provide additional
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explanatory detail to build and support a new framework
of analysis behind those definitions.

For Teece et al.

(1997), management, processes, positions, paths, and a
rapidly changing environment are key elements of their
proposed framework.

Processes are the managerial and

organizational “routines” for getting things done in an
organization (p. 518).

Positions are firm assets and

resources, both tangible and intangible, while paths
represent the previous choices and investments made by
a firm that serve to influence and constrain future
behaviour (p. 523).

Processes, positions, and paths

directly impact dynamic capability development,
maintenance, and reconfiguration.

Management plays a

crucial role here due to its control and influence over
those processes, positions, and paths, as well as its
responsibility for “adapting, integrating, and
reconfiguring” firm resources (p. 515).

A rapidly

changing environment is the impetus for dynamic
capabilities.

The primary job of management is to

develop, deploy, and protect firm resources and
competences, those dynamic capabilities, in response to
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a rapidly changing environment while seeking to secure
a sustainable competitive advantage.
The Teece et al. (1997) article is noteworthy for
many reasons.

First, and foremost, is the focus and

recognition that environmental change is a major issue
confronting firms today.

The advances in technology,

access to information, and globalization have created a
rapidly changing environment in which firms must
operate.

Later research by O’Reilly and Tushman (2008)

and Teece (2016) provide evidence showing the
quickening pace by which firms have lost their
leadership positions relative to profitability and life
expectancy on the S & P 500 list.

Success in this

environment requires an organizational capacity for
change.

For Teece et al. (1997), dynamic capabilities

represent the tools for firm change, and the
identification of the importance of a firm’s
management, routines, resources, and history provide
the start of a theory and an effective framework of
analysis to best explain the environment in which firms
operate.
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The major, implicit assumption underlying this
definition and theory of dynamic capabilities is the
concept of execution.

Teece et al. (1997) do not

employ the word “execution”, but all managerial effort
and dynamic capability existence pre-suppose an ability
to execute; that is, the ability to take the actions
necessary to develop and deploy those capabilities.

In

this initial articulation of a definition and theory,
the authors focus primarily on explaining what they
mean by “capability”; that is, explaining all the
issues relating to a firm’s capacity for change and the
elements that go into building such a capacity.

Teece

et al. (1997) do not ask or address how to effectuate
that capacity.

Thus, early on, execution becomes the

critical “how” question with regard to dynamic
capabilities and strategy formulation.

Dynamic Capability Definitions
Many of the scholars who have joined the
discussion and debate focused on the original Teece et
al. (1997) definition of dynamic capabilities.

While

the issue of definitions is interesting and valuable in
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terms of clarifying the original concept of dynamic
capabilities, the review provided in this section will
focus on how several scholars addressed or failed to
address the ability to execute as an element of their
dynamic capability definitions.
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) are frequently cited
scholars who offer a much different definition of
dynamic capabilities; one that was informed by their
resource based view (RBV) of competitive advantage.
They argue that dynamic capabilities are a firm’s
processes that use resources; that is, “the
organizational and strategic routines by which firms
achieve new resource configurations” as markets evolve
over time (p. 1107).

They reject the Teece et al.

(1997) definition and theory by arguing that a firm’s
resource base, not its dynamic capabilities, is the
source of a firm’s competitive advantage.

They liken

dynamic capabilities to “best practices”; that is,
operational capabilities, and their position initiated
a new, robust debate regarding the definition of
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“dynamic capabilities”, “operational capabilities”, and
“ordinary capabilities”.
In the course of providing an alternative dynamic
capability definition, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) do
not refer to the concept of execution.

They do,

however, demonstrate the interconnected nature of
capabilities and routines by identifying organizational
routines as a core element of their definition.
Despite using routines and applying the term “best
practices” to help explain their conception of dynamic
capabilities, they fail to consider the actions and
activities that constitute those organizational
routines and best practices.

Eisenhardt and Martin

(2000) maintain an organizational level analysis, which
assumes an ability to execute those organizational
routines that are intended to change a firm’s resource
configurations.
Several other scholars also define dynamic
capabilities in terms of routines and change.

Winter

and Szulanski (2001) define dynamic capabilities as the
“…partly routinized activities that are carried on to
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expand or change the capabilities that directly affect
revenue generation…” (p. 734).

In responding to the

Teece et al. (1997) requirement for a rapidly changing
environment, Zollo and Winter (2002) propose that a
dynamic capability is a “…learned and stable pattern of
collective activity through which the organization
systematically generates and modifies its operating
routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” (p.
340).

A Nelson and Winter (1982) influence is evident

in both of these definitions due to the important role
of routines and the interconnectedness of routines and
capabilities in explaining organizational performance,
and organizational change.
What is noteworthy in a search for execution in
this literature, however, is that despite the
identification of “change” as a core element of dynamic
capabilities, these scholars choose not to take the
next, logical step of proposing a theory or providing a
framework of analysis regarding how that change
actually comes about.

They do not directly address how

organizations execute the activities intended to bring
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about this desired change; and execution therefore
remains an implicit, assumed variable in their
definitions of dynamic capabilities.
Other scholars identify and place dynamic
capabilities within a larger, broader conception of
“organizational capabilities”.

In a later writing,

Winter (2003) refines his notion of dynamic
capabilities, labelling them as “first-order
capabilities” that act upon and influence other firm
capabilities, thereby causing change within a firm (p.
992).

He identifies changes to product, production

processes, and a firm’s customer base as examples of
dynamic capabilities.

Helfat and Peteraf (2003) share

Winter’s approach of contextualizing dynamic
capabilities within a larger organizational capability
framework.

They define an organizational capability as

“the ability of an organization to perform a
coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational
resources, for the purpose of achieving an end result”
(p. 999).

Helfat and Peteraf (2003) break down

organizational capabilities further into “operational”
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and “dynamic” capabilities, where they accept the Teece
et al. (1997) definition of dynamic capabilities as
those that integrate and reconfigure operational
capabilities (p. 999).

Helfat and Winter (2011) also

accept and maintain the view that organizational
capabilities consist of both dynamic and operational
capabilities.
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) also introduce a new
element relative to a broader understanding and
explanation of capabilities.

They propose a

“capability life cycle” model to explain how
organizational capabilities develop and evolve within a
firm.

Sharing the view of Eisenhardt and Martin

(2000), Helfat and Peteraf (2003) argue that the
resource base underlying the organizational
capabilities is the true source of change within firms;
there is no special role for dynamic capabilities
within this process.
In re-visiting the Helfat and Peteraf (2003)
article from the dynamic capabilities perspective,
there is a welcome development regarding the concept of
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execution.

Whereas consideration and reference to the

issue of execution are absent from the Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000) and Winter (2003) analyses, Helfat and
Peteraf (2003) specifically address execution in their
definition and supporting explanation.

However, their

definition and explanation of a “capability” proves
problematic.

They argue that a firm possessing a

capability has, by definition, been able to attain some
“minimum level of functionality” that results in a
“repeated, reliable performance of an activity” (p.
999).

Capability is not simply a “potential” for

performance; it also includes a certain minimum level
of demonstrated performance; that is, actual execution
of the performance is an assumed element of their
definition.
Helfat (2007) re-visits this issue in a later
definition of dynamic capabilities.

A dynamic

capability “is the capacity of an organization to
purposely create, extend, or modify its resource base”
(Helfat, 2007, p. 2).

What proves interesting is how

Helfat (2007) defines “capacity”.

A “capacity”
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involves: (a) identifying the need and opportunity for
change; (b) developing a response to that need or
opportunity; and (c) implementing that response (p. 2).
While continuing the thinking introduced in Helfat and
Peteraf (2003), Helfat (2007) now explicitly identifies
what has been assumed in much of the dynamic capability
literature; that is, implementing action is critical to
a capability.

While Helfat (2007) chooses to use the

word “implementing”, she is clearly expressing the idea
and concept of execution.
While the Helfat (2007) identification and
reference to execution within the conception of
capabilities is a tremendous advance, attributing
execution as a definitional element of the word
“capacity” is odd and problematic.

Reminiscent of the

Helfat and Peteraf (2003) definition of “capability”,
capacity is not just a potential to implement or
execute; it also conveys the understanding that action
is part of the definition.

This notion of capability

or capacity as a definition encompassing both the
potential for action and the action itself has not been
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observed in any of the dynamic capability literature
reviewed for this paper.

The dynamic capability

literature reviewed does not offer any definitions of
“capability” or “capacity” in which a minimum level of
performance is assumed as part of that definition.

The

traditional definition and understanding of the words
“capability” and “capacity” convey a meaning that
encompasses an “ability” to perform, the potential to
act or perform; it does not include the action itself.
This Helfat (2007) definition appears to be an
effort in “mental gymnastics” and it proves the
underlying failure of the strategy literature to
properly identify and explore the role and importance
of execution in an analysis of strategy and
organizational capabilities.

Helfat (2007) recognizes

this problem and attempts to solve it by awkwardly
building execution “as action and performance” into the
definition of capacity.

This is reminiscent of the

ontological issues reviewed in the organizational
routine literature, where several scholars defined and
described organizational routines on multiple levels:
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routine as actual repetitive action; routine as
patterns of activities, i.e. as a template or
principle; and routines as a potential or causal
energizing mechanism (Becker, 2005; Feldman & Pentland,
2003; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004).

While Helfat (2007)

makes an important and valuable contribution by
recognizing and addressing this issue, her solution of
building the act of executing into a definition of
capacity avoids the difficult challenge and hard work
of developing and explaining a broader conceptual
framework for execution.
Departing from the resource based view approach of
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Peteraf and Helfat
(2003), and Helfat (2007), Barreto (2010) introduces a
new perspective on dynamic capabilities, and he
proposes a definition that he claims succeeds in
consolidating all prior definitions of dynamic
capabilities:

“A dynamic capability is the firm’s

potential to systematically solve problems formed by
its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to
make timely market oriented decisions, and to change
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the resource base” (p. 271).

This new perspective

identifies “problem solving” as the foundation and
starting point for dynamic capabilities.

This approach

is much different than the original Teece et al. (1997)
focus on a firm’s ability to renew, integrate, build
and reconfigure internal and external competences.
While Barreto (2010) does make a strong argument to
justify the four dimensions of his definition, he fails
to address and explain why he chose “potential to solve
problems” as the starting point for his definition of
dynamic capabilities.

He also fails to address how an

ability to execute would be important and essential to
the four dimensions of his definition.

Barreto (2010)

states that his capability represents the “potential”
to implement those four dimensions, but he does not
address how that implementation can and will occur.
Execution is once again relegated to an assumption
within a definition of dynamic capabilities.
Aside from the position of Helfat (2007),
reference to the concept of execution cannot be found
in the early dynamic capability literature.

Perhaps
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scholars consider an ability to execute too minor of an
issue, or they may consider the concept of execution so
self-evident as to not merit attention.

Or perhaps it

is unreasonable to expect examination of such a
ubiquitous concept within the dynamic capability
literature when the concept of dynamic capabilities
itself has proven to be a “moving target” for the past
twenty years.

As Barreto (2010) correctly observes,

despite the tremendous volume of writing on the
subject, the definition of dynamic capability is far
from consolidated.

Settling on a definition has proven

to be a difficult task, and the development of a theory
for dynamic capabilities has proven even more
difficult.

Helfat and Peteraf (2009) correctly observe

that these “deficiencies” are a “tell tale sign of
early stage development of an area of inquiry” (p. 92)
and they argue that dynamic capability is not yet a
theory (p. 99).

Given these challenges, the thought of

introducing a variable, such as the concept of
execution, may be viewed as tangential or disruptive in
the pursuit of greater clarity for an unsettled area of
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inquiry.

Fortunately, the later writings of David

Teece prove valuable in providing greater clarity as to
the definition and theory of dynamic capability, and
his writings also explicitly identify the concept of
execution and reveal its importance to dynamic
capability theory.

Dynamic Capabilities, Teece, and Execution
The explicit identification of execution and its
role and importance within dynamic capabilities emerges
in the more recent writings of David Teece.

Teece

replies to those scholars who responded to Teece et al.
(1997) by revising his definition of dynamic
capabilities and expanding the theory behind the
revised definition.

The ability to execute emerges as

an element of his expanded theory.
Teece (2009) modifies the original definition of
dynamic capabilities by replacing the word
“competences” with the word “assets”.

Dynamic

capabilities are a firm’s capacity to “shape, reshape,
configure, and reconfigure assets” in response to
rapidly changing markets (p. 87).

Assets were
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previously addressed as part of “positions” in the
original definition and for Teece (2009) they now are
part of the foundational definition of dynamic
capabilities.

Teece (2009) also maintains that assets

are firm specific and difficult for competitors to
imitate.

One may speculate that the contribution of

the RBV scholars to the dynamic capability discussion
helped influence Teece’s new definition.

Once again,

however, the notion of execution is not specifically
addressed in this definition.

The ability to execute;

that is, to have the capacity and to engage in the
necessary shaping, reshaping, configuring and
reconfiguring of assets is simply assumed.
Teece (2009, 2014a, 2014b) broadens his theory of
dynamic capability by adding and emphasizing the
entrepreneurial environment in which firms operate and
in which dynamic capabilities develop and evolve.
Firms continuously develop, modify, and renew their
dynamic capabilities in pursuit of new opportunities
and as a response to a rapidly changing environment.
According to Teece (2009), a dynamic capability is a
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“meta-competence” that enables firms to invent and
innovate profitably (p. 54).

Firms accomplish this by

the entrepreneurial activities and processes of
sensing, seizing, and transforming.

Sensing as a

general concept is new market opportunity and need
identification, and it involves systems and capacities
to learn, filter, and shape those opportunities (Teece,
2009, p. 17).

Seizing is a firm’s capability to act,

and it includes such things as structure, procedures,
decision-making and developing new business models to
capture those new opportunities (Teece, 2009, p. 26).
Note the difference between Teece’s definition of
“capability” as opposed to the one promoted by Helfat
and Peteraf (2003) and Helfat (2007).

Helfat and

Peteraf (2003) argue that the action or performance,
the act of utilizing a dynamic capability, is integral
to the definition of a capability.

Teece (2009), as

well as many other scholars previously reviewed in the
organizational capability literature (Collis, 1994;
Dosi et al., 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982), view
“capability” as the potential to act or execute a
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dynamic capability.

The transforming activities of a

firm are those that change, modify, and adapt a firm’s
resources in order to “reconfigure dynamic capabilities
to better support those sensing and seizing activities”
(Feiler and Teece, 2014, p. 15).
Successful sensing, seizing and transforming of
dynamic capabilities require strong, entrepreneurial
management.

Teece (2009, 2012) identifies this

management as “entrepreneurial managerial capitalism”
and he argues that it “involves recognizing problems
and trends, directing (and redirecting) resources, and
reshaping organizational structures and systems so they
create alignment with customer needs” (Teece, 2009, p.
59).

Teece (2012) also maintains that the

entrepreneurial and leadership skills of an
organization’s top management are critical for
sustaining dynamic capabilities (p. 1398).

Much like

his new definition, this further elaboration of the
theory for dynamic capabilities rests and relies upon a
major, unspoken assumption:

that such an

entrepreneurial management team can execute the
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requisite sensing, seizing, and transforming activities
to create customer value and build a sustainable
competitive advantage in a rapidly changing
environment.

Teece (2009) makes one cursory reference

to the concept of execution when he states that once an
opportunity is identified, management must “make the
decisions and institute the disciplines to execute on
the opportunity” (p. 60).

This brief reference finally

makes explicit what has been implicit all along; that
an ability to execute is indeed a key element of
Teece’s (2009) dynamic capability theory.
Increased, explicit references to the concept of
execution begin to emerge in Teece’s more recent
writings where he further explains the nature of
dynamic capabilities, the need and role of
entrepreneurial management, and organizational change.
Building upon his previous definitions, Teece (2012)
argues that dynamic capabilities are “higher-level
competences that determine the firm’s ability to
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external
resources/competences to address, and possibly shape,
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rapidly changing business environments” (p. 1395).
Dynamic capabilities fall into three general
categories: sensing, which involves the identification
of opportunities; seizing, which requires the
mobilization of resources to exploit those
opportunities; and transforming, which consists of the
constant renewal of a firm’s resources in response to a
continually changing business environment.

Teece

(2012) argues that the entrepreneurial and leadership
skills of the top management are critical to
determining the effectiveness of dynamic capabilities
relative to this sensing, seizing, and transforming (p.
1398).
It is this identification of the changing business
environment and the functions of resource mobilization
and transformation that requires Teece to explicitly
refer to the concept of execution.

He states that in

an organization’s response to or instigation of change,
“the dynamic capabilities that make it possible to
succeed in this endeavour involve good strategizing as
well as good execution” (p. 1397).

In his description
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of entrepreneurial management he cites “getting things
started” as one of the important activities in dynamic
capability development and deployment (p. 1398).

These

two references are a stated acknowledgement and
explicit reference to the concept of execution.

Teece

(2012) does not detail and explain what he means by
“good execution”, but this explicit reference is an
exciting, next step in better understanding the role
and importance of execution in this literature.
Leih and Teece (2013) build upon these
observations by further exploring the role of
management, and specifically middle managers, in
developing and deploying dynamic capabilities to
effectuate change.

The authors emphasize the reality

and significance of fast moving environments as part of
a dynamic capability framework of analysis (p. 3).
While they acknowledge that organizational routines are
a basis for most organizational capabilities, they also
argue that dynamic capabilities often depend upon the
non-routinized activities of a firm’s top management
(p. 13).

It is in their analysis of the role and
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importance of management that Leih and Teece (2013)
make several direct and indirect references to the
concept of execution.

For Leih and Teece (2013)

“dynamic capabilities are about selecting the right
things to do…and getting them done” (p. 10), they
determine whether an organization is able to
“implement” good strategies (p. 12), and dynamic
capabilities govern “…how new business models are
created and implemented” (p. 14).

Top management plays

a critical role in the dynamic capabilities framework
due to their “ability to get the right things done” (p.
11) and the fact that the nature of their role is
strategic; that is, one that requires “engagement and
enactment”.
Leigh and Teece’s (2013) repeated use of the words
“implement”, “engagement”, and “enactment”, as well as
the use of the specific phrase “ability to get things
done” is evidence and explicit acknowledgement that the
concept of execution is at work here and that it is an
essential element in their dynamic capability
framework.

What is also noteworthy in Leih and Teece’s

116

(2013) discussion, is the importance and value of
middle management relative to firm execution and the
deployment of dynamic capabilities.

They argue that

middle managers, those situated two or three levels
below the CEO, “…assist with dynamic capabilities too
because, without enactment, dynamic capabilities are
unlikely to be realized” (p. 18).

Probing this Leih

and Teece (2013) characterization of middle management
may be helpful in my effort to develop a conceptual
framework for execution and point to an area worth
testing in my field research.

Interviewing middle

managers may provide helpful data relative to
determining what it actually means to execute, i.e. in
specifically identifying the activities and practices
performed by middle managers.
Explicit identification and references to
execution as a key element of dynamic capability theory
continues in an oil and gas industry analysis conducted
by Shuen, Feiler, and Teece (2014).

The authors

examine the dynamic capability of human resources and
its impact on a firm operating within the oil and gas
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industry.

Deciding where and what to drill represents

a major industry investment decision, and the authors
find that such a decision must be connected to the
“current organizational capability” of the human
resources.

Shuen et al. (2014) observe that a strategy

may call for the pursuit of a high value project, but
it may not be achievable given the available talent;
they state: “Many firms do not ask the ‘doability’
question when making strategic decisions about
investments” (p. 10).

This analysis and prescription

to consider “doability” in the strategy formulation is
an explicit acknowledgement that the ability to execute
plays, and should play, a critical role in strategy
assessment and formulation.
The importance of execution to strategy
formulation and dynamic capability development is again
identified and examined in a follow-on case study of a
large oil and gas company by Feiler and Teece (2014).
Through this case study of EXP, a large oil and gas
company, Feiler and Teece (2014) document how the
ability or inability to execute influenced senior
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management in their strategy formulation and decisionmaking.

The authors explain that when oil and gas

companies engage in sensing activities, simply
identifying those opportunities that will create the
most value is not acceptable; management must also
identify those high value opportunities that are also
“doable” given existing resources (Feiler & Teece,
2014, p. 15).

EXP maintained a decision-making

criterion that the investment decision process for
proposed projects must address the “strength and
availability of capability for venture execution” (p.
16).
This Feiler and Teece (2014) case study documents
the ability to execute as a defined criterion used by a
senior management team in business strategy
formulation.

The ability to execute is not simply

assumed, nor is it viewed as a separate consideration
independent of strategy formulation and firm
performance.

The senior management in this case went

one step further by designating execution as one of the
company’s ten critical dynamic capabilities: “The
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establishment of Capability as a strategic and cultural
imperative throughout Exploration” (p. 16).

As Feiler

and Teece (2014) detail, EXP senior management
understood the term “Capability” to mean the ability to
execute, the ability to get things done throughout the
EXP organization.
An increased acceptance and continued expression
of the importance of execution can be found in the most
recent work by Teece and colleagues, who have begun to
share language and repeated references to the role and
function of execution in dynamic capability theory.
Teece (2016), in re-visiting the dynamic capabilities
of sensing and seizing, emphasizes the need for a firm
to “undertake actions” to generate desired outcomes,
and that one of the primary responsibilities of top
management is the “implementation” of corporate
strategy (p. 209).

In addressing how organizations

manage risk and uncertainty in an innovation economy,
Teece, Peteraf, and Leih (2016) argue that an “ability
to quickly implement a new business model or other
required changes” is a critical determinant of the
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strength of a firm’s dynamic capabilities (p. 12), and
they specifically state that “seizing” is about
implementation and “getting things done” (p. 22).
The best evidence of execution as having secured a
permanent presence in the dynamic capabilities
framework comes from two of the most recent Teece
articles.

In one article, Teece (2016) argues that

“the ability to quickly implement a new business model
or other changes” is one of the key elements, along
with values and culture, that constitute a “pillar” of
dynamic capabilities (p. 211).

In a follow on article

further explaining his concept of business models,
Teece (2018) points out that a firm might be good at
developing new business models yet be mediocre at
implementing them, in which case the dynamic capability
of seizing new opportunities would be negatively
impacted.

Thus, for Teece, execution has become a

major, explicit element in his dynamic capability
theory.
From an original assumed presence (Teece et al.,
1997), to a first explicit reference (Teece, 2012), to

121

a determinant found in two case studies, and finally,
to an explicit articulation that implementation and
getting things done are critical to dynamic
capabilities, the concept of execution emerges as
important consideration in Teece’s dynamic capability
theory.

Execution – A More Granular Level Analysis
While the increased references and the
acknowledged importance of execution to dynamic
capabilities theory is an exciting, welcome
development, Teece and colleagues fall short relative
to detailing and explaining the specific activities and
practices that go into “implementation” and that
“ability to get things done”.

Fortunately, recent case

studies conducted by other dynamic capabilities
scholars do venture toward this next, necessary step in
seeking a better understanding of the nature of
execution.

In their case study of the Valve

Corporation, Felin and Powell (2016) develop a series
of questions that each organization should ask related
to the dynamic capabilities of sensing, shaping, and
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seizing.

Some examples of these questions include:

“How can we encourage people to share new ideas with
others?”; “Do we have mechanisms for testing new ideas—
e.g. pilot tests, experiments?”; “What rules do we use
for project investment decisions?” (pp. 91-92).

What

is valuable and noteworthy about these questions
relative to execution is the fact that finding the
answers requires the identification of specific
activity and actions within an organization.

A great

benefit of these questions is that they direct dynamic
capability inquiry to a more granular level analysis;
one focused on the activities and practices that cause
those capabilities.
A similar focus on specific activities and
practices can be found in the work of scholars
examining the dynamic capability of ambidexterity.

In

a detailed case study of executive management at IBM,
Harreld, O’Reilly, and Tushman (2007) explicitly
address execution and explain its importance to
strategic thinking and ambidexterity.

For Harreld et

al. (2007), ambidexterity is a dynamic capability
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whereby a firm is able to simultaneously exploit
existing business opportunities and explore new
business opportunities.

Regarding execution, they

argue that strategy is not simply about making quality
decisions; strategy also requires “executing well on
those decisions” (p. 22).

Harreld et al. (2007)

clearly place execution at the center of the issue of a
firm’s intentions versus its outcomes.

A firm may

intend, and succeed, in developing a winning strategy
and making the right decision in support of that
strategy, but execution ultimately determines the
outcomes; that is, actual performance and results. The
authors use this case study analysis to demonstrate and
describe how implementation, execution, and exceptional
capabilities enabled IBM to develop and retain the
dynamic capability of ambidexterity and achieve its
desired outcomes.
Another major contribution of this study is how
Harreld et al. (2007) engage in a deeper, more finegrained analysis by documenting the specific activities
that go into IBM’s strategic execution efforts.
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Examples of concrete activity include:

the monthly

meetings of their Technology and Strategy teams, and
the hosting of Strategic Leadership Forums.

In citing

the former CEO, Lou Gerstner’s statement that “in the
new IBM, we’ve always believed that our ability to
execute is as important as the strength of our
strategies” (p. 40), Harreld et al. (2007) focus
attention on just how important execution is to
strategic management.

They view “the ability of a firm

to sense new opportunities and seize them” (p. 40) as
the foundation of dynamic capabilities.

This focus on

action and activity, and the repeated references to
execution and its importance for ambidexterity is a
welcome development for a better understanding of the
concept of execution.
O’Reilly and Tushman (2008, 2011) build and expand
upon the Harreld et al. (2007) findings regarding
execution and the dynamic capability of ambidexterity.
In a theoretical study, O’Reilly and Tushman (2008)
argue that a clear articulation of specific management
actions related to ambidexterity have been missing from
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the literature; an omission they seek to address by
developing a set of guiding propositions.

Their

propositions specify five conditions necessary for the
successful development and deployment of the dynamic
capability of ambidexterity.
include the following:

These propositions

a strategic intent that

justifies the importance of both the exploration and
exploitation of business opportunities; the vision and
values that ensure a common identity despite the very
different nature of explore and exploit efforts; a
senior management team that “owns” the ambidextrous
strategy, which is supported by a common reward system
and constant communication of the strategy; the
separate but aligned organizational structures
necessary to support the different explore and exploit
activities, but integrated at both the senior and
tactical levels; and an ability of senior leadership to
accept and resolve conflicts that may arise from the
too very different explore and exploit alignments (p.
9).

For O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) these propositions

describe and prescribe five conditions that are “…the
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foundational elements for ambidexterity as a dynamic
capability” (p. 199).
What is noteworthy regarding the O’Reilly and
Tushman (2008) propositions and their relevance to
execution is that they mirror the shift found in Felin
and Powell (2016) to a more granular, activity-based
level of analysis.

Where Felin and Powell (2016) pose

a series of action related questions that firms should
address, O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) identify specific
categories of management activities and practices that
firms must pursue in order to develop and deploy a
dynamic capability of ambidexterity.

While O’Reilly

and Tushman (2008) do not venture to offer a specific
list of actions for each category, for example the
specific actions that would constitute “constant
communication” or “conflict resolution”, they clearly
focus on a greater tactical level analysis.

They do

not simply refer to the general concepts of
“implementation”, “engagement”, or “enactment”; they
address categories of actual activity and practices
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that help to explain how a firm executes to bring about
their five desired conditions.
O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) also identify
principles as supportive elements of the activities and
practices prescribed in their five propositions.

For

example, an organization’s values and a senior
management team’s acceptance of conflict help shape and
guide several of their desired conditions.

O’Reilly

and Tushman’s (2008) introduction of principles as part
of their conditions seems to lend support for my
proposition that execution as a catalytic capability
must include shaping principles in addition to specific
actions.
In a follow-on empirical study, O’Reilly and
Tushman (2011) apply their five propositions and test
these conditions in a fifteen firm case study.

The

concept of execution is at the forefront of their
analysis as evidenced by their statement that “the
focus in these interviews was on understanding in some
detail what actions had been taken and how these had
been implemented” (p. 10).

While O’Reilly and
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Tushman’s (2011) findings regarding their propositions
are interesting, for example strategic intent proved
not to be a determinant of ambidexterity, the value and
benefit for a better understanding of execution comes
from the approach and focus of their study.

They

engage in a more fine-grained, tactical level analysis,
and their five propositions guide their inquiry into
specific categories of firm activities and supporting
principles.

O’Reilly and Tushman (2011) intentionally

seek to discover the specific actions and explain how
those actions are implemented in the efforts of these
fifteen firms to develop and deploy the dynamic
capability of ambidexterity.

Their subsequent analysis

involves evaluating how each of the fifteen firms
execute their five propositions.
These case studies and the O’Reilly and Tushman
(2008, 2011) propositions make a significant
contribution to furthering the understanding of
execution.

Within several broad categories and

conditions, these authors identify specific actions and
principles that characterize execution, and they

129

explore the impact that execution has on capability
development and firm outcomes.

Felin and Powell (2016)

and O’Reilly and Tushman (2008, 2011) arrive at these
valuable insights by venturing into a micro, tacticlevel analysis of firm operations.

I embrace this

level of analysis and I seek to build upon and extend
their research efforts by exploring the actions,
shaping principles, and guiding discipline that my
research participants may demonstrate in the execution
of their businesses.

Discoveries at this level of

analysis may reveal commonalities across firms and real
world practices that may help further explain the
concept of execution.

Such findings may also confirm

and support the macro level concepts found in much of
the organizational and dynamic capability literature.

Insights from the Literature
The impetus for this critical review of the
literature arose from my awareness of just how
important the capability of execution is to
practitioners, and from the numerous, indirect
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references to the concept that I found in strategic
management theory.

My early research efforts also led

to the discovery of organizational routine theory as a
potentially valuable framework for better understanding
the concept of execution.

These disciplines,

organizational routines, organizational capabilities,
and dynamic capabilities provided a valuable context
and lens to explore the nature of execution because
routines and capabilities are widely recognized as
significant phenomenon for explaining how organizations
get things done and how they perform.
One major conclusion from this review is that most
of the literature fails to explicitly identify and
examine the concept of execution as it relates to
routines and capabilities.

Execution is largely an

implied and assumed element of organizational routines
and capabilities.

This failure to explicitly examine

the role of execution represents a gap in the
literature and an exciting opportunity to pursue new
knowledge by researching the activities and practices
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that help to explain how organizations execute their
routines and capabilities.
One of the key insights of the organizational
routine literature, and the only one for which there is
agreement among scholars in this discipline (Becker,
2005), is that “repetitive patterns of activity” prove
to be a key characteristic of a routine (Nelson &
Winter, 1982).

The early definitions and descriptions

of routines focused on task accomplishment, patterns of
behaviour, and getting things done in a repetitive,
reliable manner (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Dosi et al.,
2000; Weis & Ilgen, 1985).

However, for all the focus

on the explaining of “getting things done”, there was
no direct reference to the concept of execution; no
analysis of the specific activities and practices that
explain the “how” behind getting things done.

Despite

the failure to address the concept of execution
directly, these early definitions of routines did
introduce an attribute that merits consideration in the
development of a conceptual framework for execution;
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that is, the attribute of recurrent, repetitive
activity.
The organizational routine literature advanced and
scholars soon pointed out that the early definitions
failed to account for the ontological complexity of
organizational routines.

Feldman and Pentland (2003)

introduced their performative and ostensive aspects of
routines.

The performative aspect represented the

routine in practice, while the ostensive aspect
represented the routine in principle.

Hodgson (2003)

introduced a different, third ontological element for
consideration by asserting that a routine is an
energizing, causal capability.

Efforts to resolve

these conflicting definitions and disparate ontological
elements came from Becker (2005) and Pentland et al.
(2012) whereby these scholars combined all three
elements within a single definition of a routine.

They

argued that one could only understand the nature of a
routine by recognizing and accepting its multi-level
nature.

Though a direct and explicit analysis of

execution is absent from this debate, these scholars
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raise an important consideration for developing a
conceptual framework for execution; that is, ontology
and the potential multi-level nature of execution.
As was the case with the organizational routine
literature, Nelson and Winter (1982) proved a
compelling starting point for a review of the
organizational capability literature.

Nelson and

Winter (1982) tied routines to capabilities by arguing
that routines were a major determinant of capabilities.
They also indirectly refer to execution in their
analysis by identifying “implementation” as a critical
element of capabilities.

In much of the literature

following Nelson and Winter (1982) there is an increase
in the frequency of indirect references to the concept
of execution.

In describing capabilities, scholars

employ words and phrases such as, “implementation”,
“enactment”, “engagement”, “activity systems”, and
“intended action” (Collis, 1994; Dosi et al., 2000,
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Winter, 2003).

These

indirect references represent a welcome development in
the literature because they indicate a recognition that
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the “how” behind capability development and deployment
cannot be ignored.
This issue is further advanced by Helfat and
Peteraf (2003) and Helfat and Winter (2011) in the
definitions they propose for organizational
capabilities.

Helfat and Peteraf (2003) define a

capability as the “ability to perform a coordinated set
of tasks for the purpose of achieving a particular
result” (p. 999).

Though still an indirect reference,

the “ability to perform” clearly introduces the concept
of execution as part of the definition.

The importance

of execution to organizational capabilities is again
evident when Helfat and Winter (2011) identify
“performance as doing” as one of the three critical
elements to their definition of organizational
capabilities.

While their argument that possession of

a capability ensures a minimum level of reliable
performance is suspect, their analysis addresses the
issue of ontology, and Helfat and Peteraf (2003)
attribute a multi-level nature to organizational
capabilities.
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Though these references to execution remain
indirect and implicit, they represent an exciting
development in the organizational capability
literature.

Identifying and articulating an ability to

perform and performance as doing, along with the
introduction of the multi-level nature of
organizational capabilities, points to execution as the
critical concept to better understand capabilities
going forward.

This literature reveals the need to

further examine the “how” behind capabilities, which
will necessarily lead to a consideration of the nature
of execution.
This proves to be the case with the emergence of
the dynamic capability literature.

The Teece et al.

(1997) definition of dynamic capabilities as “the
firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure
internal and external competences to address rapidly
changing environments” (p. 516) initiated more than
twenty years of extensive research and debate regarding
the concept and the theory.

A major focus of dynamic

capability theory is change; a firm’s capacity for
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change and the rapidly changing external environment in
which the firm operates (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Teece, 2016; Zollo & Winter, 2002).

This focus on

change naturally lends itself to an inquiry regarding
the activities and practices that firms must execute to
achieve that change.

The early dynamic capability

literature does not pursue this line of inquiry,
however, and it does not identify and explore the
nature of execution. Execution is simply implied and
assumed in the integrating, building, and reconfiguring
of firm competences.
In the more recent literature, indirect references
to execution begin to emerge.

Helfat (2007) identifies

“implementing responses to opportunities” as a critical
element of her dynamic capability definition.

Teece

(2009, 2014a, 2014b) broadens his theory of dynamic
capabilities by introducing entrepreneurial management
as an important variable in the development and
deployment of dynamic capabilities.

Management engages

in the key activities of sensing and seizing new
opportunities, and in transforming firm resources in
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order to respond and adapt to the changing environment.
Whether the Helfat (2007) indirect reference to
implementing, or the sensing, seizing, and transforming
activities proposed by Teece (2009), execution is the
underlying assumption for all these activities.
Frequent, explicit references related to execution
finally emerge in the most recent dynamic capability
literature.

Teece (2012) states that dynamic

capabilities require “good execution”.

Leih and Teece

(2013) argue that dynamic capabilities are very much
about “getting things done”.

In a case study of an oil

and gas exploration company, Shuen et al. (2014)
document that project “doability” proved to be a
critical criterion in strategy formulation.

Feiler and

Teece (2014) document how “doability” became a critical
criterion in project investment decision making for a
large oil and gas exploration company.
The case studies of both Felin and Powell (2016)
and O’Reilly and Tushman (2011) move from an
identification of broad descriptors of execution, i.e.
“doability” cited in the Teece case studies, to a
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consideration of categories of activities that
constitute an ability to execute.

Felin and Powell’s

(2016) series of questions related to dynamic
capabilities require answers that detail specific
organizational activities and practices.

O’Reilly and

Tushman (2008, 2011) develop five propositions
prescribing key activities and principles necessary for
a firm to develop the dynamic capability of
ambidexterity.

These most recent case studies

represent a welcome shift to a more granular level
analysis of the actions and activities involved in
dynamic capability development and deployment.
The current state of the dynamic capability
literature makes the concept of execution explicit; it
is identified as a critical element in dynamic
capability development and deployment.

These recent

case studies also point to a promising trend where
scholars are seeking and pursuing a more granular level
analysis of the actions and activities that firms
employ to execute their dynamic capabilities.
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This trend coincides with a recent, growing call
by numerous scholars across multiple disciplines to
engage in more and better fine-grained analysis to
explain organizational behaviour.

Scholars exploring

Strategy-as-Practice, routine dynamics,
microfoundations, and practice theory share a common
dissatisfaction with the historical macro level
analysis found in much of the social science research.
As Eriksson (2014) observes, most studies focus on
organizational level issues and neglect the role of
managers and other individuals.

This is a view shared

by many microfoundations scholars (Barney & Felin,
2013; Salvato & Rerup, 2011; Teece, 2007).

Numerous

Strategy-as-practice and practice theory scholars argue
for the need of research to focus on actions and
situated activity (Ambrosini et al., 2007; Feldman &
Orlikowski, 2011; Johnson et al., 2003).
Regardless of the differing foci, individuals or
actions, the common message from these scholars is that
future research should entail a more granular level
analysis of organizational behaviour.

Such an approach
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must lead to and involve the concept of execution; that
is, research into the activities and practices that
constitute an organization’s capability to execute.
What remains now is to see if the insights gained
from this review of the organizational routine,
organizational capabilities, and dynamic capabilities
literature can be used to refine and improve the
definition of execution, and to develop a potential
conceptual framework for execution.

A Conceptual Framework of Execution
Execution - A Definition
Execution is a catalytic capability; that is, a
stored behavioural capability comprised of repetitive,
recurrent actions, shaping principles, and a guiding
discipline that energizes and effectuates
organizational behaviour.

Actions are the fundamental

activities and practices intended to achieve and
maintain an organization’s performance objectives, and
principles influence and shape the nature and quality
of those actions.

The combination of actions and

principles creates a discipline, a recognized structure
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or system that serves as a template and framework of
accountability to guide and direct organizational
behaviour.
A valuable insight from the literature review is
the need to consider different ontological elements and
the potential multi-level nature of execution.

The

analyses of Feldman and Pentland (2003), Hodgson and
Knudsen (2004), and Becker (2005) relative to routines,
and Helfat and Peteraf (2003) relative to capabilities,
prove helpful in making sense of my proposed definition
for execution.

Execution as actions, principles,

discipline, and energizing capability represent
different ontological elements that must be examined
and explained.

Execution as Action
To understand the concept of execution, one must
start with action.

I draw from Feldman and Pentland’s

(2003) performative aspect and the early writings on
organizational routines.

For Feldman and Pentland

(2003), the performative aspect of a routine is the
“routine in practice”.

Similarly, to understand
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execution as action, one must acknowledge its
performative aspect; that is, execution in practice.
In the early writings on organizational routines,
scholars attributed “recurrent, repetitive activity” to
the concept of a routine (Collis, 1994; Nelson &
Winter, 1982).

I accept this characterization and

combine it with a performative aspect, such that
“execution as action” is execution in practice that is
recurrent and repetitive.

The importance of action in

the conceptualization of routines is best expressed by
Feldman et al. (2016) when they state, “Without action,
there is no routine” (p. 506).
relative to execution:

I share this view

without action, there is no

execution.

Execution as Principles
Action alone, however, is not sufficient to
completely explain execution; and though I characterize
action as recurrent and repetitive, execution is not a
routine.

Principles are a required element in the

conceptual framework for execution.

Principles
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influence and shape the nature and the quality of
actions.
Consider the role of principles in the following
scenario:

We determine that having a team meeting

every Monday morning is one of the recurrent,
repetitive actions that will contribute to the
execution of our performance objectives.
and conduct those weekly meetings.

We initiate

The specific

action, a weekly team meeting, does indeed occur.

The

action alone, however, is not enough to constitute the
capability of execution.

The action of meeting, by

itself, does not address the quality of those meetings.
Are the meetings productive and effective?
intense and results driven?
urgency among the team?

Are they

Do they create a sense of

Meeting weekly would satisfy

the repetitive, recurrent characteristic of “execution
as action”, and if the analysis stopped there, these
meetings could be viewed simply as an organizational
routine.
Principles serve as an underlying “rule” or belief
that gives meaning and potential measurability to the
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nature of the action; in this case, what it means to be
“productive and effective”, “intense”, and “results
driven”.

For example, the rule or belief that a

meeting must be “productive and effective” may mean
that all team members do the following during a
meeting:

address important organizational issues, make

decisions, assign tasks to specific individuals, and
set deadlines for task completion.

Productivity and

effectiveness may be assessed through simple, activitybased measures:

Were the critical issues addressed?

Yes or no?

Did the team make the necessary decisions?

Yes or no?

Were follow on tasks assigned to specific

individuals?

Yes or no?

for all assigned tasks?

Were deadlines established
Yes or no?

For each shaping

principle a set of underlying rules or beliefs can be
identified and measured in order to determine the
presence and influence of the principle on specific
actions.

Execution As Discipline
The combining of execution as action and execution
as principles creates execution as a discipline.

In
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describing this “discipline”, I rely on Feldman and
Pentland’s (2003) ostensive aspect of routines.

Their

ostensive aspect is the routine in principle; the ideal
of a routine which emerges from their performative
routine as practice.

This ostensive aspect also serves

as a framework of accountability to make sense of
routines in practice.

I attribute an ostensive aspect

as an element of execution as a discipline.
Repetitive, recurring action, i.e. execution as action,
creates the phenomenon of execution as an ideal and as
a framework of accountability.
This ostensive aspect alone, however, is not
sufficient to create this discipline.

The element of

“execution as principles” must also be considered.
Principles are instrumental in influencing and shaping
the nature and quality of action.

The combination of

both execution as actions and principles produces an
obvious and easily recognized ideal and framework, a
“discipline” that serves to guide organizational
behaviour.

Pentland and Rueter’s (1994) use of the

concept of “grammars” is helpful here.

They argue
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that, much like grammar in language, there is an
underlying structure or framework that reflects and
guides the enactment of routines.
applied to execution as discipline.

This can also be
The combination of

execution as actions and principles produce a wellrecognized “grammar” that directs, guides, and explains
organizational behaviour.
In returning to the scenario of the weekly team
meetings:

a new member joining the team will recognize

the existence of a discipline that informs the team
meetings.

The actions combined with the shaping

principles create a structure whereby the new team
member quickly comes to know such things as:

never

arrive late to a meeting, extensively prepare and be
ready to report performance results, contribute
meaningful feedback on firm operations, and provide
suggestions for business improvements.

Execution as a

discipline is this structure or “grammar” that guides
and informs team behaviour within the meeting.
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Execution – A Catalytic Capability
The combination of all three elements; that is,
execution as actions, principles, and discipline,
together, create a catalytic capability of execution.
The capability is catalytic due to the fact that
organizations cannot, and will not, achieve their
performance objectives without an ability to execute.
Routines will not be enacted unless an organization
can, and does, perform the necessary activities and
practices to carry out the routines.

Capabilities will

not be utilized unless an organization can, and does,
perform the necessary activities and practices to
develop and deploy those capabilities.

Executives

typically have the best intentions; they develop
strategies, create plans, and make decisions on
particular courses of action, but the outcomes, the
realization of those strategies, plans, and decisions,
depend entirely on possession of the catalytic
capability of execution.
In drawing from Hodgson (2003) and Hodgson and
Knudsen (2004), the catalytic capability of execution

148

can best be described as a stored, energizing
capability comprised of repetitive, recurrent actions,
shaping principles, and guiding discipline that, when
triggered, causes the activities and practices that
drive organizational performance and results.

Execution in Practice
What might execution in practice look like?

Are

there common actions and principles that can be
identified as evidence of a capability of execution?
The following, speculative lists are an attempt to
identify some actions and principles that may
contribute to an organization’s capability to execute.

Specific Actions in Practice
One question that I will consider and explore when
conducting my field study is whether the proposed list
of actions below may contribute to an organization’s
capability to execute. One goal for the field study is
to explore and discover the best individual actions for
execution; that is, those actions that make it possible
to execute:
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§

Managers are “working managers” who devote a
significant percentage of their time working in
their business, interacting directly with
customers and employees.

§

The organization measures and monitors a set of
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) related to
customers, revenue, operations and finances.

§

Management teams confer weekly in intense face-toface meetings to review business performance
results and question ongoing business assumptions.

§

Management teams review real-time performance
information and they communicate daily in
reviewing that performance, addressing issues that
require attention.

§

Senior management issues constant, frequent
communication throughout the entire organization
via email, phone, and face-to-face meetings.

§

Priorities are identified, established and clearly
communicated throughout the organization. Each
priority has assigned accountability, timetable,
and key performance indicators associated with it.
There is anecdotal and empirical evidence in

support of these activities as important and valuable
actions of execution.

An outstanding example

foreshadowing this approach to execution in terms of
action and principles can be found in Eisenhardt’s
(1989) empirical study of decision-making in large
companies.

In this study, the CEO of Zap best captures
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the spirit and approach when an organization possesses
the catalytic capability of execution:
strong controls.

“We have very

We over M.B.A it” (p. 554).

Additional support can be found for the specific
actions of:

frequent, organization-wide communication

(Mankins and Steele, 2005; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008;
O’Reilly, Harreld, & Tushman, 2009); senior managers
engaging in the details of the day to day business
(Bossidy & Charan, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989); intense,
weekly management review meetings (Bossidy and Charan,
2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lafley & Martin, 2013);
pursuing and hiring “A players” (Bossidy & Charan,
2002; Mankins and Steele, 2005); and an organizational
predisposition and focus on taking action, that is
“doing something” (Rumelt, 2011, p. 87).

Shaping Principles in Practice
There are a series of critical principles that may
act as guideposts for execution as actions.

These

principles include:
§

A pre-disposition to act, and act with a sense of
urgency
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§

“Grounded” decision-making; that is, decisions
tied to operational plans

§

Frequent, organization-wide communication

§

Uncompromising belief in and commitment to
measurement and monitoring

§

Management engaged and active in the day-to-day
details of the business

§

Management embraces direct, honest and open
communication on all issues

§

A commitment to constant improvement and
accountability for results
Individuals and organizations committed to

developing a capability of execution must be predisposed to action.

“Getting things done” requires

action, and in this case those individuals and
organizations that embrace this principle act with a
sense of urgency.

Action is intense, purposeful, and

people respond and react quickly.

When answering the

question: “When is this due?”, the mantra for
individuals and organizations that embrace this
principle is, “Yesterday”.
In addition to making decisions with speed and a
sense of urgency, that decision-making must also be
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firmly “grounded”; it must be linked to the operational
plan of the organization.

In this case, good decisions

require a review and assessment of the organization’s
overall capabilities.

Does the organization have the

necessary talent, resources, and processes in place to
carry out a specific decision? While the proposition
here is that the catalytic capability of execution
causes the deployment of other organizational
capabilities, it must be noted that the effectiveness
of the execution will be influenced by the absence
and/or the level of development of those other
organizational capabilities.

As expressed in the

Introduction to this dissertation proposal, I share
Teece’s (2012) view that good strategy, hard to imitate
resources, dynamic capabilities, and entrepreneurial
management are critical variables for explaining firm
performance.

While the focus of this study is on

exploring and explaining the capability of execution, I
acknowledge the importance and potential influence
those variables and other firm capabilities may have on
actual execution.
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Good communication is another important principle
related to execution.

As part of the decision-making

process, management must be committed to open, direct
and honest dialogue.

Bossidy and Charan (2002)

identify this as “truth over harmony”, where members of
management must be willing to aggressively challenge
business assumptions and be comfortable with
disagreement and potential conflict.

Frequent company

wide communication is also a critical principle for
execution.

If employees are not fully aware of the

goals and objectives for the organization, it may
reduce the speed of action or result in incorrect
action being taken.
Regarding the principle of active management
engagement within the business, the Eisenhardt (1989)
study documents the positive effects of this principle
in several large companies (p. 551).

The principle of

accurate, real time information supports the speed of
action and grounded decision-making within a firm.
Mankins and Steele (2005) document how measurement and
monitoring were essential to Dow Chemical’s leadership
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team execution (p. 9).

In their study of IBM and its

Emerging Business Opportunity (EBO) Division, O’Reilly
et al., (2009) identify how frequent communication,
milestone measurement, and active senior management
were essential in executing these new business
opportunities.
Finally, a commitment to constant improvement and
accountability for results must serve as an overarching
guide for all execution.

This principle ensures an

organization and a team will live up to their purpose
of delivering customer value and securing a sustainable
competitive advantage.

Guiding Discipline in Practice
The guiding principles of execution combined with
these specific actions create an overall “discipline”,
much like Pentland and Reuter’s (1994) “grammars”, that
creates a recognizable structure to help guide
employees as to how to perform within the organization.
This guiding discipline helps establish and enforce the
standards for the actual execution, i.e. “take these
specific actions”, “follow these specific principles”,
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and “utilize this framework” to evaluate organizational
activity.

This discipline of execution helps to drive

the achievement of goals and objectives, the reaching
of milestones, and the meeting of deadlines.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Worldview – Interpretive Framework
Whether specifically acknowledged, certain beliefs
and philosophical assumptions underlie one’s research
and a close connection exists between those assumptions
and how one pursues and conducts that research
(Creswell, 2013).

My approach to this study is one of

critical realism.

I embrace what Maxwell (2013)

identifies as two “common sense” perspectives; one of
ontological realism, where a real world exists
independent of our perceptions and theories, and one of
epistemological constructivism, where knowledge is
viewed as a social construction rather than an
objective perception of reality (p. 43).

Critical

realism’s focus on “mechanisms, processes, and
structures that account for patterns…” (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2011, p. 13) is particularly relevant for this
study where I seek to identify the actions, principles,
and discipline that constitute a capability to execute.
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I submit the following specific principles
articulated by Van de Ven (2013) as the interpretive
framework and guide for my field research (pp. 37-38):
§

A real world exists, but our understanding is
limited

§

In general, physical material things are easier to
understand than processes

§

All facts, observations, and data are theory
laden, and therefore there are no absolute truths
in social science

§

No form of inquiry is value free and impartial;
appropriateness of the method depends upon the
phenomenon

§

A complex reality requires the use of multiple
perspectives

§

Robust knowledge is an outcome of theoretical and
methodological triangulation

§

There is no guarantee that evidence will converge;
it might be inconsistent or contradictory

§

Important to select the models that better fit the
problems they were intended to solve; this allows
the evolutionary growth of knowledge

Given this interpretive framework, the research
conducted in this study attempts to discover and
understand the elements that comprise the capability of
execution and how such a capability influences
organizational performance and outcomes.
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A Qualitative Research Approach
Given the nature and purpose of this research, a
qualitative approach to the research is appropriate and
it proved most beneficial for achieving the goals of
this study for several reasons.

First, as Creswell

(2013) maintains, qualitative research is appropriate
where a problem or issue needs to be explored, the
variables of the issue cannot be easily measured, and
the nature of the issue requires a complex
understanding.

As the literature review demonstrated,

recent dynamic capability research has only just begun
to identify categories of activities related to
execution, and an agreed upon set of variables and
measurements related to execution can not be found in
the literature.

Further, as the literature review also

demonstrated, execution is a ubiquitous, complex
concept.

Second, as Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue,

qualitative research attempts to answer how social
experience is created, and the qualitative researcher
seeks to get closer to the actor’s perspective and
examine the “world in action”.

I explore how DSC and
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MAX get things done by gathering information from their
employees regarding specific actions and principles
that contribute to their individual and organizational
capability to execute.

Third, qualitative research

lends itself to developing models or theories (Smith,
Bekker, & Cheater, 2011), which is valuable for
assessing execution as a potential, catalytic
capability.

Finally, a qualitative approach also

allowed for flexibility during the research process
(James, Slater, & Buckman, 2012), which was important
for this study given the lack of previous research on
execution and the nature of my speculative
propositions.
Further support and justification for pursuing a
qualitative approach for this study can be found in the
literature related to routine dynamics,
microfoundations, strategy-as-practice, and practice
theory.

Numerous scholars across these disciplines

argue for the need of more granular level research,
whether focused on the individual or actions, and for
more qualitative studies.

Some examples include Chia
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and MacKay (2007) who chronicle how scholars from these
disciplines are focused on “…the actual activities
performed by individuals within organized contexts” (p.
233).

In their examination of dynamic capabilities,

Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) point out that quantitative
studies far outnumber qualitative studies in strategic
management, but those quantitative studies fail to
“…delve into the detailed, micro mechanisms of how
these capabilities are deployed and how they work” (p.
37).

They argue that qualitative studies are likely to

be more appropriate for a fine-grained investigation
and for obtaining rich and contextualized data.
Salvato and Rerup (2011) argue that qualitative
research designs are particularly suitable to study the
complexity of routines and capabilities, and
appropriate for developing nascent theories (p. 483).

Research Design
For purposes of my field research, grounded theory
through a multiple case study method was the best
approach to investigate and explore the phenomenon of

161

execution.

Grounded theory, according to Creswell

(2013), is a research approach designed to generate “a
general explanation of a process, action, or an
interaction shaped by the view of a large number of
participants” (p.83), and it should be used when a
theory is not available to explain or understand a
process.
Charmaz (2014) maintains that a theory identifies
the relationship between abstract concepts for the
purposes of explanation or understanding, and she
argues that grounded theory attempts to answer the
“why” questions in addition to “what” and “how”
relative to situated action (p. 228).

Charmaz (2014)

identifies nine key activities that are integral to
grounded theory analysis (p. 15):
§

Data collection and analysis conducted
simultaneously in an iterative process

§

Actions and processes analyzed rather than themes
and structure

§

Use of comparative methods

§

Data used to develop new conceptual categories

§

Systematic data analysis leads to inductive
abstract categories
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§

Theory construction as opposed to description or
application of current theory

§

Theoretical sampling

§

Developing categories as opposed to explaining a
specific empirical topic
Grounded theory proved an ideal research approach

for this study because, as the literature review
demonstrated, a theory of execution could not be found
in the organizational routine and capabilities
literature.

The activities outlined and advocated by

Charmaz (2014) were beneficial in my efforts to
discover, identify, and evaluate my participants’
specific actions and activities related to how they
execute and measure their performance.
A case study approach to research explores a
specific, real-life “…bounded system (a case) or
multiple bounded systems (cases), over time, through
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple
sources of information…” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97).

One

of the goals of case or multicase studies is to attain
a deep understanding of the phenomenon being studied.
According to Stake (2006), case researchers focus on
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relationships that potentially connect ordinary
practice in the context of a specific case to broader,
more general issues.

In multicase research, the

individual cases are bound together by a Quintain, i.e.
a common object, phenomenon, or condition, which is the
main focus of the inquiry.

Researchers study the

individual cases to determine the differences and
similarities in the effort to better understand the
Quintain (Stake, 2006).

Stake (2006) also argues that

a critical reason for engaging in multicase research is
to examine how the Quintain performs in different
environments, and it is this study of various
situations and contexts that reveals experiential
knowledge (p. 12).
A multicase research approach was ideal for this
study.

As the gap in the literature revealed, there is

a lack of detailed, in-depth analysis of execution in
the organizational routine and capabilities literature.
The case study method presented an opportunity for an
in-depth exploration of the participants’ capability of
execution and the actual execution of their daily
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operations.

A multicase study was better suited than a

single case approach given the fact that I was also
conducting grounded theory analysis in an effort to
discover and develop a theory for execution.

An

emergent theory and/or my proposition that execution is
a catalytic capability comprised of actions,
principles, and discipline was intended as the common
phenomenon or condition, i.e. the Quintain, to be
studied across the multiple cases.

Also a multicase

study enabled the search for common themes that
transcend the individual cases, which supported my
grounded theory approach to develop a theory of
execution.
Two organizations, MAX and DSC, were identified as
valuable and beneficial participants for this grounded
theory, multicase research study.

MAX is a publicly

traded distribution company with more than three
hundred branch locations throughout the world.

The

company maintains an entrepreneurial culture and
decentralized structure in which each branch operates
as an independent profit center.

DSC is a division of
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a publicly traded engineering and professional services
company.

DSC provides training, consulting, and

various professional services to the international
development industry.
The fact that both MAX and DSC have been highly
successful in their respective industries is one reason
for their selection as case studies.

Examining why and

how they are able to execute their daily operations
generated valuable insight and knowledge on execution
as a capability and a process.

Another reason for the

selection of MAX and DSC for this study is the nature
of their differences and the opportunity that affords
for comparative analysis of how they both execute.

MAX

is a hard goods distributor with an extensive network
of physical locations.

DSC is a professional services

provider delivering training and consulting through a
mix of employees, sub-contractors, and NGO partnerships
all over the world.

The choice of MAX and DSC provide

an additional opportunity to explore intra-company
differences.

Interview participants at multiple MAX

branches and divisions shared valuable information as
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to how and why some branches outperform others.
Probing those similarities and differences, as
recommended by Stake (2006), created a better
understanding of the concept of execution.

In addition

to obtaining context rich data and a deeper
understanding of how MAX and DSC execute in each
individual case, the multicase study also provided an
opportunity to test my propositions and determine
whether, indeed, there are common and perhaps
generalizable elements related to execution across
these very different businesses.

Population and Sample
The populations being studied are the wholesale
distribution industry (MAX) and the international
development industry (DSC).
competitive.

Both industries are

According to the National Association of

Wholesale Distributors (NAW), wholesale trade in the
United States was $5.3 trillion in 2016 representing
approximately 28% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).
Distributors typically operate as re-sellers of hard
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goods connecting manufacturers to retailers,
professional contractors, and other consumer-based resellers.

They provide a variety of business services

to both their suppliers and customers, including the
primary service of the storage, management, and timely
delivery of inventory.

Barriers to entry are typically

low in the wholesale distribution industry.
The international development industry is
difficult to accurately define and quantify given the
broad scope of practice areas and the variety of firms
and organizations engaged in the sale and delivery of
services.

Services are typically directed toward and

provided to developing countries, and these services
range from general economic development efforts to
public sector management to childhood education.

Firms

operating in this industry typically contract with
governments directly, or major departments within
governments, such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and with large nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

What makes

quantification of this industry so challenging is that,
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in addition to companies dedicated exclusively to
international development such as DAI and Chemonics,
much of the international development work is performed
by large, global management consulting companies such
as Accenture, Deloitte, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
This international development work represents just a
small portion of the total revenue for these large,
multinational consulting companies.
These populations, the wholesale distribution and
international development industries, while
interesting, are not the main driver for the inquiry of
this study.

This study is focused upon the specific

actions, principles, and discipline that may be at work
at both MAX and DSC.

Although this study does not

assume the results gathered from these industries will
be generalizable, further research may demonstrate
generalizability, especially among other wholesale
distributors in various industries.
A multicase study approach was utilized with
multiple branch locations and departments from MAX, and
the Washington, DC based headquarters for DSC, serving
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as the sample.
profit centers.

The MAX branches operate as independent
Within each branch a variety of

individuals have significant influence over daily
operations and the branch’s ability to execute its
performance objectives.

Those individuals have

positions and responsibilities related to the
following:

branch management, operations, customer

service, warehousing, delivery and administration.
operates and manages nine practice areas.

DSC

A variety of

DSC executives, managers, administrators, and technical
and operations team members have responsibility and
influence for the delivery of services in each practice
area.

Selection of Participants
This study gathered primary data through
structured interviews with the goal of obtaining
information related to:

interviewees’ opinions and

perceptions regarding how their organizations get
things done; identification and understanding of the
specific actions they perform in order to execute their
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daily operations and drive performance; opinions and
identification of guiding principles that may influence
the nature of their actions; and opinions regarding the
existence and potential influence of a discipline, i.e.
the combination of actions and principles that create a
system to help guide employee behavior in executing
performance objectives.
Study participants were chosen based upon the
guidance of Karl, President at DSC, and Tim, Regional
Manager at MAX.

Employees were selected based upon

their employment and assignment to a specific,
individual branch or regional responsibility at MAX,
and from various teams and departments at DSC.

The

participants hold a variety of positions and possess
differing responsibilities, including senior
management, middle management, administration, and
functional and technical specialists.
Another selection criterion in the case of MAX
involved geographic considerations.

The branches

selected for this study were based in Florida in order
to minimize travel time and logistical expenses.

DSC
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headquarters and operating offices are located in
Washington, DC, so interviewing DSC participants
required travel to this site of operations.

Instrumentation, Procedures, Data Collection
This study employed intensive interviewing as the
primary means of exploring the research participants’
opinions, perceptions, and personal experience relative
to their organization’s capability to execute.

As

Charmaz (2014) argues, intensive interviewing is an
ideal research instrument for a grounded theory study
due to its focused, in-depth and open-ended nature.
Intensive interviewing explores an area in which the
interviewee has substantial experience and provides the
flexibility to discover and pursue ideas and issues
that emerge during the interview (Charmaz, 2014, p.
85).

The purpose of the interview is to gather enough

information to fully explore and develop the theory;
that is, to saturate the topic.
While Charmaz (2014) does not prescribe how many
interviews should be conducted, she recommends

172

increasing the number of interviews if attempting to
construct a complex conceptual analysis.

The results

of the literature review indicated that discovering and
developing a theory of execution was likely to involve
a complex conceptual analysis.

I conducted a total of

eighteen interviews; consisting of nine participants
from DSC and nine participants from MAX.

I am

confident that this number of interviews proved
sufficient to saturate the topic.
The interviews were semi-structured and flexible,
with the intent of creating an “open and interactional
space in which the participant can relate his or her
experience” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 57).

The questions were

open-ended, probing the interview participants for
their thoughts on how their organizations get things
done; that is, how their organizations execute their
performance objectives.
I began each interview with the broad based
question asking the interviewees to explain “how things
got done” within their organizations. It was important
to lead with this broad, general question in order to
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address a potential issue raised in the literature
review.

Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) found instances of

participants to a routine who were unable to articulate
and explain the nature of the routine in which they
were engaged.

Prior to directing my line of

questioning toward the variables of actions,
principles, and discipline, it was important to assess,
on an unprompted basis, whether the interviewees
perceived and could describe a capability of execution
at work in their organizations.
In-person interview was the primary method of
interviewing, but I conducted one phone interview as
well.

Interviews were recorded and transcribed only

with the full knowledge and explicit consent of the
interview subjects.
Given the rigorous demands of the participants’
businesses and my own travel and time constraints, I
was unable to conduct additional field observations at
both DSC and MAX.

Additionally, actual internal

financial and performance reports were not provided by
Karl, President of DSC, or Tim, Regional Manager at
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MAX.

I engaged in several, general discussions

regarding the overall performance of DSC and MAX, but I
was not provided, nor did I expect, internal company
reports detailing those performance metrics and
capturing organizational performance.

Thus, the

intensive, semi-structured interviews served as the
primary source of data for this study.

Data Analysis
Transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed and
coded with a focus on identifying and defining elements
associated with each organization’s capability to
execute.

I followed Creswell’s (2013) approach of

“lean coding”, using actions, principles, and
discipline as initial codes for analyzing the data,
supplemented by additional codes that emerged during
data collection.

Recognizing that I was introducing

these a priori categories into the data analysis, I
remained mindful of Charmaz’s (2014) assertion and
guidance that initial coding is “provisional,
comparative, and grounded in the data” and that the
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researcher must remain open to all possible theoretical
directions indicated by the data (p. 114).

Given that

this is a grounded theory study, I sought to analyze
and code information gathered that was related to
processes, actions, or interactions (Creswell, 2013).
Given also that this is a multicase study as well, I
looked for evidence from the individual case studies to
show how uniformity or disparity characterized the
Quintain (Stake, 2006); that is, evidence corroborating
the presence and influence of a capability of
execution.

Through a careful review of the details of

each case and a cross case analysis, I combined the
relevant findings to develop a set of assertions and
conclusions related execution.

Any and all assertions

and conclusions were based entirely upon the evidence
(Stake, 2006).

Ethical Considerations
The President of DSC and the CEO of MAX granted
formal written permission to interview their employees.
A copy of the interview questions for this study was
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provided prior to the granting of that permission.

The

companies are not specifically identified in this
study; “DSC” and “MAX” are pseudonyms allowing both
companies to retain their anonymity.

The only

descriptors of these organizations are that MAX is a
publicly traded wholesale distribution company, and DSC
is a professional services company operating in the
international development industry.
The employees of each organization also remain
anonymous; pseudonyms were used for all employee
participants and they are identified only by a general
description of their position and/or responsibilities.
Employees were provided a consent letter expressing:
their voluntary participation, the nature of the study,
the steps taken to assure their anonymity, and the
safeguards enacted to ensure that firm management and
fellow employees do not have access to their interview
responses.

Additional explicit, written consent was

obtained from employees for the recording of individual
interviews.

The audio recording consent form details

the handling, storage, and procedures taken to ensure
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interviewee anonymity and to prevent access to these
recordings by members of MAX and DSC.

All consent

forms employed with this study clearly communicate that
an employee’s agreement to participate was entirely
voluntary, and that he or she had the ability to
withdraw participation at any time.

I also verbally

communicated that participation was voluntary prior to
the start of each interview.

Every effort has been

made to ensure employee anonymity, and to protect
employees from any adverse effects from participating
in this study.

Researcher Positionality
I have enjoyed a more than thirty-year career
working in a variety of companies, both private and
public.

The nature of these businesses included

consumer based, business-to-business, retail,
distribution, service and manufacturing.

The

industries in which these companies operated included
residential construction, recreation and leisure
products, and industrial goods.

I have also held a
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variety of positions and responsibilities throughout my
career in the areas of management, sales, marketing,
and operations; and I have founded a small construction
company and a manufacturing start-up.

Most of my

positions were executive or senior level management
where I had direct profit and loss responsibility for
one or several business units.
Throughout my career and in all the businesses in
which I have worked, I have continually examined and
assessed how my companies, divisions, branches,
departments and various teams were able or unable to
execute, and the impact that ability or lack of ability
had on performance outcomes.

Thus, as indicated in the

literature review, I have been one of those
practitioners very much concerned with execution, and
this has motivated my search for answers from the
strategic management and organizational routine
scholars.

By studying their theories, data, and

analysis, in combination with this field research, it
was my desire to make a valuable contribution to the
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base of knowledge in these disciplines relative to the
concept of execution.

Validity
The goal of this study is to better understand why
and how organizations execute their daily operations
and the impact that execution has on organizational
performance and outcomes.

In an effort to validate

this qualitative research I followed several validation
strategies advocated by Creswell (2013).

I share

Creswell’s view that validation should be an attempt to
assess the “accuracy” of research findings, as
described by the researcher and the participants, and
the acknowledgement that the final research report is
my own representation; that is, a representation by the
author (pp. 249-250).
Several of the Creswell (2013) validation
strategies that I employed include:

triangulation,

negative case analysis, researcher bias identification
and clarification, member checking, and rich thick
description.
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As part of triangulation, I pursued multiple and
different sources, methods, and theories to corroborate
the data and evidence collected.

Stake (2006) is

helpful here in describing triangulation as “…a process
of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning…” (p.
37).

By following Stake’s (2006) cross case analysis

guidelines, I obtained redundant information from the
individual cases leading to several cross case
assertions that contributed toward validation.
I also challenged my assumptions by employing
negative case analysis as a validation strategy, and
regarding researcher bias, I was mindful of the need to
explicitly acknowledge and clarify my own positions
throughout this study.

I have already demonstrated

this sensitivity by way of the conceptual framework
proposed at the conclusion of the literature review,
and the details provided regarding my career in the
researcher positionality section of this dissertation
proposal.
Finally, I provide rich, thick description in this
study that will allow readers to consider the
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applicability of the information to other potential
settings.

As a grounded theory study, I present

detailed descriptions of the processes, actions, and
interactions that were revealed during the interview
process.

As a multicase study, I also provide detailed

descriptions of the individual cases; that is, the
individual employees who hold a variety of positions
and responsibilities for both DSC and MAX.
By combining and employing these validation
strategies, I discover and articulate a theory that
provides explanatory value as to how MAX and DSC
execute their performance objectives, and also a theory
that may be generalizable to other organizations in a
variety of industries.
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Chapter 4
Findings
Overview
The purpose of this study is to understand the
concept of execution; that is, an organization’s
abilities and activities related to “getting things
done”.

This study also seeks to find evidence

regarding how execution may be measured and to assess
the potential impact that an ability to execute may
have on organizational performance.

The research

findings detailed in this chapter contribute to a
better and more thorough understanding of execution by
identifying certain drivers, i.e. actions and
principles, which emerged from the participant
interviews.

The data demonstrates how these drivers

function within the two organizations studied, and
their influence on organizational performance and
outcomes.
The findings comprised of nine interviews from
Development Systems Corporation (DSC) and nine
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interviews from Maxcorp Distributors Inc. (MAX),
provide evidence and support for five key drivers as
the source and cause of much of their organizational
activities and guiding principles for getting things
done.

These five drivers are:

measurement;

communication; quality people; autonomy, flexibility,
and nimbleness; and teamwork and collaboration (see
Appendix G).
This chapter is divided into several sections.
The first section presents a brief re-examination of
the two companies, DSC and MAX.

When I initiated this

study, I was well aware of some significant differences
between the two companies, but in the course of the
participant interviews additional differences emerged,
and the previously identified differences proved even
more pronounced.

On the surface, DSC and MAX could not

be any more different.

The reason and the value in

further examining these differences is the fact that
the shared findings become more interesting and
striking.

The common drivers of execution exist in

dramatically different organizations and operating
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environments.

This discovery will perhaps lend support

to the generalizability of these findings to other
companies across different industries.

The next

section reviews each of the major findings in detail,
examining each individual driver and then the five
drivers combined.

This chapter concludes with a brief

analysis of an important “Other Finding”; that is,
“customer needs” and its relation to getting things
done within DSC and MAX.

Company Contexts
Organization
Development Systems Corporation (DSC) is a
professional services firm providing consulting and
project management services to the international
development industry.

With a U.S. based headquarters,

DSC has operated in more than 100 countries and
maintains 35 project offices around the world.

The

firm’s largest customer is the U.S. Federal Government,
primarily the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), but DSC also provides services to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some foreign
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governments.

DSC was founded in the early 1980s by

Liam and Mary, a husband and wife team.

Together, they

led, grew, and managed the firm for approximately 30
years.

DSC was recently acquired by a multi-billion

dollar, publicly traded engineering products and
services company (Global Corporation).

DSC currently

operates within the international development division
of this public company.

Mary has retired; Liam remains

active in the business in the role of President
Emeritus.
Substantial DSC activity and effort is driven by
the “client project”, what Liam called their “unit of
implementation”.

DSC’s organizational structure was

best described by Al, Executive Vice President (VP),
who likened it to a “three-legged stool”, consisting
of:

an in-country “Field” leader and team, a Technical

team (U.S. headquarters), and an Operations team (U.S.
headquarters).

No one individual has singular profit

and loss (P&L) responsibility for a project; different
teams and individuals within each team possess and
carry out different responsibilities.

For example, a
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Senior Project Manager is responsible and accountable
for managing expenses to budget, but does not have
overall P&L responsibility for the project.

Profit and

loss is the responsibility of certain members of the
Executive Management Team (EMT).

In the course of

interviewing the DSC participants, aside from DSC’s
Executive VP, Al, none of the interviewees referred to
specific sales and profit goals for the overall company
or their individual projects.
In terms of the organization of the personnel at
its U.S. headquarters, the separation of the Technical
Team and the Operations Team is a major, structural,
defining characteristic of DSC.

The two teams are

independent and they have separate responsibilities.
This organizational design was an intentional choice
made by the founders, Liam and Mary, and it continues
to shape DSC activities today.

The founders also

desired little or no hierarchy; they wanted a flat
organization with minimal management layers and a high
level of individual autonomy.

Liam shared that he

liked the fact that if you asked members of the
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Technical team who their supervisor was, most “…would
have no answer whatsoever to that question”.

He also

commented that he and Mary had wanted to create a home
for creative people, as well as for talented
individuals who may have been “organizationally
dysfunctional”.

Much of this thinking and

organizational legacy remain a strong influence on the
DSC culture and operations today.
In great contrast to DSC, Maxcorp Distributors
Inc. (MAX), has a clearly defined structure and
hierarchy.

Each MAX branch location operates as an

independent profit center that is led by a Branch
Manager.

Each branch is typically organized by major

function or department that includes:

warehouse

(inventory management), drivers (delivery), and
showroom and counter (sales and customer service).
Depending upon the sales volume of a given location, a
Branch Manager may have additional managers reporting
to him or her:

Assistant Manager, Operations Manager,

Warehouse Manager, and Customer Service Manager.

The

Branch Manager has P&L responsibility for the location,
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as well as responsibility for servicing and further
developing a defined local market.

Each branch is

typically supported by several “regional” employees who
work in the following areas:

accounts receivable,

business development, and operations.

These regional

employees are assigned to multiple branches. Also a
regionally designated Customer Call Center, or CSA,
fields inbound customer sales calls for multiple
branches.

A MAX branch belongs to a geographical

Region, and a Region belongs to a MAX Division.
Several Branch Managers report to a MAX Regional
Manager; Regional Managers report to a General or
Divisional Manager; and General or Divisional Managers,
few in number, report to a Senior Executive.

Regional,

General and Divisional Managers also have P&L
responsibility; their regions and divisions are simply
a “roll-up” of the profit and loss of the specified
number of branches in those regions and divisions.
The MAX organization operates through a clearly
defined hierarchy, with well-defined positions and
clear reporting responsibilities. During the MAX
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interviews, several participants referred to a “chain
of command” when explaining how they operate.

Gerry, a

Business Development Representative (BDR), communicated
well the hierarchy active at MAX by stating: “[We’re]
structured kind of from top to bottom so our manager
dictates how we proceed…on the operational side, the
sales side, ultimately the decision comes from top to
bottom”.
The findings of this study revealed a dramatic
difference in organizational style and hierarchies
between DSC and MAX.

This difference was a major

reason for selecting these two organizations for this
study.

As part of my grounded theory research, and

given the use of semi-structured interviews, I sought
to determine if a specific organizational style or
hierarchy might have an effect on execution.

My belief

was that the discovery of evidence supporting common
elements of execution across such dissimilar
organizations, would, perhaps, make a strong case for
the generalizability of these findings to other
companies.
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Products, Services and Customers
DSC is in the business of selling its technical
and project management expertise primarily to USAID,
but also to NGOs and some foreign governments.
Executive VP, Al, related that DSC is known as an
analytical firm within the industry; he stated, “…in
terms of reputation, we’re known as the smart
organization, the smart people, the ‘eggheads’”.

With

USAID and other U.S. federal agencies as its primary
customers, DSC activities and operations are very much
shaped and constrained by the extensive, formal
requirements involved in federal government
contracting.

Liam, President Emeritus, explained that

DSC operates in a very “compliance-oriented industry”
and that “…rule compliance has to be done in a
relatively central and consistent way”.

Satisfying

these extensive compliance requirements is a nonnegotiable reality within their industry.

The federal

government issues annual evaluations, Contractor
Performance Assessment Reports (CPARs), for companies
with whom it does business.

Achieving high scores on
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the CPARs is essential for success and future business.
Liam labelled these requirements “hygiene factors”, and
he explained, “…if that ever falls, you’re toast” and
any firm that does not fulfil the requirements “…will
have a very unhappy future”.

His conclusion regarding

the hygiene factors was the following: “I don’t think
those things win for us but they would certainly lose
for us”.
Given the nature of the federal government, the
sales cycle for DSC is usually long, ranging from
several months (quick) to several years.

Once a sale

is made, a government contract typically produces a
long term, multi-year, multi-million dollar,
international project for DSC.

Though in sharing some

of the challenges related to staffing these projects,
the Director of Contracts, Kevin, indicated that DSC
also works on smaller projects, i.e. several hundreds
of thousands of dollars.

Kevin said that, “…it’s

funny, you could have a project that’s ninety-four
million dollars that almost runs itself…but then you
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have something that’s two hundred thousand dollars that
could probably take twice as much of your time”.
The nature of MAX products and customers could not
be more different than those of DSC.

MAX distributes

hard goods; MAX inventories, manages, and re-sells more
than 150,000 products into the leisure, recreational,
and construction industries primarily in the U.S.

The

typical branch location maintains an inventory of 3,000
to 4,000 products to service its local market.

The

vast majority of MAX customers are commercial
contractors, retailers, and service companies.

The

sales cycle for MAX is short; customers order and
receive product on a daily basis through pick-ups at
the local MAX branch or via MAX delivery to the
customer’s location or job site.

Order values range

from a few dollars to several thousand dollars. Large
orders, i.e. hundreds of thousands of dollars, are
uncommon.

Unlike the long term, multi-year nature of

DSC projects, MAX branches are subject to the urgency
and pressure of fulfilling immediate customer orders on
a daily basis.

Customers evaluate MAX branches and
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personnel on a daily basis through their purchasing
decisions and buying habits.

The majority of products

sold by MAX are easily and readily found through many
different outlets, and each local market will have
several competing distributors selling the same
products from the same suppliers as MAX.

Financial Incentives
The two companies also have vastly different views
and approaches relative to employee financial
incentives.

Though a few interviewees indicated that

the recent acquisition of DSC by Global Corporation may
bring some changes in this area, DSC has historically
not offered individual employee incentives.

In keeping

with their desire to build a company with little or no
hierarchy, autonomy for individual employees, and a
supportive environment for talented, creative people,
Liam and Mary viewed their business as a “collective
enterprise”.

As Liam shared, if DSC had a good year,

“…we increased the contributions to the profit sharing
plan that was distributed to everybody”.

In discussing

this issue, Liam stated that Global Corporation was now
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attempting to introduce “external motivators”, with
which he strongly disagreed.

He passionately

communicated his position, by stating:
I hate bonuses. I hate them because you end up
with a few winners and a shitload of losers. And
even the winners, then next year they don’t win
again, yeah, so all you do is create a problem…you
asked me how things got done. I never believed in
it and I don’t now, individual credit. I think
that we either rise or fall together. And even if
somebody is not carrying their weight, then it’s
either individually or collectively our job to
either get them to do it, or help them find
another job somewhere else. But it’s not our job
to pat someone on the head or kick someone in the
butt. That’s not our job. If they’re not good
enough to be here, they shouldn’t be here. But if
they’re good enough to be here, they’re as good as
everybody else.
MAX, in direct contrast, utilizes an extensive
employee incentive plan system for numerous positions
within the organization.

At the branch level,

potential bonuses are available to the Branch Managers,
Operations Managers, and Business Development
Representatives (BDRs).

The incentive pay-outs are

contingent upon the P&L performance of the branch, and
each individual has specific performance metrics tied
to his or her position.

Similarly, bonus plans are in
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place for regional positions, such as the Accounts
Receivable and the Call Center (CSA) Representatives
(Reps).

Incentive opportunities extend up the

management chain to Regional, Divisional, and General
Manager positions, with bonus potentials increasing
with the increasing level of management responsibility.
The bulk of the pay-outs are tied to P&L performance.
Dan, one of the CSA Reps for the MAX region,
explained his incentive plan: “Yeah, there’s an
incentive every quarter they give out…if the branch
hits a certain number, if the region hits a certain
number…we’ll get a stipend every three months…” Dan has
an additional opportunity to earn incentive pay by way
of a customer service bonus plan.

He stated that MAX

has an “employee of the quarter” that is determined by
customer surveys: “…they have a form that you send to
our customers and…I shamelessly plead for a bonus to
some customers…but hey…you don’t get, if you don’t ask
for it”.
MAX even extends incentives to some employee
training programs.

Gerry, a BDR at one of the MAX
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branches, just began a prestigious, multi-year sales
training program within the company.

He shared that

the program is a lot of work, and “nothing you can do
during work”, but he is excited because “…they’ve put
some carrots out there for us as far as an end game on
the whole thing. Stock options and things that are kind
of beneficial”.
Unlike the history and culture of DSC, a keen
focus on individual performance and the extensive use
of incentives, i.e. those external motivators disliked
so vehemently by Liam, is very much tied into MAX
operations and is a strong part of the company culture.
In the course of my MAX interviews, all the
participants discussed or referred to branch sales
goals, and several discussed branch profit goals and
various other financial measures as well.
The preceding review of the significant
differences between DSC and MAX is captured and
summarized by the diagram found in Figure 2:
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Figure 2:

DSC/MAX Differences
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These extreme dissimilarities between DSC and MAX
make the shared findings that will be detailed and
discussed in the next section even more interesting and
striking.

The common drivers of execution found in

these dramatically different organizations may prove an
indicator of the findings applicability to a variety of
companies across multiple industries.

Findings Detail
Multiple findings emerged from the analysis of the
participant interviews.

Tables 1 and 2 display the

main and lesser findings discovered at DSC and MAX
respectively:
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Table 1:

Findings Map DSC

Table 1
Findings Map: DSC
Participant

Main Finding:
Measurement

Main Finding:
Communication

Main Finding Main Finding

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Carey

X

X

Nancy

X

X

Quality
People

X

Quality
People

X

Quality
People

Al

Liam

Amy

Diane

Kevin

Mike

Karen

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Main Finding

Lesser Finding Lesser Finding

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Customer
Quality People Needs

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Customer
Needs

Relationships

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Reputation

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Leadership

X

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Contracts

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Quality
People

Relationships

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

X

X

Quality
People

Overseeing,
Supervising

Customer
Needs
Accuracy,
Quality
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Table 2:

Findings Map MAX

Table 2
Findings Map: MAX
Participant

Tim

Main Finding:
Measurement

X

Main Finding:
Communication

Main Finding

Main Finding

Main Finding

X

Quality
People

Expectations

Leadership

Roger

X

X

Quality
People

Rose

X

X

Quality
People

Teamwork &
Collaboration
Teamwork &
Collaboration

Leadership

Leadership

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Bill

X

X

Ted

X

X

Quality
People

Dan

X

X

Quality
People
Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Customer Needs Nimbleness

Ed

X

X

Lance

X

X

Quality
People

Customer Needs

Leadership

Teamwork &
Collaboration

X

Structure

Customer
Needs

Customer
Needs

MAX website

Quality
People

X

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness
Customer
Needs

Quality
People

Gerry

Lesser Finding Lesser Finding

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Leadership
Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

Customer
Needs
Teamwork &
Collaboration
Teamwork &
Collaboration

Cross Training

The two tables show universal agreement among
interviewees regarding “measurement” and
“communication” as essential, fundamental activities in
their organization’s day-to-day operations.

The tables
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also show strong agreement among most of the
interviewees that “quality people”, “autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness”, and “teamwork and
collaboration” are also critical factors for their
respective organizations’ capability to execute their
performance objectives.

Measurement
In the course of interviewing both DSC and MAX
participants, it quickly became apparent that
“measurement”, the activity of measuring, tracking and
assessing numerous business functions, was strongly
embedded in both organizations.

This organizational

reality is summed up best for all by Tim, Regional
Manager at MAX, when he stated: “You know, everything
is tracked…sales, gross profit…from an operational
standpoint…we measure inventory budgets, turn budgets.
I mean essentially every segment of the business is
measured in some way.”

Whether it is a “yellow light,

red light” measure used by Project Manager Amy and her
team at DSC, or an extensive system of “trackers”
developed by Carey, Technical Director at DSC, or the
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“90-12 rule” for CSA call answering followed by Dan and
Lance at MAX, it was clear that all participants are
actively engaged in extensive measuring of key
activities.

This measuring and these measures are

important for assessing and guiding performance, and
for ensuring that both DSC and MAX are “getting things
done”.
The fundamental nature of each business requires
that certain actions and performance be quantified,
tracked, and measured.

For DSC, the compliance

requirements of the federal government dictate specific
activity and how that activity must be performed.

The

goal is always to earn high marks on the Government’s
annual “Contractor Performance Assessment Report”
(CPAR).

It is a report card that evaluates those doing

business with the government in such areas as financial
management, subcontract management, and technical
implementation.

Mike, a Senior Project Manager at DSC,

described some of the challenges in achieving these
measures:
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You know when you’re working with the federal
government…margins are very small, and so if…we’re
not meeting all the compliance requirements, and
most large projects wind up getting audited…that
can add up to a major loss for the company pretty
quickly.
The CPAR proves to be a precise tool for measuring
government contract compliance.
Similarly, MAX’s extensive measurement of branch
operations, particularly inventory management, may be
viewed as “compliance requirements” from MAX’s
corporate headquarters.

Product inventories are a high

dollar asset in every MAX branch, so proper receiving,
storing, and shipping are essential to operational
success.

As Gerry, BDR for MAX, shared, certain

warehouse activities are closely measured and must be
performed in a specific way:
So the radio frequency guns dictate that we do X
amount of cycle counts [inventory test counts] per
day. And then you can’t move forward until you do
a second level count…So and then I would say the
radio frequency guns are for pulling accuracy.
They are set up to pull serial numbers as well
so…you’re pulling the correct product, it’s
telling you if you’re not pulling the correct
products…Where before you could first put in NA
and you’re done.
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The performance of many of these prescribed
operational activities is captured in a weekly,
company-wide “Operational Flash Report”.

The report

measures activities such as: cycle counts, stock outs
[missed sales], shrink [“lost” product], inventory
adjustments, and branch inventory levels, among other
measures.

As Tim, Regional Manager for MAX, shared,

“The Ops Flash Report” is a critical daily measurement
tool, and he complained that Corporate continues to set
more stringent operational goals. One example Tim
referenced was the target for stockouts: “They lower
them is what I’m saying, so now our goal is…I can
remember them being, they had to be under 7 or 8
percent.

Now it’s like 4 point something”.

Much like the precise measuring applied to
compliance and operations at DSC and MAX, evidence for
a similar precision of measurement was found in the
areas of sales and financial results.

Given that both

DSC and MAX are part of publicly traded companies, they
track many of the standard financial measures required
and expected for a public company.

Al, Executive VP at
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DSC, sums this up well for both companies when he
stated: “The key indicators are revenue and profit.
And new business leading to a suitable backlog of
work…There is a negotiated process with our parent
company that arrives at the revenue and operating
income targets”.
Tim, Regional Manager at MAX, stated that the P&L
is the “ultimate measurement”, and he shared that MAX
recently instituted a “my digest” Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) system that provides “…anything you’d
ever want to know…there’s some pre-program reports but
you could also create any report you want”.

Tim also

shared that MAX Corporate is very much focused on
“basis point increase”, the percentage change of key
financial ratios: “So the percentages.
would be 10 basis points.

So one percent

So…any branch every year is

going to have to improve [their] margins by 10 basis
points at a minimum”.
I discovered an interesting contrast when
discussing financial measurements with both DSC and MAX
interviewees.

While the focus on numbers and precise
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financial measures and goals were top of mind for Al,
VP at DSC, knowledge of these measures and goals was
not apparent in my conversations with the other DSC
interviewees.

Some DSC interviewees expressed a

concern for expenses and some were aware of expense
budget numbers, but they did not express or communicate
an awareness of specific profit and loss targets and
measures for individual projects or for the overall
company.

Mike, Project Manager at DSC, reflected this

position when he spoke about expenses and managing to
an expense budget: “Then I look at are we managing our
budget well in terms of meeting our projected
expenditures…even more so since we were acquired by
Global Corp…”
This lack of focus, lack of awareness of profit
goals and financial measures is likely due to the
historical legacy of the DSC founders’ approach to
running the business.

Liam, President Emeritus,

shared: “You know if there’s an interesting piece of
work and we’re doing it well…and our staff enjoys
working on it and we make 5 cents, it doesn’t make us
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broke, why wouldn’t we do it?”

He also explained that

during the 30 years that he and Mary ran the company,
they did not share much financial information with
employees because Liam believed: “If the company was
losing money, too bad for Mary and me, but that…wasn’t
their [employees] problem, that was our problem”.

Many

DSC interviewees indicated that they were experiencing
a cultural shift in this area, where greater
measurement, review and more frequent discussion of
specific financial targets had become increasingly
important since being acquired by Global Corp.
In vivid contrast to the DSC participants, all MAX
interviewees were very much aware of sales and other
financial measures.

They communicated that, at a

minimum, all branch personnel would be, and should be,
aware of a daily sales goal.

Depending upon their

positions, MAX interviewees followed other financial
measures as well.

Dan, an agent at the MAX Call

Center, discussed the reports that he receives and
reviews: “You know that, the very first column is sales
volume.

So and so does 7.4 million dollars so far this
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year, and this is how many calls he’s taken…” Ed, a BDR
for MAX, explained how he uses the MAX CRM system to
not only track overall sales, but to also review and
target his individual customer accounts by category:
“I…look at all my accounts…and try to figure out where
I need to improve as far as growing a certain product
category.

And most of the sales team are pretty much

driven the same way.”

The Regional AR person for MAX,

Rose, also indicated a top of mind awareness for
“numbers”: “Well Corporate likes to look at numbers.
Everything’s a numbers game…I have numbers, every
department, you know, has numbers”.

In speaking with

the MAX interviewees, it was clear that they all were
aware of the importance of measuring and achieving
specific sales and financial goals. This was also
supported by MAX’s use of extensive incentive plans as
discussed previously.
Government compliance, corporate operations, sales
and financial results, are key areas that DSC and MAX
quantify and measure, and their goals and targets in
these areas are well defined and precisely measured.
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In the case of DSC however, employees were less aware
of specific financial goals than the employees at MAX.
They are good examples and serve as strong evidence to
support “measurement” as one of the main findings of
this study.

Interviewees discussed measurement

specifically and provided numerous examples of how and
what they measure.

It was evident that “measuring” is

a guiding principle and a set of activities embedded
throughout the operations of these two companies, and
that measuring is a critical driver for getting things
done at both DSC and MAX.
What became noticeable, however, is that when
discussing the other drivers of execution, i.e.
communication; quality people; autonomy, flexibility,
and nimbleness; and teamwork and flexibility, the
interviewees often struggled to provide clear
definitions and quantifiable “measures” of these
drivers.

This also proved to be the case when

discussing their interaction with customers.

In the

course of reviewing each of the remaining findings and
an “other finding” related to customer needs, I will
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highlight how the interviewees’ struggle to clearly
define these drivers and explain how they are measured
within their organizations.

Communication
All the participants to this study identified
“communication” in some form or fashion as one of the
critical drivers for getting things done within both
DSC and MAX.

In answering the first question of the

Interview Protocol, “what is the best way to describe
or explain how things get done around here”, many, like
the Technical Director Diane at DSC, responded that
“communication” was a key activity:

“I think that the

secret is good interpersonal relations, frequent
communication, and positive constructive feedback…”
Kevin, the Director of Contracts at DSC, shared this
view by stating: “I think staying in communication with
your team that works on your project I think is
huge…Communication is huge…you just can’t sit back and
crank out paperwork”.
MAX interviewees expressed similar sentiments
regarding communication.

Rose, the Regional AR person
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at MAX, identified communication as essential for
getting things done at her branch, and she stated that,
“I believe we communicate throughout the entire day”.
Dan, a CSA agent at MAX, commented: “…I think that’s
the key—is you got to have good communication skills
with your employees.
the cracks…”.

If you don’t, things fall through

Dan also pointed out the importance of

communicating with customers.

He stated that, “…if you

can’t communicate with the customer…if you can’t get
the customer an answer, to me that’s a problem”.
Roger, Branch Manager at MAX, also identified
communication with the customer as essential for
successfully executing the business:
A key factor is order entry, and communication
between the customer to the person keying the
order. I would say that’s probably the most
critical step. You know because from there it
snowballs you know out of control.
In addition to this general consensus regarding
the importance of communicating and the principle of
communication as essential to execution, the
interviewees identified and described a variety of
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methods used to communicate at both DSC and MAX.

Both

organizations conduct numerous, formal meetings at
multiple levels within their respective organizations.
Nancy, Technical Director at DSC, leads team meetings
every Thursday and third Wednesday of the month.

When

asked about their effectiveness and outcomes, she
stated: “Well I think it’s just one—information sharing
and so people are on the same page…it’s when we want
information delivered to the whole group so the message
is clear…and people have the opportunity to ask
questions…” Al, Executive VP at DSC, as well as several
other DSC interviewees, provided a long list of company
meetings that were open to most everyone:

a President

led, company-wide “town hall, once or twice per year,
and frequent technical, operations, business
development and executive management meetings
throughout the year.
Similarly, Ted, Regional Manager at MAX, explained
the nature and the extent of formalized meetings within
the company and his region:
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So once a year the entire company comes
together…we have our own show [product, sales,
marketing related]…then Rod will come in as
General Manager once a year at a minimum he’ll sit
down with my region…At the regional level, you
know from my direction, I do have a monthly sales
meeting…I pull my entire region together…At the
branch level, I haven’t set any specific
expectations of number of meetings, but I will
tell every branch manager at a minimum pull the
teams together three or four times a year…
Most of the interviewees maintained that meetings were
an important tool for communication, and often used for
communicating many of the compliance, operations, and
financial measurements discussed in the previous
section.
In addition to these meetings, DSC and MAX
employees communicate in a variety of other methods as
well.

Dan, CSA agent at MAX, explained how all the

agents have and use a “chat” tool designed just for the
Call Center: “We got…we can chat with them via a little
bubble on our computers now…I can still send him a link
message and say, ‘call me asap’ or ‘hey, I got so and
so on the line’”.

Dan also passionately expressed the

importance of email as a communication method for doing
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his job, and his frustration with some of the MAX
branches that fail to respond to his email: “It is
email, email, email; it’s copy, copy, copy…I find
there’s branches that I email every day and every day
they never email me back.

They never say they got it”.

Gerry, a BDR at MAX, pointed out that technology is
also driving some of the communications methods and
expectations: “…technology has kind of taken over…I get
a text message [from a customer] five cents high on
this…on a Saturday night at 10:00 pm”.
Both companies rely heavily on phone
communication, and this communication method is
especially important for DSC given that most of their
work is conducted internationally.

Kevin, Director of

Contracts, explained how one of his team members
manages the time difference issue: “And I mean you
know, we have someone in our department who will get up
in the middle of the night to take a call from Pakistan
at 3 am”.
Many interviewees identified “old fashioned”,
face-to-face meetings and conversations as a pervasive
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and important method of communication.

Karen, Director

of HR at DSC, explained how the physical layout of the
departments at DSC headquarters encourages and
facilitates face-to-face communication:
…I mean just the way we’re physically located,
physically seated, it’s the same around all the
departments at DSC. The contracts team sits
together…accounting and finance are sort of in the
same area. And so very easy; I see it all the
time as I walk around people getting up out of
their space and walking across the hall to
actually talk.
During his interview, Bill, Assistant Manager at MAX,
provided several examples that demonstrated his use of
face-to-face communication.

One example involved a

conflict with one of his drivers.

The driver became

angry and upset because an employee called out and Bill
asked him to add three more stops to his route.

The

driver failed to do one of the deliveries and Bill
explained how they had a private “consult” in which
Bill communicated the following: “You know that’s very
childish.

And you know, you’re a grown man.

I mean we

expect a lot from you, we expect a lot from everyone…”
Bill was one of several interviewees who clearly
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expressed a preference for direct, face-to-face
communication with his team members.
These DSC and MAX interviews demonstrated a
consensus among the participants that communication is
an important driver of getting things done. The
interview data also documents the various actions and
activities that constitute this driver “communication”.
Given this consensus, one might expect, or hope, that
the interview data would also have identified a
specific “formula” for communication that could be
universally applied to all businesses.

For example, a

prescription or guidance regarding the frequency and
the optimal number of meetings, emails, phone calls,
and/or face-to-face meetings to conduct each week.
Unfortunately this proved not to be the case.

No such

formula or prescription emerges from the data.
The data instead indicates that individuals
communicate using a constantly changing mix of methods
and varying frequency.

For example, despite the

extensive use of meetings in both organizations,
several interviewees voiced their reservations
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regarding the need and effectiveness of meetings in all
situations.

Mike, Senior Project Manager at DSC,

cautioned that some meetings can actually hinder
communication: “…I think you have to be selective in
what you take into a meeting and how you use that time
otherwise it can become quickly wasted time and…they
[meetings] can actually break apart a team…”
Tim, Regional Manager at MAX, echoes Mike’s
feelings when he shared: “I’m just not huge on meeting
to meet.

You know I mean I think they can turn into

just fluff…and then you know nothing has changed”.

Tim

also expressed his scepticism toward email as a
critical communication method: “There’s a lot of
email…I’m not a huge email person either.

Because to

me it’s noise…I mean there’s certain stuff, yeah I’m
going to forward…I’m a buffer or whatever”.

Contrast

this position with the earlier quotation from Dan at
MAX who stated that communication is “email, email,
email”.

During his interview, Tim also made it clear

that face-to-face communication was his preference.
Karen, HR Director for DSC, expressed a similar
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preference for face-to-face communication as well: “I’m
a big pusher of having a verbal discussion, getting up
out of your seat and going into someone’s space to talk
when you can put those quick answers”.
The interviewees strongly voiced their belief that
communication was a key driver in their organizations’
ability to get things done.

However, when asked in

follow on questions to better define and detail what
they meant by “good”, “frequent”, and “effective”
communication, and how to measure those states, the
interviewees were at a loss.

They could not provide

greater specificity or precise measures.

Interviewees

did respond with a list of actions and activities, but
they could not or would not volunteer any measures
regarding how many meetings, emails, phones calls,
and/or face-to-face discussions should be conducted on
a daily or weekly basis.

In response to my probing,

they looked at me as if I should just “know” what was
meant by “good”, “frequent”, and “effective”.
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Quality People
When asked how the critical things “got done”
within their organizations and what they viewed as the
“key to success” for their businesses, many
participants responded with the following: “employees”,
“our people”, “good people”, and “quality people”.
“Quality People” was a main finding for thirteen of the
eighteen interviewees, and that ratio increased to
fourteen of eighteen when also accounting for the
lesser findings (see Appendix G).
Similar to the challenge of arriving at a precise
understanding of “good communication”, it was also a
challenge to determine what the interviewees meant,
exactly, by “quality people”.

What emerged from the

interviews was not a static description of a “type” of
person or individual, but rather an identification of
several attitudes and/or “dispositions” that trigger or
cause action and activities that enable the individual,
and their respective organization, to get things done.
These individual dispositions centered around:
initiative, drive, engagement and/or commitment.
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In the earlier, “Company Contexts” section of this
chapter that detailed the dissimilarities between DSC
and MAX, Al, Executive VP at DSC, had been quoted as
stating that the company employs “smart people” and
that DSC was known as the “eggheads”.

While Al

identified these “smarts” as a definitive DSC
capability, when asked how DSC got things done, how the
overall organization executed its major objectives, Al
identified “personal initiative” as a critical element:
I would say this company is an unusual blend of
systems and personal initiative and connection…I’d
say very early middle stage of development and
cover only half the things that processes might
cover in a company. On the other, to balance the
gap is filled by a degree of personal initiative
by technical staff who lean forward to undertake
projects or pursue work and personal connection…
The President Emeritus of DSC, Liam, had explained
the efforts of he and his wife to build a company for
talented people, i.e. individuals with a lot of
“intellectual fire power”, creativity, and/or
“organizationally dysfunctional”.

When asked to

identify the most important element behind the more
than 30-year success of the company, he did not respond
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with “talent”, but rather he stated that success was
due to:
…people who are not standing on ceremony about
their job titles and responsibilities, who feel
some collective responsibility for producing the
results and who are willing to do the things that
nobody quite instructed them to do to make sure
that happens.
For Liam, this individual initiative and commitment to
achieving results is the key to organizational success.
Carey, a Technical Director at DSC, described this
initiative, drive, and commitment as the “passion” of
her staff:
I think that the passion of the staff…and if that
means you work late to get it done, then you work
late to get it done. I don’t know many box
checkers here who are just here for a pay check.
Several other interviewees, who identified “quality
people” as a driver of execution, supported their
claims with specific examples.

Amy, a Project Manager

at DSC, explained how her team, entirely unsolicited,
organized and conducted a Myers-Briggs testing and
analysis workshop so that they could improve their
collaboration and team dynamics. Carey provided the
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example of what has been labelled the “treasure hunt”
within DSC.

Given the flat, non-hierarchical structure

of the company, new hires must demonstrate drive and
initiative in order to find the people within DSC who
have the information and answers they need to perform
their jobs. Carey noted the frustration and
inefficiency of the treasure hunt, but she also stated
that it was an excellent process for making contacts
and establishing relationships within DSC.

An

additional example of what quality people do at DSC is
the previously cited case of an employee regularly
fielding a 3 am phone call from Pakistan.

Kevin, the

Director of Contracts, who supervises that employee
also shared:

“That’s just the way she operates.

I

tell her that’s not necessary…but it’s very
appreciated”.
The support for “quality people” as a main finding
proved even stronger at MAX where eight of the nine MAX
interviewees identified it as a key driver of
execution.

These interviewees provided a substantial

amount of data, an amount of data that I am unable to
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adequately review here, so I will provide several
representative examples across the MAX interviewees.
When asked to describe the one key to success for
the company, Rose, Regional AR person for MAX, stated:
“you have to have passionate people and you have to
have good leadership”.

In questioning Rose regarding

the meaning and actions behind “passionate”, she
provided several examples that demonstrated her own
drive, initiative, and commitment, as well as the
drive, initiative, and commitment of her fellow team
members:
So in the morning even though I’m not a counter
girl, I will ring up the orders for customers…or
in the back for instance…like today, I think
there’s three guys missing back there, so the
counter knows they’re going to have pull some of
their orders…
She further explained that her branch has twenty-one
associates, a staffing level that is often insufficient
given the volume of work, and the common practice is
for everybody to “jump in” regardless of position.
Rose also pointed out that “jumping in” is not
necessarily due to the direction of management.

She
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described how the team will get together, on their own,
to make sense of a “rough day”, and determine what
adjustments are needed to improve the day-to-day
operations.
Rose also provided additional examples of how
individual initiative and drive help branch
performance.

She described how, despite all the formal

operational procedures and operational measures,
employees develop their own tools to better execute the
day-to-day activities: “…I mean you’ve got some guys
back there that have been doing this forever.

So

they’ve developed tools or you know…I guess we all kind
of come up with what works best for us”.

Rose

explained how she has developed her own “system” for AR
collections: “…I have a different way of doing it than
any other branch”.

She then went on to further

describe how she used the Corporate AR procedures as
her starting point, but then modified and adapted those
procedures.

No one at MAX instructed or directed Rose

to do this.

In fact, her system has been so successful
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that Tim, her Regional Manager, asked Rose to train
other AR collection agents within the company.
Bill, Assistant Manager at MAX, provided another
outstanding example of the importance and the impact
that quality people have on business execution.

He

recounted a story of how his warehouse manager, without
being asked, fixed the fence around the branch after a
damaging storm.
it.

Bill stated: “He fixed it, he fixed

This man, this man is insane, he’s a workaholic”.

This same warehouse manager, again unsolicited and
self-initiated, also developed a unique solution to
their branch space constraints.

As Bill explained:

…you know pallets come like this and you can only
fit two [in a rack]…well he, he managed to
actually slice them through, make them half
pallets so you can fit three SKUs [stock keeping
units] in one row rather than two SKUs. So we
gained space.
Not only was this an example of individual initiative
and drive, it also proved to be a major improvement in
inventory management and warehouse efficiencies.
Ted, currently a Regional BDR and a former Branch
Manager at MAX, provided one of the best, most
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passionate descriptions regarding the impact and
importance of quality people on their business.

When

answering the question, “what is the best way to
describe how things get done around here”, he replied:
I think it always comes down to people and their
individual drive and leadership. When you have
responsible, engaged, hungry people, they get
things done…So really it’s…do the branch managers,
and the sales team, the operations folks, react to
issues and opportunities and jump on it and make
things happen or not. Or are you waiting for two
days for responses and action.
Ted may have a broader view of this issue given the
fact that he was a Branch Manager for many years prior
to becoming a Regional BDR.

He also mentioned branch

manager leadership and employee experience levels as
important elements of execution, but during our
interview he kept returning to the notions of “drive”
and “engagement”:
Is the sales guy really engaged and is he out
pushing, or are they just there for the ride…I
think it comes down to the people and it’s hard to
say but I’m an engaged guy. I get things done but
I focus on branches where the team is there and
can get things done with me. So it’s individual
drive and leadership of the branch manager and his
or her team.
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From the data provided by the DSC and MAX
interviewees, a better understanding of the concept of
“quality people” emerges.

Quality people take

unsolicited action; they demonstrate initiative in
getting things done.

They react and respond to

problems and challenges without the direction of
management; and they develop their own, oftentimes
unique, solutions to problems.

Quality people possess

a pre-disposition that consists of drive, initiative,
and engagement; an individual capability that serves as
a trigger or source of their actions.
While there was strong support in identifying
“quality people” as a major driver of execution at both
DSC and MAX, obtaining answers to the questions as to
the meaning of “quality” and how to measure that
“quality” proved elusive.

When I pressed the

interviewees in my follow-on questions regarding how to
better define and measure such elements as “drive”,
“initiative”, and “engagement”, they struggled to
provide definitive answers.

When I asked Ted at MAX as
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to how and why the organization was so fortunate to
have these quality people, he responded:
You know it’s funny. We don’t do a very good job
of training here. So maybe it does have to do
with recruitment. We always do find a way to get
some pretty good people…it must have to do with
recruitment, and getting lucky sometimes.
An interesting “other finding” of this study is
the fact that almost all interviewees for DSC and MAX
specifically stated, and some vented their
frustrations, that both of their respective companies
provide little or no employee training.

This data

points to a conclusion that the quality people working
at both DSC and MAX are not developed through company
provided training. I specifically asked Liam, President
Emeritus at DSC, how he had selected and hired the
“right”, i.e. quality, people in the past.

Given his

more than 30 years leading and growing the DSC
business, I expected, and hoped, that he could provide
some specific criteria and measures.

Unfortunately he

could not; Liam responded: “I don’t know the answer to
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that.

I would be interested, when you get it done, in

your answer to that question”.
Finally Tim, Regional Manager at MAX, admitted his
inability to adequately measure “quality people”, and
instead described how he and his team had taken an
aggressive observation and assessment approach to all
new hires: “So my team is very effective at…evaluating
if they’re [new hires] going to fit or not.
know.

Basics you

Are you on time every day…are you hustling every

day…do you have a good attitude?”

Tim explained that

they know within one or two weeks if they have the
“right” person; if not, they quickly terminate the new
hire.

While Tim did identify some characteristics he

and his team associate with a “quality” person, i.e.
punctuality, hustle, good attitude, he was unable to
tell me how to go about measuring such characteristics
as “hustle” and “good attitude”.
The data from most of the participants provide
strong evidence that “quality people” are essential and
instrumental for getting things done within DSC and
MAX.

Quality people propel these organizations
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forward.

Unfortunately, however, the data does not

shed light on how to specifically describe and more
precisely measure the elements of drive, initiative,
and engagement that make up “quality people”.

Similar

to the measurement challenges confronted when exploring
the driver of “communication”, the interviews again
yielded imprecise explanations and measures. While the
interviewees did provide some activity and trait-based
descriptors, a clearly defined and measurable profile
of “quality people” remained elusive.

Autonomy, Flexibility and Nimbleness
At first this finding may appear as an odd
combination of disparate elements; forcing very
different descriptors of activities into a single
category.

During the course of my interviews, however,

I found that whenever a participant referred to one of
the elements of “autonomy, flexibility, and
nimbleness”, the participant also referred to at least
one of the other elements, and in many cases identified
all three elements together as a major contributor of
getting things done within their organizations.

The
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participant understanding of “autonomy”, “flexibility”,
and “nimbleness” reflected the common, every day
meanings for these words.

Autonomy was understood as

an individual freedom to act, an independence to make
decisions and to solve problems.

When participants

spoke about “flexibility”, they described it as an
ability and a willingness to change, both
organizationally and on an individual level.

They

often used words such as “adaptable”, “fluid”, and
“customize” or “tailor” to convey the meaning of
flexibility.

The meaning of “nimbleness” is closely

related to “flexibility”.

Participants used this term

to also explain change within their organizations, but
also communicated a “responsiveness” and a “quickness”
related to the change, as well as other organizational
actions and activities.

“Autonomy, flexibility, and

nimbleness” was a main finding for eleven of the
eighteen interviewees, which increased to thirteen of
eighteen interviewees when also accounting for the
lesser findings (see Appendix G).
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“Autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness” proved to
be a particularly strong finding for DSC where eight of
the nine DSC interviewees identified it as a critical
driver in getting things done.

The importance and

impact of this driver may likely be due to the legacy
of the DSC founders, who, as described previously,
desired a non-hierarchical organization and a culture
supportive of individual creativity.

Al, Executive VP

of DSC, provided an insightful summary regarding the
influence of this driver at the organizational level:
We do retain a degree of flexibility
having an enormous set of procedures
single action. So there is a bit of
to adapt or change is in theory much
than it is for some organizations.

from not
for every
nimbleness…So
easier for us

Several DSC interviewees shared how autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness were essential for getting
things done at the project level and in and among
various DSC teams.

In responding to the question

regarding “how things got done” at DSC, Carey, a
Technical Director, responded: “In one word, sort of
‘fluid’…” She further explained that, “The projects I
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work on require flexibility because we work really
closely with our client and they change their mind on a
day-to-day basis…So we really have to be flexible and
fluid”.

Diane, another Technical Director at DSC,

stated that their industry requires a certain level of
flexibility, and she assessed DSC favourably in this
regard by stating: “I think…we have a willingness and
flexibility to be able to mobilize quickly and to work
as larger teams on some ad hoc assignments that might
come up…” The Director of DSC Contracts, Kevin,
identified this driver of execution as
“resourcefulness” and explained that most DSC employees
actively seek out answers when something arises that is
not specifically defined in their job descriptions.
Mike, Senior Project Manager at DSC, perhaps best
expressed the importance and the need for autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness across multiple levels of
the organization when he explained:
So I think we have a lot of intelligent people who
come up with innovative solutions to tailor what
we do to the particular circumstances in a
different country or in a different technical
practice area or with a different client who has a
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different set of expectations. So there’s a lot
of analyzing specific situations and sort of
adjusting what we do to that circumstance…there’s
no one specific approach to anything.
DSC participants described how success in their
industry and the ability to accomplish major goals and
objectives was largely due to the organizational
environment at DSC, one that supported and promoted
freedom and a willingness and ability to change, with
employees who were flexible and adaptable.
While the MAX interviewees identified
“adaptability, flexibility, and nimbleness” less
frequently than DSC interviewees, only three of eight
main findings and six of eight when combining main and
lesser findings, numerous examples of adaptability,
flexibility, and nimbleness emerged from their
interviews when discussing other issues.
One of the most interesting examples related to
this driver of execution was Bill, an Assistant Manager
at MAX.

Of all the MAX interviewees, Bill was the most

focused and steeped in operational policies and
procedures.

He extensively detailed how he and his
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team comply with policies and procedures, i.e. MAX
corporate operations, and how he tracks everything:
I’m more of an operations kind of guy. So…strict
protocol on safety goggles…steel toe shoes no
matter what…if I see someone on a cherry picker
[forklift] without a harness, I write them up…Yes,
I track injuries. I track lateness.
Given Bill’s acute focus and sensitivity to corporate
operations requirements, it was interesting to learn
that he believes he and his team have a lot of freedom
and flexibility to come up with their own operational
practices and solutions to problems.

He stated, “…of

course some [procedures] come down from corporate…but I
like for them [warehouse team] to use their own mind.
I don’t like to micro-manage”.

Bill further explained

how he encourages his team to come up with new ideas
and how his typical response to those new ideas is
usually, “Let’s give it a shot—it’s your warehouse”.
Roger, a Branch Manager at MAX and Bill’s
supervisor, shared Bill’s sentiments and went even
further when he stated: “Yeah, we have adapted.

The

only real corporate things that’s come down is just the
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use of the RF guns…no, there’s a lot of freedom”.

He

provided a great example of this adaptation relative to
the MAX computer system that directs them to put newly
received inventory into any available warehouse space.
Roger pointed out that, while theoretically this makes
sense, in practice it creates problems: “…so supposedly
you can put anything anywhere, but at some point you
have product so blended it…turns into a mishmash…you
still need to categorize your products and keep certain
product categories together…” He further explained that
grouping certain product categories together increased
picking efficiency and enabled newer employees to learn
the products more quickly.
Several other MAX interviewees recounted stories
that reflected employee nimbleness and flexibility on a
day-to-day basis.

Gerry, a BDR, explained how his

branch team was cross trained, intentionally, so that
they could better adjust to the demands of the day-today business: “…I’m in sales, but if I have a guy in
the warehouse that’s out, I can go back there and do
the cycle counts.

I can receive things…I can do it
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all”.

Much like all the other MAX interviewees, Gerry

discussed the existence of corporate requirements but
maintained that each branch has considerable freedom as
to how to meet those requirements: “So some of them are
directed by corporate, but how we really achieve those
things is all internal from the branch”.
Many additional examples emerged in support of
“autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness” as a driver of
execution at MAX:

Rose, as a Regional AR collections

agent, “jumping in” to help customers at the counter
and to write up orders; Bill’s warehouse manager redesigning pallets in order to be able to store more
inventory due to facility space constraints; and Ed, a
BDR, who explained that given this freedom and autonomy
at MAX, the burden is on the individual to learn how to
use the available tools to be successful; according to
Ed, “It’s up to the individual to learn and grow…”
While far fewer MAX than DSC interviewees
specifically named “autonomy, flexibility, and
nimbleness” as a driver of execution, through numerous
examples and the detailed discussions of the nature of

238

the MAX business, it was evident that this driver is a
strong determinant in MAX efforts “to get things done”.

Teamwork and Collaboration
The final, strong finding that emerged from the
interviews was “teamwork and collaboration”.

It proved

to be a main finding with ten of the eighteen
interviewees, and it was identified by thirteen of the
eighteen interviewees when including lesser findings
(see Appendix G).

The data clearly demonstrated that

teamwork and collaboration is another key driver for
getting things done at both DSC and MAX.
“Teamwork and Collaboration” was particularly
strong at DSC where it proved to be a main finding for
seven of the nine interviewees, and expanded to eight
of nine when including the lesser findings.

Amy, a

Project Manager at DSC, perhaps best communicated the
importance of teamwork and collaboration at DSC.

She

stated that it was one of the primary reasons for their
success and it was her answer to the question as to
“how things got done” at DSC:
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I think if things get done and it’s really
centered around teams…I feel like that’s really
how we get things done. It’s a lot of
collaboration and the teams aren’t really separate
teams because, you know, I work on one project,
but I still have to work with accounting and
payroll or the travel teams.
Many other DSC interviewees shared and voiced this
sentiment regarding the critical nature of teamwork and
collaboration within DSC.

Nancy, a Technical Director,

concluded: “So I think it’s basically teamwork and now
making proper assignments to staff”.

Kevin, Director

of Contracts, explained that much of the way in which
DSC staff and projects were organized was in response
to the nature of Federal Government contracts.
Teamwork and collaboration was essential in order to
comply with those government requirements:
DSC is set up in such a way that, for every
project we have a project manager and a senior
project manager, contracts administrator, senior
contracts administrator, a technical director.
The Director of Operations oversees the project
managers and we all support the field offices.
The DSC interviewees also provided numerous
examples of teamwork and collaboration in practice.

In

240

one such representative example, Diane, a Technical
Director, explained the nature of their Practice Area
meetings: “We share experiences, we share best
practices, we share lessons learned and there’s always
a lot of lessons learned on how to deal with clients”.
In listening to the DSC interviewees it became clear
that, given the nature of federal government compliance
requirements and the internationally based projects,
DSC would fail to have a viable business without
extensive teamwork and collaboration between its
various departments and individual employees.
While not as many MAX participants cited “teamwork
and collaboration”, specifically, as a key driver for
getting things done, numerous examples of day-to-day
teamwork and collaboration emerged in the course of the
overall interviews.

Gerry, a BDR, viewed teamwork as

essential for his branch’s success.

Gerry stated that,

“Our culture down here, I think, is more teamwork
driven…” He supported this claim by describing how the
region identified a need and then took the initiative
to deploy a “transfer truck” that replenishes inventory
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to each of the region’s branches on a daily basis.

As

opposed to relying solely on a single, weekly delivery
from the Regional Distribution Center, the branches
help fill each other’s orders via this transfer truck
on a daily basis.

Another example of teamwork is

Gerry’s description of cross training detailed in the
previous discussion of “autonomy, flexibility, and
nimbleness”.

Recall that Gerry was the MAX employee

who stated, “I can do it all” regarding numerous
operational procedures.
All the MAX interviewees provided examples of
teamwork and collaboration as a critical element of
their day-to-day operations.

Bill, an Assistant

Manager, indicated that teamwork and collaboration was
essential just given the nature of their business; one
of high pressure, voluminous customer demands, and
extremely long hours:

“We all see each other more than

we see our families, see our wives, see our kids.

If

we all didn’t get along, oh boy, that would be bad”.
Lance, who works at the MAX Call Center, explained how
the CSA agents all work together as a team:
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One good thing is we’re always talking to each
other…and if somebody messed up, I get a phone
call from Tom…’Hey Lance, you messed up on this
ticket…this is what the customer wanted, this is
what you needed to do…’ ‘Great, thanks man’…So
we’re always looking out for each other…
Lance also explained how he extends that teamwork
beyond just his CSA group.

He offered an example where

a branch failed to deliver an overdue order to a
customer, and the branch could not explain the reason
for the failure.

Lance was the point of contact with

the upset customer, and he stated:
So in order for me to handle the customer…an
apology, we’re sorry…Sometimes I’ll make up
something just so we don’t look like complete and
utter idiots…To go back and say…the branch screwed
up…I’ll try to fabricate a little something like,
“Oh, we had a glitch in the system”.
The data revealed a strong consensus, either
explicitly expressed by the interviewees or by way of
numerous operational examples, around teamwork and
collaboration as a critical driver of execution at both
DSC and MAX.

However, determining the specific nature

of the teamwork and collaboration proved difficult.
The typical interviewee response was to cite “good
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teamwork” and “strong collaboration” as the explanatory
phrase for this driver.

Similar to the previous

challenges of pressing the interviewees to more clearly
define and explain what they meant by “good
communication” and “quality people”, so too the
challenge of determining the meanings behind “good
teamwork” and “strong collaboration”.

Interviewees

once again looked at me as if I should be well aware of
the meaning of these statements; that I should just
“know” their meanings.
The interviewees failed to identify and discuss
more specific definitional elements or indicate how
they measured “good teamwork” and “strong
collaboration”.

To better understand this driver, I

examined the examples of teamwork and collaboration
provided by the interviewees to see if greater
specificity and potential measures could be discovered.
During the course of the interviews, most
participants discussed the prevalence of meetings at
both DSC and MAX.

The picture that emerged is one of

two organizations that have numerous, frequent, formal
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and informal meetings.

A natural assumption might be

to identify “meetings” as an indicator and specific
action reflective of “good teamwork” and “strong
collaboration”.

While the data often shows this to be

the case, it is also important to note the previously
cited warnings about meetings from some of the
interviewees.

Recall that Mike at DSC had cautioned

that some meetings could actually “break apart” a team,
and Tim from MAX had expressed his concern that some
meetings can turn into “just fluff”.
In describing the long hours put in by he and his
team, Bill, an Assistant Manager at MAX, had discussed
a potential indicator of teamwork and collaboration.
Recall that Bill had identified “getting along” as an
important factor in the teamwork at his branch.

When I

asked Bill to be more specific, he was unable to
further explain and describe what “getting along”
actually meant.
“Relationships” proved to be an “other”, main
finding for Mike, Senior Project Manager, at DSC.
During his interview, Mike shared a philosophical view
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that all business is driven by relationships, and that
relationships are the foundation of getting things
done: “I think the key element for me is relationships
with other people in the organization…So much of it is
delivering technical services through people.
have relationships.

So we

Our product is people…” When

pressed in a follow on question as to how to develop
strong relationships, he responded:

“…I think the most

important elements to developing strong relationships
with other people is trying to understand…what are the
motivations and needs of the other person…How can I
listen to them…” Mike shared a deeply thought out
perspective regarding the inter-personal and
relationship dynamics between individuals, leading to
his identification of “making an effort to understand”
and “listening” as critical elements of building good
relationships.
While the identification of “making an effort to
understand” and “listening” proved helpful in providing
a more specific description of “relationships” and how
those elements impact execution within DSC,
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definitional and measurement challenges surfaced again.
Reminiscent of Bill’s inability to further explain
“getting along”, so too was Mike unable to further
explain what, exactly, constituted the “effort to
understand” and “good listening”.
Rose, Regional AR at MAX, expressed feelings
similar to Mike’s regarding the importance of
relationships, but tied relationships directly to
teamwork: “And yeah…we talk about personal things and,
you know, really try to not just form a business
relationship, but to get to know that person…I think
team and performance building is very important”.
Interestingly though, Lance, CSA agent at MAX, provided
a contrary example where not getting along does not
keep him from collaborating and performing as a good
team member.

Lance shared how he and a fellow CSA

agent, Ray, do not get along at all and that they have
a “huge history”, yet they support and help each other.
Lance stated, “…I mean when you’re in the middle of a
war…you look out for my back and I’ll look out for your
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back…or we’re going down with the ship, there’s no life
boats…”
The data demonstrates a few conflicting instances
and examples within the driver of teamwork and
collaboration.

While “getting along” is a key element

for Bill, and “relationships” are critical for Mike and
Rose, Lance serves as a contrary example where his
inability to get along and a poor relationship with Ray
does not prevent him from providing good teamwork and
collaboration.

Summary
The findings indicate that five key drivers:
measurement; communication; quality people; autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness; and teamwork and
collaboration are major contributors to an overall
process of getting things done at DSC and MAX.

The

data and evidence from the detailed discussions with
the interviewees show the following:

that execution at

DSC and MAX involves individual initiative and the
actions of driven, engaged employees; combined with
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organizational processes related to measuring,
communicating, collaborating, and teamwork; all
operating within an organizational environment
supporting a freedom to act and encouraging change and
adaptability based on the demands of the business.

Customer Needs – An Important “Other Finding”
When considering the question as to how a business
gets major things done; that is, how it executes its
major objectives, one might reasonably expect “the
customer” to have a major impact or influence in that
execution.

While “customer needs” did emerge as an

“Other Finding” in this study, it was surprising just
how infrequently the interviewees identified customer
needs as a major contributor of execution. It was a
main finding for two MAX interviewees, and a lesser
finding for four MAX and three DSC interviewees.
Dan and Lance, both CSA Reps at MAX, communicated
the importance of “customer needs” in getting things
done.

This may be due to the nature of their positions

because of the immediacy and urgency of interactions
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they experience with customers.

As Dan stated, “You

know when the customer calls in, who’s the first person
to talk to—me or Lance”.

Lance shared Dan’s “front-

line” mentality, but he also took a broader view in
terms of how the customer and customer needs drive
activity within MAX:
I mean it really starts with just a call and a
very demanding customer, and ‘I need, I need, I
want, I want’. So really it starts with just how
am I going to get what the customer needs in a
timely manner and keeping the customer happy…
Lance also explained how meeting those customer needs,
creating a favourable customer experience, impacts
company performance and financial results: “That call
is everything because I mean depending on how the
customer is satisfied at the end of the call
will…determine is he going to call back again.
we going to get a repeated customer”.

And are

Similarly,

Roger, a Branch Manager at MAX, viewed the actual
customer order as the “trigger” that sets into motion
the major activities at his branch.

Rose, the AR Rep

at MAX, also shared the importance of trying to satisfy
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those customer needs and to do their best “to make
everyone that comes through the door feel special”.
Only a few DSC interviewees identified customer
needs as a significant factor in their efforts to get
things done.

Early in our interview Nancy, a Technical

Director at DSC, expressed the importance of the
customer and her focus on taking care of customer
needs:
I always reply to clients within the first one day
of their email so that’s very important because
they’re the ones who are paying us and giving us
work and future work and give us reviews. So
that’s my priority number one, make sure that not
a single client request is neglected and addressed
properly in a timely manner…
Carey, a Director of Operations, provided great detail
regarding her “trackers”, i.e. her system of monitoring
all the major deliverables of a project to ensure that
DSC meets its obligations to the client.

She also

described the frequent communication that she has with
her client because that is what the client “needs” and
wants:
We talk almost daily, but we have weekly Wednesday
meetings that are three hours long…And I
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personally think those could be significantly
shorter, but she really likes to chat…And so we’ve
learned that that’s important to our client, and
so we do that.
Amy, a Project Manager at DSC, shared similar stories
detailing how and what she does to make a client happy.
While “customer needs” emerged as a main finding
for just two interviewees and a lesser finding for
seven other interviewees, its role and influence in how
DSC and MAX go about getting things done may not be
accurately represented by the findings.

The reason for

this is that all of the interviewees acknowledged and
discussed the importance of customers.

It was apparent

that they clearly understood how their individual
efforts and major organizational activity were directly
tied to the customer; that is to customer needs and a
customer experience.

A potential explanation for the

infrequent identification of “customer needs” as an
explicit driver of execution may be due to the
interviewees viewing customer needs as the purpose
behind their action and activities, as opposed to a
driver of those actions and activities.

Customer needs
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is the “why”, the purpose for what the interviewees do;
and the five drivers of execution that emerged in the
findings are the “how”, the specific actions and
principles involved in getting things done in order to
fulfill that purpose.
One final, interesting note regarding “customer
needs”.

When I asked all the participants, not just

those who had specifically identified customer needs as
a driver of execution, how they knew if and when they
were delivering “good service”, or how they could be
certain that their customer had had a “good
experience”, the DSC and MAX interviewees were not able
to provide clearly defined metrics or precise measures.
Two representative examples of how “imprecisely” the
customer experience is measured came from Carey, a
Technical Director at DSC, and Roger, a Branch Manager
at MAX.

When I asked Carey how she knew if she and her

team had performed well for her customer, she
responded: “Did the client yell at us?”

Similarly,

when I asked Roger what indicators he relies upon to
know if he and his team are providing good service for
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his customers, he replied: “customer complaints”.
Roger elaborated further regarding this indicator:
You know if I have a high level of customer
complaints and I always feel like I’m constantly
in the weeds, then you know something’s not right.
You know I would say that’s my highest indicator.
Obviously, I can look at the P&L and see if the
numbers are bearing themselves out, but a lot of
customer complaints because that makes my life
miserable.
Many other DSC and MAX interviewees communicated how
they relied upon “customer complaints” to know how they
were performing.
When I pressed the interviewees for more detail
regarding the nature of the complaints or for a
threshold as to an acceptable versus unacceptable
number of complaints, they were unable to provide me
with those answers.

As was the case with several of

the identified drivers of execution, a measurement
challenge emerged relative to customer needs.

The

findings reflect the difficulty and inability of the
DSC and MAX interviewees to clearly define and
precisely measure their customer’s happiness and/or
satisfaction.
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Chapter 5
Discussion, Conclusions, Applications and
Further Research
Overview
This study explored the nature of business
execution; that is, how organizations “get things
done”.

It examined two companies:

DSC, a professional

services and consulting firm in the international
development industry; and MAX, a distributor of hard
goods to the recreational and construction industries.
The purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory,
multiple case study was to discover how these
organizations executed their day-to-day operations and
to better understand the drivers behind this execution.
An additional purpose, and hope, was to also find
evidence in support of developing a theory for the
concept of execution.

Such a theory is lacking in the

strategic management and organizational routine
literature.

The research questions guiding this study

focused on the nature of execution, the effort to
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measure execution, and the impact that an ability to
execute has on organizational performance.
I begin this chapter by first discussing the five
drivers identified in the interviews as having a
significant impact on execution within DSC and MAX.
This section reviews the key findings established in
chapter four relative to: (1) measurement, (2)
communication, (3) quality people, (4) autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness, and (5) teamwork and
collaboration.

I examine each driver individually, and

then in combination as a five-driver capability.

In

the next section of this chapter, I discuss the
implications of these findings for practice and theory.
I then re-visit my theory of execution as a “catalytic
capability”, proposed at the conclusion of chapter two.
I assess its explanatory value, if any, given the
evidence presented in this case study.

This chapter

concludes with sections identifying the potential
limitations of this study and recommendations for
future research.
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Individual Drivers of Execution
In responding to the general question as to how
their organizations “got things done” and in describing
the operations and major activities of their
organizations, interviewees identified measurement;
communication; quality people; autonomy, flexibility,
and nimbleness; and teamwork and collaboration as
significant drivers of performance and outcomes.
Figure 3 shows the individual drivers of execution
identified by the study participants.
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Figure 3: Individual Drivers of Execution
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Individual Drivers of Execution

The drivers fill the “gap” in the literature
identified earlier in Figure 1 in chapter one; that gap
being an explanation as to how organizational routines
and capabilities may be converted to organizational
performance and outcomes.

The findings demonstrated

how each individual driver had a significant impact on
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organizational performance and outcomes.

The

interviewees described, explained and provided numerous
examples of specific actions, activity and principles
that constitute each identified driver of execution.
At DSC and MAX, people continually measure and evaluate
important activity and key results; they engage in
extensive, frequent communication through multiple
methods; they exhibit drive, initiative, and
engagement; they work and support each other as a team;
and they operate in an environment that fosters an
individual freedom to act and a willingness and ability
to respond quickly to changing business demands.

Extensive Measuring
The participants of this study identified
measurement as an activity and principle deeply
embedded in the operating cultures of both DSC and MAX.
As previously detailed in chapter four, interviewees
provided numerous examples of what and how their
organizations measure activity and performance.
Examples included the CPAR at DSC, the Operations Flash
Report at MAX, and financial reporting for both
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organizations.

Support for this concept of measurement

can be found in the organizational routine literature.
This driver is best explained by the Feldman and
Pentland (2003) concept of a routine, and their
introduction of the performative and ostensive aspects
of routines.

DSC’s government compliance and MAX’s

corporate operational procedures are clear examples of
a routine in practice, Feldman and Pentland’s (2003)
performative aspect.

The extensiveness of the

measurement throughout the two organizations serves as
strong evidence of measurement as a routine in
principle, that is, their ostensive aspect.

Tim, the

Regional Manager at MAX, captures both the performative
and ostensive aspects of a routine at work when he
states, “…essentially every segment of the business is
measured in some way”.

The interviewees for both DSC

and MAX provided many examples of specific acts of
measurement and also expressed how the principle of
measurement guided much of their efforts in assessing
performance and getting things done.
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While the evidence showed measurement as a strong
routine operating throughout both organizations, an
interesting, related finding showed that not all the
measures employed at DSC and MAX were well defined or
quantifiable.

During the course of the interviews, the

participants shared numerous, precise measures that
they employed in the areas of compliance, operations,
and financial reporting.

They also revealed several

major functions and critical areas of their businesses
that proved difficult to clearly define and precisely
measure.

Those functions and areas included the other

drivers of execution identified in this study and their
customers.

One such example highlighting this

challenge emerged when I asked the interviewees to
explain how they knew if their customers were “happy”
or “satisfied”.

The most common interviewee response

was “customer complaints”.

When pressed to further

define and quantify this indicator, the interviewees
struggled to identify the elements and measures
constituting customer complaints.
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This proves to be one of the most interesting, and
perhaps surprising, discoveries of this study.

All the

participants held positions that can be characterized
as mid to senior level responsibility within their
organizations.

All the participants have extensive,

and generally varied, professional experience; if not
directly with DSC and MAX, then certainly within their
respective industries.

All the participants conveyed a

strong understanding of the importance of measuring
every major organizational function in order to
evaluate and guide performance and outcomes.

It is

surprising therefore that these mid to senior level
employees were unable to provide clear metrics and
quantifiable measures for the other drivers of
execution identified in this study, and for determining
the satisfaction of their customers.

When pressed to

clarify or better explain their measures, most
interviewees responded with very broad indicators such
as the following: “good communication”, “effective
communication”, “driven, hungry, engaged people”,
“freedom to act”, “quick to adapt”, “strong teamwork”,
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and “good collaboration”.

By responding with answers

such as these, the unspoken assumption was that I would
readily understand what those phrases meant in terms of
performance standards.
I draw two possible conclusions from this finding.
First, attempting to clearly define and precisely
measure such drivers as communication, teamwork, and
collaboration is extremely difficult.

One might employ

activity-based measures to better explain the key
drivers and major operational functions within an
organization.

In the case of communication, for

example, “meetings” could be identified as an indicator
essential for “good communication”.

The limit and

challenge of such a measure, however, is the fact that
conducting a meeting, or numerous meetings, does not
guarantee that those meetings are effective or that
they will indeed produce “good communication”.

Recall

Tim at MAX warning that some meetings turn into “just
fluff”.
Second, the interviewees recognize and are
resigned to the challenge of precisely measuring
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something like “good communication”.

In response they

turn to their own accumulated experience and they rely
on their “gut feelings” to determine and know what
constitutes “good communication”.

In the course of the

interviews, many participants referenced “knowing”
through their “feelings” and “experience”, especially
in relation to their interactions with customers.

Mike

and Carey at DSC both described the importance of a
“feel” when evaluating the condition and strength of a
customer relationship.
Based upon the broad ranging business discussions
conducted within the study interviews, I conclude that
the interviewees rely on both approaches to measure and
manage the key operational drivers and functions of
their businesses.

They try their best to quantify and

precisely measure critical activities whenever
possible, but they also rely on their experience,
knowledge, and gut feelings in the throes of the dayto-day operation of their business.
Setting aside this challenge of clearly defining
and precisely measuring all the critical functional
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areas of their business, the findings demonstrate that
measurement is pervasive throughout DSC and MAX.
Measurement is an aggregation of numerous actions
applied to all the major functions of the business, and
a strong guiding principle for those actions.

Though

clearly defined metrics and precise measures were not
always found, the interviewees universally expressed
that their organizations were committed to, and all
employees were actively engaged in, extensive measuring
of performance.

Extensive Communicating
The other driver that enjoyed universal agreement
among the interviewees was communication.

The findings

showed communication as action, principle, driver, and
facilitator of major activity in pursuit of getting
things done.

At both DSC and MAX, communication was

evident between management and staff, among and between
employees, and with customers.

Both organizations

demonstrated their use of numerous methods of
communication that included formal and informal
meetings, face-to-face discussions, phone, and email,
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among others.

As was the case with measurement,

communication is best understood and supported in the
literature by Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) definition
of a routine.

The numerous methods of communication,

i.e. meetings, phone, etc., is the performative aspect,
or, communication in practice.

The frequent statements

by the interviewees regarding the importance of “good
communication” or “effective communication” was
evidence of the ostensive aspect; that is,
communication in principle at work in both
organizations.
Much like the driver of measurement, the findings
showed the ubiquitous nature of communication operating
within and throughout DSC and MAX.

Employees engage in

constant communication via multiple methods, and
communication serves as a guiding principle influencing
and directing major operational activity, as well as
the other identified drivers of execution.
An interesting discovery emerged during the course
of the detailed discussions about communication.

The

interviewees were unable to offer a “winning formula”
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for communication; that is, a prescription of methods
and frequency that would constitute that “good
communication” that so many of the interviewees claimed
was so critical to getting things done.

None of the

interviewees argued for or would commit to a specific
number of meetings, phone calls, emails, etc. as a
requirement for that “good communication”.

Instead the

findings showed that communication was a constantly
changing “mix” of methods and frequency.

All actions

could not and should not be pre-determined;
communication was ever changing based on the specific
situation and the changing demands of the day-to-day
business.

Rose, the Regional AR Rep for MAX, captured

this condition best when she explained how, in response
to a “rough day”, the branch employees would get
together after closing to discuss the problems from
that day, and then come up with a new game plan for the
following day.
While the Feldman and Pentland (2003) concept of
routine accurately and readily applies to communication
as practice and as principle operating at DSC and MAX,
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it does not account for this changing “mix” of methods
and frequency.

Communication as a changing mix is best

described and supported in the literature by the
Pentland and Reuter (1994) concept of routines as
“grammars”.

In their study they argue that diverse,

even non-routine “performances” could constitute a
routine.

As numerous and varied sentences operate

within the rules of a grammar, so too can the numerous
and varied mix of communication methods be viewed as
operating within a broader, “grammar” of communication.
Thus communication at DSC and MAX exhibits performative
and ostensive aspects while operating within a
communication “grammar” that allows for ever changing
methods and frequency.

Quality People – Extensive Drive, Initiative, and Engagement
The DSC and MAX interviewees firmly believe that
“quality people” is a critical factor to overall
performance and organizational success.

The

interviewees strongly expressed that given the nature
of their businesses, the realities of their day-to-day
operations, and the demands of their customers, it was
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essential that employees be driven and engaged, and
that they be willing and able to take initiative.
There is no “hand holding” at either of these
organizations.

One of the best, representative

examples of this approach and principle was shared by
Karen, the Director of HR at DSC, when she explained
that her own onboarding process consisted of being
directed to her desk and receiving a laptop computer.
(She has since worked hard over the last year to
develop a formal onboarding and new employee training
program at DSC.)
The DSC and MAX interviewees shared many stories
similar to Karen’s, and they communicated a consistent
position that it was necessary and expected that
employees would “figure things out” and solve problems.
Whether Carey’s “treasure hunt”, a MAX warehouse
manager’s innovative pallet re-design, or Rose’s unique
system for collecting money, getting things done at DSC
and MAX was the result of actions initiated by “quality
people” who are driven, engaged, and committed.

The

examples provided by the interviewees also demonstrated
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that this driver of execution was not directed by
management; this driver was usually the result of
individual employees and employees working together in
teams to solve problems and improve performance and
outcomes.
When queried about how each organization acquired
these “quality people”, no clear answer emerged.

Some

interviewees responded with recruitment, some stated
that it was luck, and some admitted that they did not
know.

Tim, the Regional Manager at MAX, explained that

he and his team had developed an ability and placed a
high priority on closely monitoring and evaluating new
hires during their first two weeks of employment.

If

the new hires failed to demonstrate the requisite
“hustle” and “good attitude”, among other traits, they
were quickly terminated.

An additional, interesting

finding related to this driver “quality people”, was
the strong agreement among all interviewees that DSC
and MAX were poor at providing employee training. Most
interviewees stated that DSC and MAX provided no
training whatsoever.
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The interviewees had great difficulty trying to
define and explain the meaning of “quality people”
however.

Individuals possessing and demonstrating such

characteristics as “drive”, “initiative”, and
“engagement” is admittedly a challenge to describe and
somehow precisely measure.

Direct support for this

concept could not be found in the organizational
routine and capability literature.
“Quality People” as described by the interviewees
does not meet the Feldman and Pentland (2003)
definition of a routine.

There was no evidence of

consistent, well-defined performative aspects at work
relative to drive, initiative, and engagement.

An

ostensive aspect may exist and the concept may provide
some understanding of this driver, but the interviewees
identified varied principles such as “hustle”, “good
attitude”, and “doing whatever it takes” as operating
within this driver.

The Hodgson and Knudsen (2004)

definition of a routine perhaps comes the closest to
capturing and explaining what the interviewees
described as “quality people”.

Hodgson and Knudsen
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(2004) define a routine as a pre-disposition, an
energizing causal capability that, when triggered,
produces action.

While these scholars viewed a routine

as an organizational level phenomenon, as opposed to an
individual capability, their concept applies and adapts
well to this individual level.

Drive and initiative

may be characterized as a pre-disposition for action or
a capability for action possessed by an individual.
Once triggered, the individual’s drive and initiative
cause action.
Partial support for “quality people” as a driver
of execution may also be found in the most recent
literature on dynamic capabilities.

Teece (2017)

maintains that entrepreneurial management is a critical
factor in dynamic capability development and
deployment, in executing that sensing and seizing of
new opportunities and in transforming an organization
in response to a rapidly changing environment.

Teece

(2017) argues that senior managers play a crucial role
in developing and orchestrating those dynamic
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capabilities, and as such, those managers must be good
“at getting things started”.
While strictly focused on senior management, this
attribute of “getting things started” is clearly
compatible and reflective of the elements identified
within the driver “quality people”.

The findings show

that quality people identified from this study are
certainly individuals who get things started; they are
individuals who initiate action.

One may argue that

moving beyond senior management to an examination of
all “quality people” within an organization, is a
logical and valuable next step in the effort to further
explore and better explain dynamic capabilities.

Autonomy, Flexibility, and Nimbleness
The DSC and MAX interviewees identified “autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness” as essential for their
individual ability, as well as the overall
organizational ability, to get things done and drive
performance.

The nature of their businesses, the day-

to-day operations, and the demands of their customers
require a working environment that supports and
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promotes autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness.

The

interviewees provided many examples demonstrating the
need for the freedom to act and a willingness to change
and adapt.

They shared how they often had to respond

to changing circumstances, such as when faced with
staffing shortages, MAX counter sales people pick their
own order, or, as in the case of Carey at DSC, having
to remain flexible because her client changes his mind
on a day-to-day basis.

All the interviewees either

specifically voiced its importance or provided
supportive examples demonstrating the impact and
influence that “autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness”
has on the ability of DSC and MAX to get things done.
This driver is clearly not a routine as defined by
Feldman and Pentland (2003).

Partial support for

“autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness” may be found in
the Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) definition of a routine
however.

One may argue that “flexibility” and

“nimbleness” can be viewed as both an individual and
organizational level pre-disposition or capability for
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action.

In this case action would involve change and

adaptability.
“Autonomy”, however, appears to be less of a
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) pre-disposition and
energizing capability, and more like a “condition”;
that is, an environment supportive of the freedom of
action or an environment providing the absence of
restrictions to act.

Stronger support for this aspect

of the driver of execution may be found in the dynamic
capability literature.

The dynamic capability concept

was founded upon the belief that firms needed to
respond, adapt, and transform themselves in the face of
rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997).
Whether the O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) element of
“exploring” in the dynamic capability of ambidexterity,
or the Teece (2012, 2016) variables of sensing,
seizing, and transforming, the freedom to pursue new
opportunities and the ability of firms to adapt and
change are critical operating principles within dynamic
capability theory.
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This study provides evidence and specific answers
as to how such organizational change and dynamic
capability development comes about.

One can make a

strong case that in order to be able to explore and to
sense, seize, and transform capabilities, it is
essential to develop, promote, and preserve an
organizational operating environment supportive of
“autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness”.

Teamwork and Collaboration
The final driver of execution that received strong
support in the findings was “teamwork and
collaboration”.

Each study participant provided

specific examples of critically important teamwork and
collaboration in their day-to-day operations at both
DSC and MAX.

From the regional transfer truck at MAX,

to the Practice Area meetings at DSC, to Lance at the
CSA who often “covers” with customers for the mistakes
made by MAX branches, it was evident that teamwork and
collaboration are essential for getting things done and
for driving performance.
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Support in the literature for teamwork and
collaboration is comparable to the support and
characterization of the driver “communication” found
earlier in this section.

The Feldman and Pentland

(2003) definition of a routine is relevant here.
Typical DSC and MAX activities of meetings and training
exemplify the performative aspects of a routine; that
is, teamwork and collaboration in practice.

The

frequent reference and expression by the interviewees
for the need of “good teamwork” and “we work as a team”
demonstrate the ostensive aspect of this driver; that
is, teamwork and collaboration at work as a guiding
principle within DSC and MAX.
Similar once again to “communication”, the Feldman
and Pentland (2003) articulation of a routine does not
explain all the evidence for this driver.

Recall that

Mike from DSC and Tim from MAX warned that meetings
could sometimes “tear a team apart” or just turn into
“fluff”.

Also recall how Lance from MAX explained that

despite a “huge history” with a fellow CSA Rep, Lance
still looked out for this Rep and remained a strong
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team player.

This anomalous evidence is best described

and supported in the literature by the concept of
“grammars” developed by Pentland and Reuter (1994).
The concept of “grammars” allows and explains
significant differences in specific actions, even nonroutinized action, while still acknowledging the
presence of a routine.

As was the case with

communication, “teamwork and collaboration” is a driver
of execution at DSC and MAX that operates as a routine
with peformative and ostensive aspects, within an
overall structure of a routine as grammar.
Table 3 provides an overview of the five
individual drivers of execution identified in the
findings and their support in the literature.
Relative to each driver, Table 3 displays the
following:

support from the relevant scholars; the

applicable concept or theory, i.e. organizational
routine, organizational capability, dynamic
capabilities; key attributes of those theories as
described in the literature; the application of those
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attributes to the drivers of execution; and supportive
examples identified and discussed in the findings.

Table 3:

Individual
Drivers

Support in the
Literature

Drivers of Execution - Support in Literature

Concept /
Theory

Concept / Theory
Attributes

Driver
Application

Examples in Findings

Measurement

Feldman &
Pentland (2003)

Org.
Routine

Performative &
Ostensive Aspects

Driver in
Practice; Driver
in Principle

CPAR, Ops Flash Report,
Financial Reports

Communication

Feldman &
Pentland (2003)

Org.
Routine

Performative &
Ostensive Aspects

Meetings, Email, Phone,
"Good Communication"

Pentland & Reuter
(1994)

Org.
Routine

"Grammars"

Driver in
Practice; Driver
in Principle
Drivers as
"performances"

Other Disciplines?

−−−−

−−−−

−−−−

−−−−

Hodgson &
Knudsen (2004)
(partial)
Teece (2017)
(partial/extension)

Org.
Routine

Pre-Disposition;
Energizing Causal
Capability
Entrepreneurial
Management

Drive, Initiative,
Engagement

"Hustle", "Good Attitude";
"Do Whatever It Takes"

Driver as
"getting things
started"

Pallet storage innovation;
New A/R collection method

Hodgson &
Knudsen (2004)
(partial)

Org.
Routine

Pre-Disposition;
Energizing Causal
Capability

Innovative people tailor
solutions to the circumstance;
"cross training"

Teece et al.
(1997)

Dyn.
Capability

Sensing, Seizing,
Transforming

Driver as
individual
capability for
change
Driver as
freedom,
change,
adaptability

Feldman &
Pentland (2003)

Org.
Routine

Performative &
Ostensive Aspects

Pentland & Reuter
(1994)

Org.
Routine

"Grammars"

Driver in
Practice; Driver
in Principle
Drivers as
"performances"

Practice Area meetings;
Branch meetings after "rough
day"
Meetings as "fluff"; CSA Reps'
"huge history"

Quality People

Autonomy,
Flexibility,
Nimbleness

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Dyn.
Capability

The Communication "Mix"

"Our client changes his mind
on a day-to-day basis"; "It's
your warehouse"
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One major conclusion of this study is that each
individual driver identified from the research proved
to be a significant contributor to the execution of
organizational performance and outcomes at both DSC and
MAX.

Each driver has a major impact on overall

operations and how things get done within both
organizations.

Combined Drivers – A Capability of Execution
The findings provided substantial evidence
demonstrating that each, individual driver has a
significant impact on the overall ability of DSC and
MAX to drive performance and to get things done.

What

proves even more interesting, however, is examining the
five drivers not in isolation, but rather, operating
together.

In the course of discussing and describing

the individual drivers, the interviewees always
referred to several of the other drivers as part of
their explanations and examples.

From the interviewee

answers and their detailed discussions about their
business, it became clear that the five drivers are
interconnected, and that the success and impact of any
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one driver is very much dependent upon the other
drivers.

Combined, these five drivers seem to form and

function as a larger organizational capability within
DSC and MAX.

Figure 4 depicts these drivers as a

combined capability of execution.

Figure 4:

Execution as Capability
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From the findings a clear picture emerged as to
how these five drivers operated and worked together as
a capability of execution.

Figure 4 shows how three of

the drivers overlap and intersect.

For example,

“quality people” work on a customer project or order.
These DSC and MAX individuals are driven and engaged;
they often demonstrate initiative in their ongoing
effort to produce high quality work for their
customers.

Given the needs of those customers and the

nature of their businesses, these quality people cannot
implement projects and fulfil customer orders entirely
by themselves.

They work in teams; they rely heavily

on teamwork and collaboration to carry out their
individual responsibilities and to satisfy their
customers.

These quality people who collaborate and

work in teams also operate in an environment that
supports autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness.

The

nature of their respective industries and customer
demands require responsiveness, adaptability, and a
willingness to change.

Both DSC and MAX promote and

support freedom for the individual and for teams to
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take action, adapt, and change when necessary and
beneficial.

This freedom and autonomy, in turn,

creates an ideal environment for those quality people
and their teams.

It facilitates and further promotes

that drive and initiative found in those quality people
and the collaboration between the teams.

Thus, the

overlapping circles represent the interaction and
interconnectedness of these three drivers of execution.
The drivers of measurement and communication sit
in a larger sphere outside and surrounding the spheres
representing “quality people”, “autonomy, flexibility,
and nimbleness”, and “teamwork and collaboration”.
Their position and the outward-bound arrows are
intended to express the ubiquitous nature of
measurement and communication within both
organizations; they are deeply embedded in the major
operations and activities within DSC and MAX.

Of the

five drivers, these drivers received universal
agreement and main support in the findings.

The

interviewees identified measurement and communication
in practice and in principle as having a major impact
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on their organization’s ability to drive performance
and achieve their desired outcomes.
One of the most important conclusions of this
study is the identification and recognition that the
five individual drivers of execution combine to form
and create a larger capability of execution within DSC
and MAX.

As expressed in Figure 4, the five drivers

are interconnected, interwoven, and very often found
working together simultaneously.

While the findings

show each individual driver as a significant
contributor toward execution, they involve and depend
upon several of the other drivers for that success.
These drivers as a combined capability of execution
represent an aggregation of specific actions,
principles, and conditions evidenced in each of the
individual drivers.

This capability of execution fills

an operational gap between the organizational routines
and the organizational and dynamic capabilities of DSC
and MAX, and their organizational performance and
outcomes.
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Implications for Practice
The findings from this research provide several
valuable insights that may help managers in their daily
challenge to effectively run their businesses and
achieve their desired performance outcomes.
First, this study provides evidence showing that
measurement; communication; quality people; autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness; and teamwork and
collaboration are significant drivers of execution in
two publicly traded companies.

This research

identified many specific actions and several guiding
principles that practitioners may consider and choose
to employ in their efforts to “get things done” and to
improve operational performance.
The evidence also showed that, when combined,
these five drivers of execution form a larger
capability of execution that appears to be stronger
than any of the individual drivers.

Managers may use

this “five driver capability model” as a frame of
reference to evaluate and assess their own
organization’s ability to execute.

This study provides
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specific examples of what to do and how to do it in
order to execute major activities within their
organizations.

It also provides a potential model for

identifying and developing a larger, stronger
capability of execution.

Developing these drivers and

this capability may help managers improve
organizational performance and outcomes.
Second, the evidence from this study confirms the
nature of the current business environment described in
chapter one.

Businesses today operate in a rapidly

changing environment that demands responsiveness,
flexibility, and a willingness and ability to adapt in
order to remain viable and achieve long term success.
Mike, Senior Project Manager at DSC, expressed this
situation the best when he explained that, “there’s no
one specific approach to anything”.

Businesses today

must develop and provide customized or tailored
solutions based upon differing customer needs; needs
that also change based on changing circumstances and
changing customer expectations.

The findings from this

research demonstrate the need for managers to focus on
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their capability to execute and on the specific actions
and principles that enable that execution.

A strong

capability of execution is critical for navigating in
todays fast paced, constantly changing business
environment.
A third and final insight that may have
significant value for practitioners is that much
important results driven activity is frequently nonroutinized and difficult to clearly define and
precisely measure.

The interviewees at DSC and MAX are

intelligent, experienced individuals with important
responsibilities within their organizations.

They

demonstrated an inability to detail and precisely
measure important elements within major functions and
areas of their business.

They struggled to clearly

define and to provide metrics for such things as “good
communication”, “strong teamwork”, and “customer
satisfaction”.

All the interviewees understood well

the need and importance of measurement to their
organizations, but they also expressed the need to use
their experience and “gut feel” to evaluate and drive
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performance in those difficult to measure areas of
their business.

The evidence from this study supports

a lesson for practitioners that getting things done and
driving performance require a combination of precise
measures and metrics wherever possible, while also
being supplemented by the management intangibles of
“feeling”, “gut”, and experience.

My assumption is

that effective managers already know this; this study
provides evidence to support that position.

Implications for Theory
This study produces evidence that makes a
significant contribution to the existing literature and
academic theory in several ways; it does so by:
confirming the continued relevance and practical value
of concepts found in the organizational routine and
capability literature; supporting the recent call by
scholars from a number of disciplines for more
qualitative studies that focus analysis on a microfoundational level; combining different ontological
elements found in the organizational routine literature
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to explain execution as a capability; and by extending
the dynamic capability literature and creating new
knowledge within the theory of dynamic capabilities.
The findings provided evidence supporting several
well-known, longstanding concepts found in the
organizational routine and capabilities literature.
Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) performative and
ostensive aspects of routines are present and active
within DSC and MAX operations.

Specific actions and

principles supporting these aspects were frequently
observed in the interviewees’ discussions of
measurement, communication, and teamwork and
collaboration.

The Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) concept

of a routine as a pre-disposition and an energizing
causal capability was evident relative to the drivers
of “quality people” and “autonomy, flexibility, and
nimbleness”.

The notion of “grammars” from Pentland

and Reuter (1994) found expression in the interviewees’
explanation of “teamwork and collaboration” and
“communication”.

The substantial evidence provided by

the DSC and MAX interviewees, i.e. their description of
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specific actions, principles, conditions, is proof of
the continued relevance and value of several concepts
within organizational routine theory, and its
applicability and explanatory power relative to
practical day-to-day business operations.
This study is also a response to the recent call
by scholars from multiple disciplines arguing for
greater micro-level analysis in social science
research.

Scholars from the disciplines of Strategy-

as-Practice (Johnson et al., 2003), microfoundations
(Winter, 2013), practice theory (Feldman & Orlikowski,
2011), and routine dynamics (Feldman et al., 2016)
argue that in order to better understand organizational
behaviour, it is critical to study the actions,
practices, processes, and/or the individuals in
specific contexts.
The findings from this study provide many examples
of specific actions, activities, and processes and
specific individuals as part of the explanation of the
five drivers of execution.

The responses of the

interviewees provided the “fine grained” data that has
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enabled a more granular level of analysis of execution.
They explained what they do on a daily basis in terms
of specific actions and guiding principles within
specific circumstances.

The interviewees explained how

they fulfil their major responsibilities and how their
organizations perform the critical tasks that drive
performance and produce desired outcomes.

Salvato and

Rerup (2011) observed that “organization studies have
long neglected the fine grained, multi-layered nature
of routines and capabilities”.

This study produced

fine-grained detail related to the five drivers of
execution at work within DSC and MAX.

This research

makes a contribution toward filling the gap in
organizational studies and provides fresh data for
those scholars calling for more microfoundational
studies.
The evidence of the drivers of execution at work
within both DSC and MAX also confirmed one of the major
insights from the literature review; that is, that
execution is a complex concept composed of multiple
ontological elements.

This study documents execution
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as a routine in practice and in principle, Feldman and
Pentland’s (2003) performative and ostensive aspects.
Supporting examples were found in the drivers of
“communication” and “teamwork and collaboration”.

The

findings also demonstrate execution to be a predisposition and an energizing causal capability
(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004).

Examples supporting this

ontological element were found in the factors of
“drive” and “initiative” for the driver “quality
people”, and the individual capability for change found
in the driver “autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness”.
A major contribution of this study is discovering and
documenting that execution does indeed operate on
multiple levels and requires a recognition of multiple
ontological elements in order to adequately explain the
concept.
The final, major contribution of this study to
theory can be found in an extension of some of the most
recent dynamic capability literature, and in the
identification of new knowledge as a result of this
extension.

The literature review documented the
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progression of “execution” from an assumed and implied
variable in the early dynamic capability literature, to
an explicitly identified and important factor for
getting things done in the most recent literature.
This evolution can be seen in the writings of
David Teece and other dynamic capability scholars.

In

his earlier writings, Teece (2009, 2012) uses words
such as:

build, integrate, reconfigure, orchestrate,

transform, and harness, to explain how organizational
assets and resources are transformed into dynamic
capabilities.

The words are broad and the discussion

of dynamic capabilities is high level.

In more recent

writings, Teece (2016, 2017) narrows his focus by
examining the need and role of entrepreneurial
management in directing the necessary sensing, seizing,
and transforming for dynamic capability development and
deployment.
In case studies by other dynamic capability
scholars, the trend toward a greater micro-level
analysis is evident:

the specific activities and

principles employed by the Executive Management Team at
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IBM (Harreld et al., 2007); the role of middle managers
in deploying dynamic capabilities (Leih & Teece, 2013);
and the development of specific questions to better
determine how to sense, seize, and shape resources at
the Valve Corporation (Felin & Powell, 2016).

As

dynamic capability theory evolves, scholars are moving
from broad concepts to a narrower focus on activity,
principles, and values.
This study represents a next step in the microlevel analysis of execution.

This research of the five

drivers of execution within DSC and MAX provide some
specific answers to Teece’s use of those general terms;
the evidence shows how to actually build, integrate,
coordinate, reconfigure, orchestrate, transform and
harness DSC and MAX assets and resources into dynamic
capabilities.

This study is a continuation and an

extension of the dynamic capability literature.
The findings also provide new knowledge due to the
granular level of the evidence provided.

The

discoveries made in this study support an argument that
Teece and others should not limit their analysis to the
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level of executive management, or even middle
management within organizations.

To more thoroughly

understand dynamic capabilities, one must conduct
micro-foundational research; that is, examine the
actions, principles, and behaviour of individuals and
their impact on exploring new opportunities (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008) and on the sensing, seizing, and
transforming of dynamic capabilities.

This research

has demonstrated the value of studying the activity of
all employees; the actions they take and the guiding
principles they follow in the execution of their
responsibilities.

This approach has produced insight

and better understanding of the concept of execution
and may serve as an example and model for future study
into dynamic capabilities.

Execution – Catalytic Capability Re-Visited
At the conclusion of the literature review, I
proposed a conceptual framework for execution and
offered a definition for execution.

I stated that

execution is a “catalytic capability”; that is, a

296

stored behavioural capability comprised of repetitive,
recurrent actions, shaping principles, and a guiding
discipline that energizes and effectuates
organizational behaviour.

I argued that execution is a

complex, multi-level concept that involves actions,
principles, and a guiding discipline, and I proposed
several specific actions and principles as essential
elements of this capability.
Significant support for this proposed conceptual
framework and definition of execution can be found in
the evidence from this study.

The findings identified

five drivers of execution, and demonstrated the major
impact and influence those drivers have on getting
things done within DSC and MAX.

The evidence shows

that each individual driver is “catalytic”; each driver
produces specific actions and principles that propel
performance and outcomes in both organizations.
As previously reviewed and discussed, each driver
is fairly complex.

Table 3 shows the multi-level

nature of each driver, with each one possessing two to
three different conceptual attributes found in the
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literature.

For example, the driver “communication” is

best understood as an organizational routine comprised
of performative and ostensive aspects, while also
operating within an overall grammar of communication.
The evidence from this study also shows that,
while each individual driver is itself a capability of
execution, when the five drivers are examined in
combination, it is clear that a larger, stronger
overall capability of execution emerges.

As discussed

and explained previously, the five drivers are
interconnected and interwoven, and each driver is often
dependent upon one or more of the other drivers for its
own expression.

Recall that freedom and autonomy

support those driven, engaged quality people, and how
teamwork and collaboration rely extensively on
communication.

By examining these five drivers of

execution together, a broader, stronger organizational
capability of execution is observable.
Other than having documented the
interconnectedness of the five drivers, additional
proof for this broader capability cannot be found in
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this study.

Its substantiation rests upon the argument

that, since there is strong supporting evidence that
“measurement”; “communication”; “quality people”;
“autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness”, and “teamwork
and collaboration” each drive execution, then the
combination and sum of these five drivers must
constitute an overall, and perhaps greater, capability
of execution.

Another challenge in seeking to support

this idea of a larger capability, is the fact that none
of the interviewees stated that their organizations
possessed such a general capability of execution.

In

the course of the interviews, at no point did the
participants argue that the five drivers combined
created a broader capability of execution.

The

interviewees frequently mention two or three drivers
together when explaining how things get done in their
organizations, but they never explicitly identified the
five drivers together as creating a larger, stronger
capability of execution.
This study also failed to produce evidence
supporting my concept of “discipline” as an important
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third element of a theory of execution.

While the

concept of “grammars” allows for the enacting of varied
actions within a driver as a routine, recall the
changing “mix” of communication methods within
“communication”, the way in which those actions are
carried out is not captured by the concept of grammars.
My notion of “discipline” was that actions and
principles would be instituted in a specific,
prescribed manner.

For example, when communicating,

some prescription such as, “one must always do X”, or
when conducting a team meeting, a general rule such as,
“the team must always do Y at the conclusion of the
meeting”.

Such a guiding discipline, i.e.

prescriptions guiding the specific actions and
principles of each driver, was not evident from the
findings.
The specific actions and shaping principles that I
proposed as part of the theory found only partial
support in the evidence.

Just two of the six proposed

actions that I deemed critical to execution emerged in
this study.

Measurement and communication were
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strongly supported in the findings.

Also, just three

of my seven proposed shaping principles of execution
were observed in this study.

A pre-disposition to act,

communication, and measurement as principles were
supported by the research.
The definition and theory that I proposed at the
end of chapter two provides just moderate explanatory
value relative to concept of execution.

The evidence

does confirm that the five identified drivers of
execution are “catalytic”, and their natures are
complex, consisting of two or three different
ontological elements.

The findings did not strongly

support the existence of a larger, combined capability
of execution.

The interviewees did not provide any

direct evidence for this combined capability.

An

argument in support of this broader combined capability
can only be made by assuming its existence through a
combination of the individual drivers.

The findings

also demonstrated only partial support for my proposed
“execution as action” and “execution as shaping

301

principle”.

Finally, the evidence did not support my

argument for execution as a “guiding discipline”.

Limitations
A few limitations must be noted relative to this
study, and they may have impacted some of the results
of this research.
The recruitment and selection of the interviewees
was conducted by Karl, President of DSC, and Tim,
Regional Manager at MAX.

Through some extensive

discussions with both gentlemen, I explained the nature
of my study and my desire to interview as broad a
selection of employees as possible within DSC and MAX.
Karl and Tim provided nine participants each; each
respective pool of participants consisted of
individuals with varied positions, responsibilities,
and experience levels.

Ultimately, however, the

solicitation and selection of the employees was the
choice of Karl and Tim, and their choices may have
impacted the results of this study.
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There was also a limitation regarding the duration
of the interviews.

Both Karl and Tim requested that I

limit the interviews to approximately thirty minutes.
They were concerned about each interviewee’s absence
from the day-to-day operations, and the potential
negative impact that might cause the business.

Based

upon that request, I was mindful of the thirty-minute
time limit.

Actual interview times ranged from twenty-

six minutes to forty-six minutes.

This time constraint

may have impacted results.
A final, potential limitation of this study
involves the micro-foundational nature of this
research.

While well documented in the literature, the

call by many scholars for more qualitative studies
devoted to a granular level analysis of actions,
practices, and individuals, may in itself, prove to be
a possible limitation.

Becker and Zirpoli (2008) warn

that if a task chosen for study is too “micro”, the
object of the analysis becomes meaningless and the
analysis itself might become meaningless also.
not believe this to be the case with this study.

I do
The
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common findings across DSC and MAX, shown to be two
extremely different organizations, may serve as proof
and strong support that the five drivers of execution
found in this study may be applicable and generalizable
to other companies.

Suggestions for Future Research
While this study identifies five specific drivers
of execution operating and impacting the performance of
two organizations, these may not be the only drivers to
have such an impact.

Further research should be

devoted to identifying and explaining other potential
drivers of execution.

A few of the interviewees in

this study identified “leadership”, “relationships”,
and “structure” as important factors for getting things
done within DSC and MAX.
additional investigation.

These factors may merit
Also, though the strong

consensus around the five drivers was encouraging, this
study is based on just eighteen interviews.

A new

group of interviewees may identify new and different
drivers of execution.

Additional research is needed to
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confirm the findings of this study and to explore the
possibility of additional drivers of execution.
I agree with the scholars from the various
disciplines identified in the literature review, that
there is a need for more and greater research at the
microfoundational level.

Answering the questions as to

what is execution, how is it measured, and how does it
impact organizational performance, can only be found in
the details of the day-to-day operations of a business.
The progression of the dynamic capability literature is
certainly pointing in this direction.

The findings

from practitioner surveys and the writings in the
business press confirm the very real concern and
critical need to more thoroughly understand the concept
of execution; specifically, how to develop the
capability and successfully deploy it to achieve better
organizational performance and desired business
objectives.
Given the complex nature of the concept
demonstrated in this study, future research should also
look to other disciplines for insight and answers.
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Perhaps human resources, organizational behaviour,
and/or psychology.

There is need to identify and

develop several constructs in order to better define
and more clearly explain some of the drivers in this
study. For example, creating or finding a construct for
the elements of “drive” and “initiative” within
“quality people”.
within psychology?

Do such constructs already exist
If so, could they be adapted and

used to better understand and explain execution within
the context of organizational performance?
for the driver “teamwork and collaboration”:

Similarly,
might a

construct for “collaboration” be found in the human
resource or organizational behaviour disciplines?
Research leading to clearer, better-defined elements,
and the attempt to quantify some of these elements will
prove valuable in furthering our knowledge of execution
and in developing a theory for the concept.

The

complexity of the concept also points to the need for a
multi-disciplinary approach to the research.

New

knowledge and the development of a theory for execution
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may only be achieved by examining these other
disciplines and combining their insights.

Summary
The focus of this qualitative, grounded theory
case study was to better understand how organizations
“get things done”; to understand how they execute their
daily operations in order to achieve their desired
organizational performance and objectives.

Execution

was examined through the perspectives of organizational
routines and capabilities by exploring the experiences
of the individual employees.

The participants of this

study shared the details of their own actions, and the
overall activity within their organizations, relative
to running their businesses and meeting the demands of
their customers.

This detail serves as a body of

evidence showing how specific actions, principles, and
processes contribute to and drive execution.
This research discovered and identified five
“drivers” of execution within the two organizations
studied.

These five drivers were: (1) measurement, (2)
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communication, (3) quality people, (4) autonomy,
flexibility, and nimbleness, and (5) teamwork and
collaboration.

Key results emerged supporting the

individual impact of these drivers, as well as their
combined impact, on execution.
The experiences and insights shared by the
interviewees presented a clear picture of how these
drivers of execution, both individually and combined,
operated within their organizations.
demonstrated and expressed by:

Execution was

driven and engaged

individuals who are self-motivated.

They take

initiative; they take action to solve problems, improve
business operations, and satisfy the demands of their
customers.

An individual’s success frequently depends

upon the help and support of colleagues, so individuals
work in teams and engage in constant collaboration.
Individuals and teams are further supported by an
operating environment that fosters extensive freedom
and autonomy, and a willingness and ability to quickly
respond and adapt to changing business needs.
of these overall efforts to drive performance,

As part
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individuals and teams also continually measure and
evaluate important activity and key results, and they
engage in frequent communication using numerous and
varied methods.
A major goal, and hope, of this study was to find
evidence that would contribute to a better
understanding of the concept of execution, and perhaps
also provide the beginnings of a theory or framework of
analysis to explain the operation of execution within
an organization.

The microfoundational approach of

this study uncovered specific actions and principles
related to execution in action and execution as an
organizational capability.

This data has value for

both scholars and practitioners.

For scholars, the

five drivers identified in this study help to answer
the question found in the literature regarding the gap
between organizational routines and capabilities, and
organizational performance and outcomes.

This research

also contributes new data and extends the work of
recent dynamic capability scholars who are examining
dynamic capabilities at a more granular level of
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analysis.

For the practitioners, this study provides

many concrete examples of actions, activity, and
principles that can be used to improve daily business
operations and drive organizational performance.
Whether from an academic or practitioner
perspective, one of the most important questions and
greatest challenges is to determine, exactly, “how
things get done” in organizations; that is, how well do
businesses execute relative to their organizational
performance and desired outcomes.

Those businesses

that excel at execution most likely possess an
advantage over their competitors, while also increasing
the probabilities of their success and continued
viability in the marketplace.
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Appendix A
Letter of Introduction
University research study exploring the nature of the day-to-day
execution of successful business activities.
Study Title: “Execution: A Catalytic Capability of Firm Performance”
Robert Keimer (the researcher) is a candidate for the degree of Doctor of
Business Administration at the College of Business at the Florida Institute of
Technology. He is interested in conducting a case study within your organization.
The purpose of the study is to better understand how and why some organizations
execute better than others. Specifically, he is looking to discover how
organizations “get things done”; that is, the day-to-day activities that lead to
successful performance.
The research will consist of short interviews with consenting participants. The
nature of the interview questions will relate to the general topic of “how things get
done” within the organization. Participation in the interview process is entirely
voluntary, anonymity is guaranteed, and only the researcher will have access to the
interview responses. Interviewee names will not be used in any report and
interviewees will have the opportunity to review their responses to the interview
questions. Participant confidentiality will be maintained at all times.
Participants are critical for the success of this study. At the end of the
study participants will receive information about successful efforts at
execution, and this may prove beneficial for improving an organization’s
performance. Please direct any questions or requests for additional
information to Robert Keimer at the contact information listed below. Thankyou for your consideration to participate in this study.
Sincerely,

Robert F. Keimer
Instructor of Management
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Nathan M. Bisk College of Business
Florida Institute of Technology
150 West University Blvd.
Melbourne, FL 32901
rkeimer@fit.edu
(O) 321.729.9729
(M) 321.961.8371
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Appendix B
Participant Informed Consent Form
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to
participate in this study. The researcher will answer any questions
before you sign this form.
Study Title: “Execution: A Catalytic Capability of Firm Performance”
Dear Participant:
The following notice invites you to participate in the study listed above.
You are free to decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without
affecting your relationship with your co-workers, managers, or other team
members.
The purpose of the study is to better understand how and why some
organizations execute better than others. Specifically, the study seeks to discover
how organizations “get things done”; that is the day-to-day activities that lead to
successful performance. The research will consist of short interviews with
consenting participants. The nature of the interview questions will relate to the
general topic of “how things get done” within the organization.
Please do not hesitate to contact the researcher with any questions about the
study either before participating or during participation. Your anonymity is
guaranteed. Your name will not be associated with the research findings in any
way, and only the researcher will know your identity as a participant. The
recordings and any related notes will be stored on a password protected memory
disk, and only the researcher will have access to any research data. The audiorecordings and interview transcripts will be stored in a locked, fireproof safe for
five years following the dissertation’s final approval and will be destroyed at that
time.
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this study. After
completion, the researcher will share the study findings with you. The expected
benefits associated with your participation include information about successful
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efforts related to execution and how that may benefit your organization’s future
performance.
Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study:
Dr. Lisa Steelman, IRB Chairperson
150 West University Blvd.
Melbourne, FL 32901
Email: lsteelma@fit.edu Phone: 321.674.8104
Agreement:
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in
the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.
Participant: ___________________________________________ Date: _________________
Principal Investigator: ___________________________________ Date: _________________
Robert F. Keimer
Nathan M. Bisk College of Business
Florida Institute of Technology
rkeimer@fit.edu
(O) 321.729.9729
(M) 321.961.8371
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Appendix C
Interview Protocol
Employee subjects’ participation in the interviews are
voluntary. Employee subjects can cease involvement at
any time during the study with no negative consequences
to their employment.
1.

What is the best way to describe or explain
how things get done around here?

2.

What are the key factors in the
branch’s/practice area’s ability to get
things done around here?

3.

What are the key factors in your ability to
get things done around here?

4.

How do you know if what the branch
team/practice area team is doing is good and
effective?

5.

How do you know if what you are doing is good
and effective?

6.

What indicators do you use to evaluate the
branch team’s/practice area team’s
performance? Your own performance?

7.

How do you go about reviewing those
indicators for the branch/practice area?
often are they typically reviewed?

8.

How

How is performance information communicated
and shared within the branch/practice area?
How frequently?
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9.

Are team meetings used as part of that
communication process? If so, how are the
meetings typically conducted? What are the
typical outcomes of these meetings?

10.

How does the branch/practice area determine
goals and set priorities? What is done to
ensure that the goals and priorities are met?

11.

What is the typical approach to making an
important business decision for the
branch/practice area?

12.

Describe a major decision that was made in
the last 6 months. How did it go? What were
the results?

13.

How are major problems typically handled when
they pop up? How long does it typically take
to solve/resolve a major problem?

14.

How is conflict typically handled within the
branch/practice area?

15.

How do you typically handle conflict when it
arises?

16.

Are there any particular capabilities that
you believe the branch/practice area
possesses that are critical to achieving your
branch/practice area performance objectives?

17.

Are there any routines that stand out in your
mind as having a big impact on performance?

18.

What are the unwritten, informal, “this is
the way we do things around here” guidelines
that people follow? What, if any, impact do
they have on performance?
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Appendix D
Research Themes
Worksheet: The Themes (Research Questions) of the
Multicase Study

These themes indicate primary information about the
Quintain the researcher seeks (Stake, 2006; p. 68).
Theme 1: What, exactly, is execution?

Theme 2: How can execution be measured?

Theme 3: How does the ability to execute impact
organizational performance?
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Appendix E
Journal/Memo (JM) Form
Name: Robert Keimer
Date:
JM #:
Memo:

Notes:

Codes themes emerged:
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Appendix F
Employee Case Report Template (ECR)
Employee Case Report (ECR)
ECR #: __________
Pseudo name: ____________________
Organization (MC/DSC): __________
Position: _______________________
Primary
Responsibilities: 1. _____________

2. _____________

Notes:
Research questions:
1. What, exactly, is execution?
2. How can execution be measured?
3. How does the ability to execute impact
organizational performance?
Quintain as seen at outset:
Notes:
Embedded Case:
Themes and Quotations:
Findings:
Main finding:
Main finding:
Main finding:
Lesser finding:
Lesser finding:
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Lesser finding:
Conclusions:
Quintain newly conceptualized:
Summary:
Transition Defined:
Main finding:
Main finding:
Main finding:
Lesser finding:
Lesser finding:
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Appendix G
Findings Map

Table 1
Findings Map: DSC
Participant

Main Finding:
Measurement

Main Finding:
Communication

Main Finding Main Finding

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Carey

X

X

Nancy

X

X

Quality
People

X

Quality
People

Al

Liam

Amy

Diane

Kevin

Mike

Karen

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Main Finding

Lesser Finding Lesser Finding

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Customer
Quality People Needs

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Customer
Needs

Relationships

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

Reputation

Leadership

X

Quality
People

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Quality
People

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Contracts

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

X

Quality
People

Relationships

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Teamwork &
Collaboration

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

X

Overseeing,
Supervising

Customer
Needs
Accuracy,
Quality
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Appendix G
Findings Map Continued

Table 2
Findings Map: MAX
Participant

Tim

Main Finding:
Measurement

X

Main Finding:
Communication

Main Finding

Main Finding

Main Finding

X

Quality
People

Expectations

Leadership

Roger

X

X

Quality
People

Rose

X

X

Quality
People

Teamwork &
Collaboration
Teamwork &
Collaboration

Leadership

Leadership

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Bill

X

X

Ted

X

X

Quality
People

Dan

X

X

Quality
People
Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Customer Needs Nimbleness

Ed

X

X

Lance

X

X

Quality
People

Customer Needs

Leadership

Teamwork &
Collaboration

X

Structure

Customer
Needs

Customer
Needs

MAX website

Quality
People

X

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness
Customer
Needs

Quality
People

Gerry

Lesser Finding Lesser Finding

Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Leadership
Autonomy,
Flexibility &
Nimbleness

Structure

Customer
Needs
Teamwork &
Collaboration
Teamwork &
Collaboration

Cross Training

